Au contraire, the unclassified version of the NIE was most assuredly intended for public consumption. With this National Survey of the public reaction to it the purpose of the unclassified NIE most assuredly can be assessed as a failure. We'll see come November '08 just how much of a failure.Originally Posted by Rex Brynen
The unclassified portion of the NIE is presumably precisely that--the key judgements of the NIE that could be unclassified with prejudice to means/sources/techniques, or to key US interests.
Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.
A more salient point...
A more salient point would be to note what GlobalSecurity.org has to say, with the acknowledgement that this NIE confirmed the existence of Iranian WMD of the nuclear variety.
With respect to the role of the upcoming election, and the barometer of public perception of the Iranian nuclear threat, I submit the poll posted above is most germane to this issue. To quote one of my favorite columnists:The success of strikes against Iran's WMD facilities requires both tactical and strategic surprise, so there will not be the sort of public rhetorical buildup in the weeks preceeding hostilities, of the sort that preceeded the invasion of Iraq. To the contrary, the Bush Administration will do everything within its power to deceive Iran's leaders into believing that military action is not imminent.
From the same link as above:I think the election results will turn as much on perceptions as reality, and political campaigns are all about creating perceptions, so the campaigning will be highly relevant. Don't get me wrong, there is not always a major disconnect between perception and reality. The electorate will often perceive things as they objectively exist.
This might be the bottom line if the current NIE was in fact politically motivated.4 November 2008
The US presidential election of 2008 is scheduled to occur on November 4, 2008. If the White House judges that military strikes would rally the country around the President and his party, it would argue for timing strikes as little as a week before the election, a pre-planned October Surprise.
Are you certain of that?
In totality, I mean. The Intel community both has leanings and likes synergies...
As I noted above, the unclassified NIE notes within its text that it contains estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions.
This one is assuming nothing but has noted above and will note now that in the text of the unclassified version of the NIE were the objections of the DOE and the NIC to some of the estimates, assessments, key judgements and key assumptions made in the document.Unless one assumes the NIC is full of nefarious, manipulative political ideologues (a view that I reject, knowing several of the primaries) it has no "intent" to influence the 2008 elections.
I'm not sure what the relelvance of this post is. The NIE is not targeted at the GAP (great American public). Its purpose, like any intelligence product, is to answer questions asked by deicsionmakers in order to help inform the decisions that they make.
I earlier tried to make a post about the problem of getting any kind of consensus about the NIE's meaning/truth. However, it was eaten by etherspace. I'll try again now.
Statements are not true in a vacuum. They are true in a complex of a question and an answer. The question itself is framed against a backdrop of presuppostion held by the questioner. If the NIE does not provide an answer to the question asked by the decisionmaker in the context of those presuppostions, then it is neither true nor fals. It is simply irrelevant.
Here's an example. I see a paper on a bulletin board. I ask myself, "Why did someone post that paper on the bulletin board?" I am seeking an answer that provides me with someone'as motivation for putting the paper on the board and have presupposed that it was indeed posted on the board by someone. Now if the answer I get is that the paper lists the hours of operation of the local pizza shop or that no one posted the paper, it just appeared mysteriously by an act of divine providence, I will not have an answer that I accept as true. Neither response answers my question in the context of my presuppostions.
I suspect that this may be why the poll results are so negative. The GAP idn't get its questions answered in a way that accorded with their presupposition, built up since 1978 by the US MSM, that the Iranians are deceitful scoundrels. But, of course, they were not the customer.
As a further point, I think the above analysis (for which I cannot take credit--it comes from R.G Collingwood in his Essay on Philosophical Method and his Essay on Metaphysics) probably explains most of our so-called "intelligence failures." Decisionmakers dismissed the intel they received because it didn't answer their question or did not fit their presuppositions. Then they acted on instinct rather than with reason.
I just plain give up herein
Are we to conclude that your HUMINT is based on a 800-Joe-Delta-Everyday-Civilian's opinion and top that with Global Security ?
How 'bout addressing the issue. What's your fix, Sean ?
Stan,
Regarding HUMINT as pertains to this topic I wrote:
In the very next post to this thread Jedburgh had quoted some text from an LATimes article.We need covert HUMINT in almost every area of intelligence collection. As evidenced by the 2005 and 2007 NIE we desperately need covert HUMINT assets in Iran reporting on core capabilities. No more estimations, assessments, judgements or assumptions - just good solid intelligence data.
I re-submit my response:.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....
Dang, there goes the coveted HUMINT. POOF!
My fix is tied to the necessity of getting well-placed HUMINT to determine the real status of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and go from there.How 'bout addressing the issue. What's your fix, Sean ?
