Agreed on stove pipes. I wrote a piece called "rumors of war" that centered on the tensions in the region as a whole but emphasizing Iraq and Iraqi efforts to field its SCUDs in the west against Israel. I got called on the carpet and dressed down by a 2-star who told me he could not imagine war in the ME for the next five years. His boss was the 3 star who had removed Iraq from the threat list. 6 months after castigating me for the warning piece, the 2 star was in the desert. Funny how often analysts get "shut the F%$& up" later get told we had "failed".Originally Posted by Ken White
You and others caught the signs. Your Boss and other's of his ilk ignored the signs through IMO ego and hubris; the net result is that we were unprepared thus my "...was not foreseen, it should have been..." As usual, the working guys got it right and the Flags screwed it up.
I know one guy who postulated it in DC early in the spring of '90 but was told it was "not in our lane" by his Boss. Stovepiping and excessive concern for turf is stupid.
Regards,
Ken
Indeed after Desert Storm, the 3 star wanted an AAR on how we had failed; my immediate boss was an O6 who put that on the table and asked for a response. I told him that "we" had not missed anything and laid my warning article on the table in front of him. He told me I was going to have to come off of that position. I told him then he had all the input he was going to get from me on the subject. somehow the AAR never got done..
On reading each other, I really like the JFCOM's report on how the Iraqis read us and how we read them. Saddam really thought we would strike hard when the Iraqi Exocet missile hit our ship in the tanker war. Of course we did not and one can look at interpretations and misinterpretations as a cascade of steps and misteps. Funny though, I would have to say that the Kuwaitis really the worst at understanding their neighbor to the north. They mistakenly believed that they could keep buying him off when he only got hungrier after each feeding.
But back to the thread, I agree that we should not be hasty in surrendering the edge we have in airpower. We are unlikely to ever develop a crystal ball in foreseeing future threats. Even when we get it right at certain levels, the "shut the F#$%k up" syndrome kicks in hard when such warnings butt heads with senior-level agendas. A good friend of mine and I debated via Parameters about the likelihood of large scale armor formations ever charging across another desert after Desert Storm. His position was that such warfare was as outdated as lancers at the Battle of Omdurman. Mine was simply one should never say never. He was pushing for recognition that such warfare was more exception and that we should train for other forms of warfare. Twelve years later we had large armor formations charging north and then we (again) learned there are other ways to fight a war.
In this debate on air forces, we are really talking roles and missions. I believe we are at least 10 years past the due date for another Key West conference. We should have held that conference before we (generic) started crowing about transformation. I attribute the failure to hold such a conference as very much tied to the creation of JFCOM and its own evolution in roles and missions. I still hope that we will hold a come to Jesus meeting on roles and missions because our shortfalls in aging and worn out equipment are increasingly affecting our capabilities to perform them.
Long winded ramble, hopefully of some value
Best
Tom
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