Airforce may be be going out of business

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

I have sat in meetings where the USAF bemoans insufficient funding to recapitalize its fleet yet has no problem “deploying” 2nd Lts to EUCOM in Stuttgart for four months, paying them TDY, billeting them in hotels, providing them rental cars (at €100 per day) under the guise of “QOL,” and providing them two weeks of leave off the books (to recover from an arduous deployment). All at an estimated cost of around $60,000 per. Now while in the grand scheme of things $60K may be a drop in the bucket, multiply that by the thousands of Airmen who “deploy” under similar circumstances. To me it shows a distinct lack of prioritization and resource allocation skill in a service that often places quality of life issues far ahead of mission capabilities. Yet they are "desperate to figure out how to save money."

"For the 30 years during which I covered the military, the pattern was to defend the advanced weaponry while neglecting the inglorious low-tech equipment needed in war. There is no constituency for the cheap and mundane. The military prepares to fight an enemy, however imaginary, that justifies the high-tech equipment it wants — not the unglamorous ragtag militia that is actually out there."

Fred Reed
Washington Times
December 15, 2007

Of the all the services the USAF has a serious techno-crack habit (although the USN is close behind).

[Penta]

I wouldn't call it techno-crack, I'd call it techno-Ketracel White.

See, if not for the continuing march of technology, there'd be minimal reason for the AF to exist as a separate service.

[carl]

The article fails to point out the lion’s share of the USAF load in IZ and AF is borne by AMC. In the world of air dominance the Eagle and Viper are still the premier platforms. Are they old? Certainly. Are they still relevant? Certainly. Should they be replaced? Not by obscenely expensive manned platforms.

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

[Norfolk]

Eagles and Vipers the premier platforms? Maybe, probably not. A well crewed SU-27 derivative is at least as good if not better. But, arguments about which is better don't really matter. Ours are going to fall out of the sky from old age before we can develop an unmanned alternative, so we have to go with what is available now.

Stories of Air Force profligacy won't put airplanes on the ramp. But knowledge of that behavior make it much more painful to spend the money to do so.

What is AMC?

I'm a little confused myself: either Air Mobility Command, or Air Material Command - I think it's the former. I still think in terms of SAC, TAC, MAC, etc.

There is no question that the AF needs to replace most of its aircraft fleet: but with what, and at what cost, and for what roles?

Given that the AF really, really needs mondo muella to do so, I think that now would be a good time to extract some concessions from them in the form of serious reforms and reorganization on their part - including turning CAS and perhaps some other Army-related roles (such as certain tactical transport roles)to the Army - along with the legal right (have to work on Congress here for that) for the Army to have its own fixed-wing aircraft for such purposes. A worthy replacement for the A-10, under Army control, would be nice.

But when the AF has to ground major portions of its F-15 fleet because their wiring is literally rotting away, it's clear that there's not much time left before the AF is turned from the Kings of the Sky into the world's largest collection of Hangar Queens. But this has to be done smart, and the AF will have to have its feet really held to the fire here, both because of its past practices and because all the other services need to replace tons of old and worn-out stuff too.

[Rifleman]

See! See! I knew they were going downhill. Bad things happen once you give up C7 Caribous and A1 Skyraiders.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Norfolk and carl I apologize for my dependency. AMC is Air Mobility Command the successor to MAC, the lowly trash haulers and tankers who do Herculean service in theater. SAC and TAC have combined into Air Combat Command, silk scarved fighter jocks and bomber guys.

The AF is scrambling to redefine itself to deal with LIC/COIN and yet yearns for a conventional conflict with China or a resurgent Russia. They are a bit on the defensive, witness Dunlap et al, who write op eds decrying those with "boots on the ground." They are having an identity crises and often fail to play to the strength of their current relevancy in the AOR: ISR and airlift. Predator and Global Hawk are force multipliers that pay huge dividends in COIN, as they are passive/aggressive platforms. Strategic and theater airlift are the lifeblood for those boots on the ground.

The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

[Ken White]

I agree with your second paragraph but have some questions on the remainder.

. . .
The F-15 and F-16 are both sufficient platforms able to be upgraded to deal with any foreseeable air threat. The F-22 is an outstanding fighter but to what end? And JSF is an expensive proposition as well.

Even allowing for the Air force manipulating the F15 fleet issues for their F22 procurement benefit, the bulk of the fleet is still approaching an age where upgrading is not an option. The real workhorse in your "GWOT" scenario is the F16. even with all the A/B models retired, the C/D fleet median usage is at 4,600 hours out of 8,000 hour life (and some are approaching 6,000 hours). Extensive upgrades to either fleet are not really cost effective.

Ideally, purpose specific platforms would be procured as attempts to go multi mission always impose compromises. Everyone knows that quantity has a qualitative effect. Also ideally, large production runs offering economies of scale would the norm. Unfortunately, in the era of declining budgets we are likely to face, the Air force is going to have to wrestle with those conflicts and produce a solution -- and I'd submit that cancellation of any of their major programs would be a mistake.

The F35 does not offer the fighter capabilities of the F22 -- but it is likely to exceed most anything else out there to include the F15 and F16. It also provides some great CAS and ISR cape that none of those other three offer. Given the time to develop and field new aircraft, it would, I think, be quite wrong to cancel it though the delivery schedule could be stretched a bit and could ramp up if needed. That doesn't even count the allies that are buying it. It isn't going away for those reasons. And it should not.

Same with the F22; right now we are capable of achieving air superiority in most of the world and fairly quickly. That is a capability we should be quite cautious in lessening.

These high tech advancements were important when our primary opponent was the Soviet Union. We had to keep one step ahead in order to drive them into acquisition defeat. But it is time now to wisely spend the shrinking availability of cash. Our addiction to high tech as the ”silver bullet” of solutions is a chimera. The GWOT is a war of ideals and idealists, it is SO/LIC/COIN and PSYOPS in a global context.

