Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom
I must confess that I am a past and current practioner of what the MI community would consider to be "voodoo intelligence". That is to say that I believed....that I had an obligation to tell the old man WHAT I thought the enemy was going to do rather than list capabilities (or possibilities) as MI doctrinally trained to do. You know the drill: the enemy has the capability to attack, he can defend, or he can go home or whatever alternatives you can list. I do not believe that selecting a "most likely" course of action answers the mail because it is too pro forma.
I wouldn't call that "voodoo intelligence". Its good solid practice, although it may divert a bit from doctrine. At the schoolhouse the rational aspect of threat decision making for COA analysis is pretty much all that is taught. However, as you clearly understand, the cultural and emotional aspects are just as - and sometimes more - important when attempting to determine a potential threat COA. Especially in the unconventional threat spectrum. The logic of the rational aspect of decision modeling in COA analysis is also its weakness. It is simply too easy to fall into the trap of mirror-imaging.

The shortcomings you mentioned in training and professional development for the intel field have to be addressed in order to effectively meet the demands of the current operational environment. From the enlisted point of view, NCOs tend to stay in a single position longer than officers, which is a definite plus. However NCO's opportunities for intelligence professional development do not equal the operational demands placed upon them.