Bottom line: The enfranchised American public will elect the next chief executive decisionmaker and those who control the funding of the national policy the IC attempts to guide through their product.
Last edited by Sean Osborne; 12-18-2007 at 08:01 PM.
One of our main allies in the Middle East also had objections to the current NIE. Those objections resulted in an "unusual visit" to Israel by C-JCS Admiral Mike Mullen on Monday, 10 December.
According to a report published the next day by the New York Times:
The LA Times also reported on that day what Admiral Mullen told his Israeli hosts:Israeli intelligence estimates say Iran stopped all its nuclear weapons activities for a time in 2003, nervous after the American invasion of Iraq, but then resumed those activities in 2005, accelerating enrichment and ballistic missile development and constructing a 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor in Arak that could produce plutonium.
The Jerusalem Post also published a report that included a significant detail from the Israeli perspective:Mullen said after the meetings that both Barak and Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, the new head of the Israeli defense staff, expressed a desire to work with the U.S. on analyzing American intelligence on the Iranian program.
Mullen said he expressed similar U.S. concerns about the enrichment program, calling it the "center of gravity" of the Iranian program that needs to be stopped with the help of international pressure.
He also reiterated American views that Iran continues to mislead nuclear regulators about the extent and intentions of its program.
"I wanted to reassure them that I still consider Iran a threat," Mullen said in an interview with The Times aboard his aircraft.
"Their hegemonic views, their regime's rhetoric, still speaking to the elimination of Israel, is all very disturbing to me. I intended to leave the impression with them that I wasn't taking my eye off the mark."
Question: If the US NIE is accurate and Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and had not re-started it as of mid-2007, how can Iran be capable of manufacturing a weapon in about two years time?During their meetings, Mullen and Ashkenazi discussed the Iranian threat. Israel believes Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon and will be ready to manufacture such a device as early as the end of 2009.
The unclassified NIE states on its last page the basis of the US and Israeli differences:
The details regarding these differences would appear to exist in the classified version of the NIE.We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
I think Stan wanted a solution not some other opinion about the current state of play vis-a-vis Iranian nuke weapons development, which is what you have now posted twice.
I doubt very seriously that the majority of the American electorate will have sufficient longevity of memory to harken back to this NIE as a major issue when they step into the voting booth next November. I suspect that votes will be cast primarily for that Presidential candidate who makes the "biggest and bestest" promises to improve average citizens' creature comforts by allowing them to have as much discretionary use of their paychecks as possible.
As to the election of those who control the budget (the Congress)--the incumbents will generally get re-elected unless they happen to do something viewed as particularly heinous by their constituents. Congressional elections are not won and lost over intel estimates--Tip O'Neil' saying that all politics are local is particularly right when it come to Congressional elections. Incumbency and bringing home the bacon, AKA pork, of government funded activities are generally pretty huge. (How about that $1Million earmark for a Woodstock museum?) What else explains the continuance in office of folks like Ted Kennedy? Now, if the case could be made that this NIE causes a lot of Congressional districts to lose a lot of Federal money, voters might have something to consider. I wish you good luck making that argument stick.
By the way, in my experience the IC does not try to guide national policy with its products. When asked to do so, it tries to provide advice and information to those who create and implement national policy. Please do not confuse intelligence dilettantes who worked in cabinet positions with the true intelligence professionals of the IC.
Sorry wm. I fixed it.
I think you are correct. We'll have to wait and see what real-world event(s) occur between now and then which might bring this NIE back into the spotlight it now has.I doubt very seriously that the majority of the American electorate will have sufficient longevity of memory to harken back to this NIE as a major issue when they step into the voting booth next November. I suspect that votes will be cast primarily for that Presidential candidate who makes the "biggest and bestest" promises to improve average citizens' creature comforts by allowing them to have as much discretionary use of their paychecks as possible.
I was attempting to nut-shell in a sentence what is stated in the NIE:By the way, in my experience the IC does not try to guide national policy with its products. When asked to do so, it tries to provide advice and information to those who create and implement national policy.
NIE says "help" and I wrote "guide". The Intelligence Community product is a guiding light for national policy.National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
Last edited by Sean Osborne; 12-18-2007 at 08:16 PM.
Sean, the unclas version here is slightly different from your quote.
Condensing quotes is misleading and should be avoided.• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
Thanks for the quick fix !
Correct me if wrong herein, but covert intel from in-country would be performed by whom ? As I opined in my previous post, I doubt we have intel types with degrees in nuclear physics, and now is certainly not the time for more sneaky Sierra. They already don't trust us, and now we slip a few rocket scientists..wanna be..spies in with beards speaking arabic ?
Last edited by Jedburgh; 12-18-2007 at 09:42 PM.