Can you assure us that the GWOT is the only conflict we will face in the next 20 years or so -- because it is toward the end of that time period that the aircraft you seem to wish to retain will be falling apart...

Expending ever decreasing allocations of funding to prepare to fight a symmetrical war in the face of the present and near term asymmetrical threat is pure folly.

Asymmetrical is a buzz word, it means the other guys strikes where you're weak and / or that he's more flexible than you are. The available equipment -- and money -- have little to do with that. That is mind game pure and simple and we're not doing too well at it.

You say the "GWOT" is war of ideals and idealists. Perhaps. I'd be more comfortable if it were a war between dreamers and pragmatists -- with us being the latter. Even one between plots and common sense. Not at all sure we're there yet...

Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

[Steve Blair]

Preparing to fight a conventional (not at all the same thing as symmetrical) war as well as we can is one factor that drives opponents to those 'asymmetric' strikes -- which are annoying, even dangerous to an extent but are far from threatening the demise of the Republic. As Global Scout quoted the other day; we can afford to lose a COIN war, we cannot afford to lose a conventional war.

Are you sure you want to give up that deterrent factor?

All true, but I'm becoming more and more wary of giving the AF a blank check to meet its needs. That's been done before, and left us in many cases with a mess. It's always instructive to remember that the AF didn't want the F-16 at first, and we've already gone over their efforts to get rid of the A-10 on multiple occasions.

The more I look at it, the more I really want to strip CAS away from them in total. Let them build F-22s and the next generation manned bomber (and yes, they are looking at one of those), and then mandate that they upgrade and maintain the heavy fleet (tankers, lift, and AWACs). But since the AF as an overall institution has proven very reluctant to actually devote long-term interest and effort to CAS strip it out and give it to the Army and Marines. The Marine air wing system has proven itself over the years..so why not give the Army something similar?

[LawVol]

What is AMC?

AMC is the Air Mobility Command. AFMC is the Air Force Materiel (not material) Command.

AMC has the heavies, the cargo carriers. AFMC (where I am now) does research, testing, development, and evaluation (RTD&E) and acquisitions. It's where we spend all that money that you guys are complaining about us getting!

[SteveMetz]

AMC is the Air Mobility Command.

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

[Ron Humphrey]

So they're the ones who made my first car (a Gremlin)!!

What ever happened to wind turbine cars

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 13 Dec 07: US Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2004-2007

The attached chart summarizes the trends in the US use of airpower in the Iraq and Afghan Wars during 2004-2007. While airpower is scarcely a forgotten dimension of both wars, it is clear that it is playing a steadily more important role over time. The data show a steady rise in air activity, with particularly sharp rises in the case of Afghanistan.

The data for total annual close air support/precision strike (CAS) sorties do not show a dramatic increase for Afghanistan between 2004 and 2007, but doubled in the case of Iraq. It is also the number of such strikes that actually used major munitions, however, that measure combat activity, and these data reflect a dramatic increase in both the use of airpower and the intensity of combat in both wars.

Sharp increases took place in the levels of CAS delivery of major munitions between 2004 and 2007, with very sharp rises between 2006 and 2007. In the case of Afghanistan, the total number of close air support/precision strike sorties flown in that dropped a major munition rose from 86 in 2004, and only 176 in 2005, to 1,770 in 2006 (10-fold annual increase), and 2,926 in 2007 (1.7 times higher as of 5 December). The number of CAS sorties that used a major munition in Iraq increased from 285 in 2004, 404 in 2005, and 229 in 2006, to 1,119 in 2007 (Nearly 5 times higher than in 2006 as of 5 December).....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Jedburgh's stats are telling and CAS has become a more effective tool with the use of PGMs. "Surgical" air strikes are possible. Do the stats also show the number of missions flown by AMC to support both OEF and OIF?

While the fast movers certainly have an important role in LIC/COIN the heavier burden is upon the airlift folks.

Ken, unfortunately my crystal ball is busted...

While I dare not predict the length of the "GWOT" many inside the building are favoring the term "the Long War." IMHO we will be faced with more LIC/COIN scenarios vice conventional ones over the next decade or two. Why? OEF and OIF demonstrated that it is hard to meet us head on in a conventional slug fest. We will win. So our enemies tear a page out of Ho and Giap and cannot help but notice they might do better in a long, exhaustive conflict. Easier to test our political will than our overwhelming firepower.

Both the B-52 and the C-130 have lasted a long time, granted fighters work in a different realm thus requiring a different set of upgrades, but the advances in technology are more in the avionics than in the airframe. The AF needs a cultural paradigm shift, compared to the other services they have a tendency to squander funding on “nice to haves.” Having created some really nice infrastructure in the name of QOL they now spend more O&M to maintain it. Their champagne taste is now funded on a beer budget.

Who is our conventional opponent in the air?

China? They have an air force of some merit but I do not foresee a head on with them. If we tangle with the Chinese I feel it will be by proxy, possibly in Africa, so it will be LIC/COIN.

Russia? Despite Putin’s recent bellicosity, it will take them many years to straighten out their internal problems before they become more than just a regional power.

Iran? After the NIE the strident calls for war have subsided and a convential war against them at this juncture might be unwise.

Who else has the power to challenge us decisively in the air?

Yet we are so enamored with technology. The ABL is one example of a program gone amok, a cash cow for defense contractors but a money pit for the taxpayer. JIEDDO also squandered funding searching for "silver bullet" techno answers, many of which proved to be pipe dreams.

I have no special prescience and realize it is a tough call to posture our military for success in multiple scenarios that involve varying levels of technology.

But I do know those tasked with being the stewards of the citizen’s taxes can do a much better job.