Airforce may be be going out of business

[carl]

My conversations with assorted thinking Grunts * indicate they strongly disagree and most -- not all -- would say:

""Also agree about not giving a blank check. But I do think both the F-22 and F35 are critical as is replacement of the transports and tankers.""

The alternative to the capabilities a mature (note that word) F35 will bring is the Army having its own CAS with UAVs and E-4s flying them.

Your choice, Air force...


* Those are the Army types, haven't talked to any Marines on the topic recently but I suspect they feel even more strongly that the F35 should stay (for some strange reason). That's without even addressing the other Nations that have bought into the program and have a right to expect something for their money. I suggest that if the AF wants the air missions required for national defense, it needs ALL the capabilities including the ones it does not like and has consistently tried to ignore over the years...

Both of course would be better, but if the choice had to be made, I would give up the F-35. The Australians are already covering their bet in that regard.

[Ken White]

Both of course would be better, but if the choice had to be made, I would give up the F-35. The Australians are already covering their bet in that regard.

The Australians are less bureaucratic and more focused than we are. They also have a booming economy (right now) and can afford alternatives. The other JSF partners are not so fortunate -- aside from the fact that we said we would do something (a fact the USAF senior leadership in some cases appears to be willing to ignore)...

History is full of similar examples. Army Ground Forces fought tenaciously for the Tank Destroyer concept in WW II in spite of overwhelming evidence form 1940 forward that it was an extremely stupid idea; as late as 1944 they were still wasting money, material and effort developing Tank Destroyers and trying to derail the M26 Tank. They fought mightily to prevent it being deployed in Europe, it took a personal plea from Eisenhower to Marshall to fix that. Criminal malfeasance in my view.

The USAF fought all through the 70-00 period buying enough Transports to fund more than enough fighters; they tried at least twice to dump the A-10. They don't like the F35 because it 'won't do the air superiority mission...' and siphons funds from the F22. Also criminal malfeasance in my view, perhaps even more so as the USAF has fought tenaciously to retain the CAS mission while avoiding until forced to buy the right gear for the job.

Both aircraft are equally necessary; the workhorse F16 is also a '70s design. so's the A-10 -- all of them are going to wear out soon.

The US Army diligently ignored COIN all through that same 70-00 period -- they paid and are paying a price for that. If you want a job, better be prepared to do it and to do it right you need the right tools for those jobs...

Or someone else will take your job.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

I have sat in meetings where the USAF bemoans insufficient funding to recapitalize its fleet yet has no problem “deploying” 2nd Lts to EUCOM in Stuttgart for four months, paying them TDY, billeting them in hotels, providing them rental cars (at €100 per day) under the guise of “QOL,” and providing them two weeks of leave off the books (to recover from an arduous deployment). All at an estimated cost of around $60,000 per. Now while in the grand scheme of things $60K may be a drop in the bucket, multiply that by the thousands of Airmen who “deploy” under similar circumstances. To me it shows a distinct lack of prioritization and resource allocation skill in a service that often places quality of life issues far ahead of mission capabilities. Yet they are "desperate to figure out how to save money."

"For the 30 years during which I covered the military, the pattern was to defend the advanced weaponry while neglecting the inglorious low-tech equipment needed in war. There is no constituency for the cheap and mundane. The military prepares to fight an enemy, however imaginary, that justifies the high-tech equipment it wants — not the unglamorous ragtag militia that is actually out there."

Fred Reed
Washington Times
December 15, 2007

Of the all the services the USAF has a serious techno-crack habit (although the USN is close behind).

[Penta]

I wouldn't call it techno-crack, I'd call it techno-Ketracel White.

See, if not for the continuing march of technology, there'd be minimal reason for the AF to exist as a separate service.

[carl]

The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

[Norfolk]

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

I'm a little confused myself: either Air Mobility Command, or Air Material Command - I think it's the former. I still think in terms of SAC, TAC, MAC, etc.

There is no question that the AF needs to replace most of its aircraft fleet: but with what, and at what cost, and for what roles?

Given that the AF really, really needs mondo muella to do so, I think that now would be a good time to extract some concessions from them in the form of serious reforms and reorganization on their part - including turning CAS and perhaps some other Army-related roles (such as certain tactical transport roles)to the Army - along with the legal right (have to work on Congress here for that) for the Army to have its own fixed-wing aircraft for such purposes. A worthy replacement for the A-10, under Army control, would be nice.

But when the AF has to ground major portions of its F-15 fleet because their wiring is literally rotting away, it's clear that there's not much time left before the AF is turned from the Kings of the Sky into the world's largest collection of Hangar Queens. But this has to be done smart, and the AF will have to have its feet really held to the fire here, both because of its past practices and because all the other services need to replace tons of old and worn-out stuff too.

