Distiller,

Take this with a grain of salt, since I readily confess to being branch biased. I think most people are biased though. Sometimes it comes down to which bias is the best bias to be biased with.

Moving on.....

I fail to see how air assault and airlanding operations are any safer than a parachute assault if a SAM threat is present. Either way you've got troops in an aircraft flying through a SAM threat.

Sure, transport aircraft are vulnerable to SAMs; and ships are vulnerable to anti-ship missiles; and tanks are vulnerable to anti-tank missiles; and convoys are vulnerable to IEDs and RPGs; and troops are vulnerable to small arms fire.....

Even if SAMs are not present airlanding operations are not without problems: bottleneck comes to mind, and aircraft make a big targets for guerrillas with RPGs while unloading on the ground. Also, I think the Germans lost a lost of Ju52s at Maleme airfield on Crete due to beginning airlanding operations too soon.

All things considered, if the operation requires moving large numbers of troops long distances by fixed wing aircraft I think it makes sense to drop at least a brigade combat team before beginning airlanding operations.

Consider this: Point Salinas airstrip in Grenada was a cluster; Panama, while not without mistakes, generally went a lot smoother. In Panama the Army parachuted a reinforced brigade combat team from the 82nd and three Ranger Battalions; six infantry battalions, plus support. It made for a rapid build up of combat power.

I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?