Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If you have access you may see relevant studies at the CALL gateway. That is the best I can offer.
IDF operations against Hizballah had a host of problems, not all of which were due to fixation on effects based operations as applied through aerial means.
Many of the problems on the ground were due to poor warfighting skills--some say due to degradation brought about by fixation on operations on the West Bank and Gaza. That may be partially the case; some of the problems sounded very much like what I saw in southern Lebanon in 1987 and harken back to similar issues dating back to the 56, 67, and 73 Wars.
best
Tom
Is this the targeting cycle?
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp.../3-56_1ch4.htm
Isn't that pure EBO? How is effects based thinking different from EBO? Really, I'm here to learn.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, not at all. Targeting is just one step in the EBO process, however it is the one that people usually jump to. This leads to the targeting only mentality which is where you get the everything is a target so let's just blow it up type thinking (Your IDF Paper Example) which can be a disaster. There is a paper from Hurricane Katrina I am goinng to post (when I can find it) about how EBO was used in the Military response to Hurricane Katrina. Later Slap
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