[Rifleman]

See! See! I knew they were going downhill. Bad things happen once you give up C7 Caribous and A1 Skyraiders.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Norfolk and carl I apologize for my dependency. AMC is Air Mobility Command the successor to MAC, the lowly trash haulers and tankers who do Herculean service in theater. SAC and TAC have combined into Air Combat Command, silk scarved fighter jocks and bomber guys.

The AF is scrambling to redefine itself to deal with LIC/COIN and yet yearns for a conventional conflict with China or a resurgent Russia. They are a bit on the defensive, witness Dunlap et al, who write op eds decrying those with "boots on the ground." They are having an identity crises and often fail to play to the strength of their current relevancy in the AOR: ISR and airlift. Predator and Global Hawk are force multipliers that pay huge dividends in COIN, as they are passive/aggressive platforms. Strategic and theater airlift are the lifeblood for those boots on the ground.

The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

[Ken White]

I agree with your second paragraph but have some questions on the remainder.

. . .
The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

Even allowing for the Air force manipulating the F15 fleet issues for their F22 procurement benefit, the bulk of the fleet is still approaching an age where upgrading is not an option. The real workhorse in your "GWOT" scenario is the F16. even with all the A/B models retired, the C/D fleet median usage is at 4,600 hours out of 8,000 hour life (and some are approaching 6,000 hours). Extensive upgrades to either fleet are not really cost effective.

Ideally, purpose specific platforms would be procured as attempts to go multi mission always impose compromises. Everyone knows that quantity has a qualitative effect. Also ideally, large production runs offering economies of scale would the norm. Unfortunately, in the era of declining budgets we are likely to face, the Air force is going to have to wrestle with those conflicts and produce a solution -- and I'd submit that cancellation of any of their major programs would be a mistake.

The F35 does not offer the fighter capabilities of the F22 -- but it is likely to exceed most anything else out there to include the F15 and F16. It also provides some great CAS and ISR cape that none of those other three offer. Given the time to develop and field new aircraft, it would, I think, be quite wrong to cancel it though the delivery schedule could be stretched a bit and could ramp up if needed. That doesn't even count the allies that are buying it. It isn't going away for those reasons. And it should not.

Same with the F22; right now we are capable of achieving air superiority in most of the world and fairly quickly. That is a capability we should be quite cautious in lessening.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Can you assure us that the GWOT is the only conflict we will face in the next 20 years or so -- because it is toward the end of that time period that the aircraft you seem to wish to retain will be falling apart...

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

Asymmetrical is a buzz word, it means the other guys strikes where you're weak and / or that he's more flexible than you are. The available equipment -- and money -- have little to do with that. That is mind game pure and simple and we're not doing too well at it.

You say the "GWOT" is war of ideals and idealists. Perhaps. I'd be more comfortable if it were a war between dreamers and pragmatists -- with us being the latter. Even one between plots and common sense. Not at all sure we're there yet...

Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

[LawVol]

What is AMC?

AMC is the Air Mobility Command. AFMC is the Air Force Materiel (not material) Command.

AMC has the heavies, the cargo carriers. AFMC (where I am now) does research, testing, development, and evaluation (RTD&E) and acquisitions. It's where we spend all that money that you guys are complaining about us getting!

[SteveMetz]

AMC is the Air Mobility Command.

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

[Ron Humphrey]

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

What ever happened to wind turbine cars

[George L. Singleton]

So...the old hidden agenda...the Army again wants to take over and reinstitute the Army Air Corp as in charge of all flying, short of the Navy/Marine air arm!

We are still amazing parochial, as was the case during the Bill Mitchell days.

[Ken White]

So...the old hidden agenda...the Army again wants to take over and reinstitute the Army Air Corp as in charge of all flying, short of the Navy/Marine air arm!

We are still amazing parochial, as was the case during the Bill Mitchell days.

Of course we are -- human frailty. If there was a huge AAC, then the Infantry and Tankers would fight about who was to control it -- allowing the Aviators to do whatever they wanted...

[George L. Singleton]

IN this grim time of economic collapse, a little early aviation history trivia:

1. In World War I Corporal Bennett Powell Singleton, AEF, 31st Division, in France fighting WW I at age 14 (yes, age 14 and a Corporal) was standing under/near the dog fight between the German Red Baron and Captain Quinton Roosevelt, son of then former President Teddy Roosevelt.

2. Dad went over to the shot down/crashed and burning plane of CPT Roosevelt to try to lend assistance, and managed to drag his body away from the plane, but of course Roosevelt was already dead.

3. A few years later Dad, now a young civilian bookkeeper (accountant) in Washington, DC was in the audience at the Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, AAC court martial.

3. Seated next to Dad, randomly, was a young Navy pioneer aviator, Lt. Arthur Gavin.

4. Leap forward in time to 1954, and at age 15 I was an usher at the wedding of Dad's older sister, Carolyn Singleton (an old maid) to...retired Naval aviator, Rear Admiral Arthur Gavin (a widower). Arthur Gavin thus became the brother in law to my Dad!

Talk about a small, random world!!! Dad and his older sister were from Alabama, Gavin was from Wisconsin.

