Not impressed. The NYT came out with an article couple of days ago that said much the same thing. So have several other outlets.
Look deeper. The system likes metrics, they're something to show -- usually, they prove little but they satisfy those with an itch for 'meaningful data on which to base decisions.' Or for analysts who want more than well honed instincts...
That .pdf reminded me of a page in a math text book rather than any intel estimate of value I've ever read. Sorry. The net content was summed up in this; "Taliban can hold terrain for limited periods; Allies cannot prevent Taliban attacks." which doesn't pass the "so what" test. It does not because in a nation that size with terrain like that where shifting loyalties are a national sport it is simply logical that should be so. It would not change if there were ten times as many Allied troops there.
Consider the fact that the Joint Staff and CentCom are -- properly -- concerned about the health of the US Defense establishment and their entire AO respectively; they'd both be quite happy to see Afghanistan and Iraq just go away. Based on prior experience, I have no doubt that some in both places are actively fomenting to make that happen (Note that is not an accusation of treason, merely of being over zealous in pursuing their Bosses stated -- or assumed -- goals). So CentCom leaks to the NYT the fact they're 'reviewing' the mission. Given the paper's tilt that immediately is cast as the sky is falling...
At the same time, Gates is pushing NATO for a bigger commitment -- not just more troops but the things like Choppers and support elements that they promised and haven't delivered. So he doesn't object at all to the Times saying things are going downhill -- perhaps that'll tweak NATO a bit. Could even be that the J staff leaked instead of CentCom.
I noted in the Times article a 'military official' spouting gloom is quoted. His location is not stated (deliberately, I'm sure, so we'll asume he's in the 'stan) but I'll bet big bucks he's here in the States and his 'professional' opinion is swayed by a whole lot of factors of which current on the ground knowledge is not one.
Wheels inside of wheels and nothing in war is simple -- nothing in the bureaucracy that is the US DoD is even merely comples -- its generally a bucket of worms. I assure you there's no intent to denigrate you or McCreary, I'm just highly skeptical of a numbers approach in a COIN effort. I thought we'd learned better than that from Viet Nam -- apparently not. Sad.
Bookmarks