Stan,
I was being specific with respect to the 2009 date ("about two years time") and how the US and Israeli estimates currently judge/assign confidences to the Iranian nuke weapons capability or lack thereof.
I apologize for misunderstanding what you had asked.
A guess - someone of similar insider access as Iran's former deputy defense minister and most recent defector Gen. Ali Reza Asghari? I was just engaged in some wishful thinking recently that with his defection he might have given the US or a closely allied intel agency someone else inside the Iranian nuke program as a potential POC/HUMINT source to pursue/exploit? Hope so.Correct me if wrong herein, but covert intel from in-country would be performed by whom ?
Last edited by Jedburgh; 12-18-2007 at 09:42 PM.
I've now read the pdf three times and cannot understand why the 2009 date is even remotely significant. I can see and appreciate why Israel would have a differing view, as they sit on the border. I have no doubt they have some serious concerns, but that should not influence hard intel.
F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
Last edited by Stan; 12-18-2007 at 09:27 PM. Reason: Added the red ink for blind folks
Stan,
It has to do with what our unclassifed NIE specifically states about that year and what the Israeli intel assessment says about that year regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Maybe I should also bring to this 'table' what the French, British and Italian intel folks have to say on the matter of this NIE.
(Hmmmm, that sounds like a great idea to me at this point... broaden the scope of this thread to include other foreign intelligence assessments on the same Iranian nuclear weapons program as referenced in this current NIE!)
Actually Israel lies a significant number of miles west-southwest of the Iranian border with Iraq, and come to think of it, west of Jordan and southwest of Syria. The distance is nothing a theater ballistic missile like the Shahab-3/4, BM-25 or Kh-55 cruise missile can't handle though.I can see and appreciate why Israel would have a differing view, as they sit on the border.
There is NOTHING relating to "hard intel" with respect to the unclassified NIE. Sources and methods are thoroughly protected/sageguarded through the declassification process of the estimate by DNI, et al. More to the point, there's nothing about the words "estimate" or "assessment" or "judgement" or "assumption" even remotely related to "hard intelligence". Hard intelligence is what vetted, viable HUMINT is supposed to provide.I have no doubt they have some serious concerns, but that should not influence hard intel.
Yes, it is probably high time and logical at this point to bring into this discussion what the somewhat divergent intelligence assessments of our NATO allies on the Iranian nuclear weapons program have to say in order to add some distance from the politically charged nature of purely American opinion.
Last edited by Sean Osborne; 12-19-2007 at 03:22 AM.
Do I understand you to say that no HUMINT intelligence contributes to any of the sources used to write an NIE, Sean? That really isn't what you mean't to say, is it?
Why?
Why do that-- it's broadly irrelevant in any case. Sure. the Unclas version of NIE was tailored for a purpose; so what? It's been released, the good and bad intended has been done and isn't going to be undone and all that's being accomplished here, it seems to me is the flaying of a dead Jackass for no good reason.
I don't think it's near big enough to rise to Horse status.
We've been playing silly games with Iran since 1979 and are likely to continue to do so for a good many years. They don't mean us well (some of them, not all) and they do odd things on occasion but they aren't stupid.
Much ado about nothing.
Sean,
While I understand that the NIE utilizes many sources when developing their products, I didn't draw the same conclusion (that Israel's contribution was the overall impetus). I'll assume you're going to invite these fine folks to join the SWC and participate.
Thanks for the geography lesson. I think you know what I was saying
We already have many distinguised SWC members from every corner of the world (including NATO members), and some have in fact posted on this very thread.
Roy Gutman's OpEd in yesterdays Post-Bulletin (Rochester, Minnesota) had a rather unique conclusion regarding the NIE, Iran and HUMINT.
U.S. intelligence can be spectacularly right -- or wrong
This brings us to Iran. The Bush administration could have deduced months ago that Iran had no active nuclear weapons program. The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency reached that conclusion by talking with Iranian officials, sending in inspectors and verifying the facts.
Under the mullahs, Iran is a notoriously difficult country for recruiting top-level spies. True, there are phone intercepts, satellite images and walk-in defectors. But human, on-the-ground contact is best facilitated by having an embassy, full diplomatic relations and a program of exchanges and visits. The IAEA did that. While an IAEA inspection regime is not infallible, it is, when supplemented by intelligence (and journalism), the most plausible way to monitor any threat from Iran.
Reporters and the public ought to view intelligence findings and National Intelligence Estimates as a starting point for an investigation rather than the conclusion to it. Until we can examine the sources and methods on which such findings are based and understand the context in which those sources are operating, we should treat such pronouncements with caution.
No More Slam Dunks: A reality-based assessment of Iran’s nuclear capability, by Philip Giraldi. The American Conservative, January 14, 2008.
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