[carl]

Knowingly buying an airplane that is "good enough" now, assumes that the enemy isn't going to spring a nasty surprise of you in the next 20-30 years. If he does, your "good enough" may quickly turn into Fokker fodder and there won't be anything you can do about it for 5 or 10 years. If you buy something that is vastly superior, then you have some wiggle room.

(I was thinking about bringing up Shermans but Ken beat me to it. Zaloga's recent book about the M-4, Armoured Thunderbolt, was very good.)

I would not count on a potential enemy not being able to train as well or better than we can. Both the Indians and the Chileans have given us surprises in exercises over the years. Also at times during Vietnam, our pilot training standards weren't all that great. If you have a superplane like the F-22, that doesn't make so much difference.

SAM's do well enough if you just want to dissuade the other guy from dropping bombs on your head; but not always, as the Syrian air defense forces can attest. But for us that wouldn't be enough.

For the last several generations, we have gone after the other guy in his backyard. We are the ones who fly over his SAMs, destroy them, then drop bombs on their heads. We destroy his fighters over his airfields so they don't bother us as we go about our business. In order to do this, and to do it for the next bunch of years, I think we need the best we can get.

One thing also that has been brought up before; most of the money has already been spent on the F-22. All the r&d checks have already been cashed so what we spend now is production cost, which isn't as spectacular.

[Ron Humphrey]

One thing also that has been brought up before; most of the money has already been spent on the F-22. All the r&d checks have already been cashed so what we spend now is production cost, which isn't as spectacular.

Since this is the case then whats the major difference in ordering 183 now with guaranteed buy of "blank" later in relation to buying it all at once. I get the ordering in volume is cheaper bit but realistically how fast are these things gonna come off the shelves. If you order today how long would it take to have 200 of them in service and in place?

Not trying to say don't buy em pretty sure I've said before I agree we need to have them, just trying to understand the real reasons for why, when, and how many.

[Entropy]

Since this is the case then whats the major difference in ordering 183 now with guaranteed buy of "blank" later in relation to buying it all at once. I get the ordering in volume is cheaper bit but realistically how fast are these things gonna come off the shelves. If you order today how long would it take to have 200 of them in service and in place?

Not trying to say don't buy em pretty sure I've said before I agree we need to have them, just trying to understand the real reasons for why, when, and how many.

The current rate of production is 20 airframes per year and could be ramped up if need be, though that probably isn't necessary.

[Sparrow]

They say if you do something long enough you witness it's rebirth. You all have remarkable insight into Air force weapon systems. The discussions on the A-10 and A-16 were very interesting.

I also agree with the many comments the Air Force is going though a challanging period of discontent and have lost the confidence of their boss - the Amreican people. I see that as a failure of Gen McPeak.

The Air Force has lost their focus. They need a close air support fighter and yet refuse to rebuild an imporved A-10. The F-16 was not a great ground attack fighter and not the best air-to-air fighter but if you ever had to deploy and need a multi use aircraft it was great.

I still want to bite my nails off when I read how the F22 and F35 are the end all be all. The Air Force should remember the numerous occassions where they threw all of the eggs in one basket. I remember the F-4s - did not have guns because some analyst told them the future would be fought without guns.

For your benefit allow me to describe my perspective. Master Avionics technician, QA inspector for motors and mainframe. I worked F-111, F-16, and F-117A. I have been a 'Gunslinger, Juvat, Bold Tiger, and a member of the GoatSucker Inn. I have since retired and worked servers, network hardware, as a Business Analysis, and dodled into South American terrorism.

I like Ford motor company's suggestion of building a modern mustang with the best of the old school. Beef up the engines, the avionics, and build new airframes. It may look and smell like a mustang but they have their own special identity.

Has it ever occurred to build a new A-10 that was designed around an even better gun with even more powerful engines. Airplanes are like race cars. High performance machines dedicated to taking mankind into another realm. But airplanes like cars can be rebuilt better. Or create a dual engine F-16, update the avionics and vectoring motors and you have a killer.

The worst thing the Air Force could do is only uby one plane from one source. For years we have seen a particular type of aircraft grounded for maintenance issues.

The Air force needs to really assess their missions and that means sitting down with the Army and finding out what are the Army's needs and what type of aircraft they are going to need to address them. I read several federal magazines and I do not see it yet. The Army is the Air Force's customer.

One final note - stealth is an illusion. You can defeat an aircraft using stealth.

The 22 and 35 need much more than stealth to survive. They have a combination of exceptional radar packages, integrated ECM packages, supperior weapons, and advanced engine technology.They need pilots. Drones are invaluable for C4ISR but they have a drawback which I have not seen discussed here. 15, 16, 18, 22, & 35 all have the capability to carry and deploy a tactical nuclear weapon. I turst an officer with this responisbility. Not certain I would trust a SPC.

The Air Force needs to sit down and replan for how to support the Army and the direction they are taking. They need to find and plan for their customer's expectations.