An Airborne Expeditionary Unit?

[Ken White]

Ken, I normally agree with a lot of the things you post but I have to say that I totally disagree with you on this one. First of all, cutting the funding and resourcing of the three Ranger Battalions and redistributing it to rest of the infantry battalions isn't going to make that much of a difference and it is just going to dilute those resources.

Possibly different perspectives at work here; I retired with 27 years 2 years after 1st Batt formed so all the things they were supposed to do for over 25 years of my time in, the two less well resourced and trained Abn Divs provided the muscle for -- acceptably, I believe.

... Second, some of the assets and equipment that the Ranger Battalions have is only available in finite amounts so you are either left with diluting it to uselessness or going back to concentrating it into a few chosen units.

True and as I mentioned, that was one of the prime drivers in their formation. Some of the stuff they have for the msn of a few years ago isn't getting much use now, is it?

My experience with mechanical stuff is that if you don't use it tends to break down...

The non-mechanical stuff? Most, not all, of that is already in most infantry units, is it not?

...Third, the Ranger Battalions have one thing that will always give them an advantage, let's call it exclusivity for lack of a better word. To be in the Ranger Battalions you have to pass Basic, AIT, Airborne, RIP and still maintain an extremely high standard each and every day. To be in a regular infantry battalion you have to pass Basic, AIT and not be convicted of a felony. In the Ranger Battalions if you have a weak link then you get rid of him, period. In the regular infantry, if you have weak link then you have a weak link. If it is a Joe you will eat up hours and hours with counseling, retraining, "rehabilitative transfers," nonjudicial punishment, more counseling, multiple trips to JAG and finally, if you are lucky you can chapter him out or push him to S and T platoon. If it is an NCO then you might be able to get him pushed to a staff job but more often then not you will just have to work around him. I was in the infantry for seven years before joining the Special Forces. There are a lot or really good guys in the regular infantry who would probably do well in the Ranger Battalions but there are also a lot who would never make it and I am not just talking about the sh*tbags who need to be booted out, I am talking about otherwise good guys who are just not quite up to Ranger Battalion standards. In Ranger Battalion you don't have the guys who just joined for the college money or because 11B happened to have the best bonus. You don't have the guys who discovered that joining the Army was a bad idea for them and they are now just riding out their time. You don't get the guys who can quote verbatim from AR670-1 and always have perfect uniforms but couldn't lead fat people to a doughnut shop. Most of those guys will never even try to go to Batt and those that do either won't make it or won't last long.

All true. You take what the pipeline provides and you train it and make it work. It ain't easy, it's often a pain -- but anyone who spends excess time with his slugs instead of training his good people is not doing it right IMO. Been there, done that -- and in my recollection it was not as bad as you seem to recall. I'd also suggest that easily getting rid of problem children is an easy way to be 'elite.' Nobody ever said leadership was easy...

We are still not training Infantrymen properly or adequately and, last time I knew, both BNOC and ANCOC were pretty sad. My contention is that Infantry Battalions are now better trained than they ever have been -- but we can still do better; that's all.

... One of the SOF truths is that "You cannot mass produce SF." This is absolutely true....

True -- and if you'll recall, I've said that here a couple of times. Nor do I suggest that SF doesn't need to exist.

...You cannot bring everyone up to the same standard as the elite few. If you were to try to bring up all the infantry battalions to the same standards as the Rangers, ignoring the resource shortfalls, you are still going to find that either A) you weed out your units to the point where they are seriously undermanned or B) you will have to lower the standard. I know that it sounds like I am bagging on the regular infantry but I am not. I believe that our light infantry is the best in the world but that does not mean that they all can be as elite as the Rangers.

I don't believe I said that they could be as 'elite' as the Rangers; I did say that IMO, the Regiment was unnecessary (and that is partly based on today's missions) -- I don't think those two things are quite the same thing. There is such a thing as over training -- and also overkill...

Best is the enemy of good enough (as the old saying goes...).

No, NO, NO, hell no, *$#@ NO. You do that and Group will be gutted and misused and its budget and resources raided. The mistrust and outright animosity by many big Army commanders is palpable. Ask any SF guy who joined SF out of the 82nd how he was treated after he informed his chain of command that he was going to selection and you will probably hear a story reminicent of how lepers used to be treated. Having said that, SOCOM is not ideal either, dominated as it is by JSOC guys but it is better than the alternative.

SFC W

Hmm. Don't recollect the 77th having much problem with that back in my day. Biggest bitch was having to wear Unassigned brass and having Teal Blue Guidons...

And the Beret, didn't have that then either. Long before Bill Ruddy got to put his on JFK's grave..

I'm fully aware of how the Smoke Bomb Hill and Gela Street view each other, lived on both. Gruber Road does not connect them, nor does Ardennes...

You can ask anyone who's ever left the Eighty Twice for a potentially greener pasture (no pun intended) anywhere aside from SF and that attitude's pretty much the same. You can also ask anyone who left Group of his own volition how he was treated when he announced that he wanted to leave...

I'm also aware of the number of Big Army Gen-Gens who mightily distrust SF; been that way probably back to the time of the Pharoahs. Fortunately, there are always a few smart guys around who control the dumb ones. That antipathy existed back in the day but rarely hampered ops and on the odd occasion when it did, briefly, it got fixed quickly.

As you know, there are also people in the Groups who totally despise the rest of the Army and are not shy about flinging their beret in everyone's face.

Some fault on both sides there, I suspect. Used to be, anyway.

I don't have any hard and fast concerns over it but I do believe that ID and UW are Army and not SOC missions. Aside from the potential budget and staffing issues, I imagine SOCOM if honest would say the same thing -- therein, I think, lies your problem, the JSOC mode will generally win and IMO, SF will lose in the long run; hope I'm wrong. We'll see...

[Uboat509]

All true. You take what the pipeline provides and you train it and make it work. It ain't easy, it's often a pain -- but anyone who spends excess time with his slugs instead of training his good people is not doing it right IMO. Been there, done that -- and in my recollection it was not as bad as you seem to recall. I'd also suggest that easily getting rid of problem children is an easy way to be 'elite.' Nobody ever said leadership was easy...

We are still not training Infantrymen properly or adequately and, last time I knew, both BNOC and ANCOC were pretty sad. My contention is that Infantry Battalions are now better trained than they ever have been -- but we can still do better; that's all..

This is why we have the finest infantry in the world, but you are correct. They could absolutely be better.

True -- and if you'll recall, I've said that here a couple of times. Nor do I suggest that SF doesn't need to exist..

I actually meant that as it applies to Rangers as well.

I don't believe I said that they could be as 'elite' as the Rangers; I did say that IMO, the Regiment was unnecessary (and that is partly based on today's missions) -- I don't think those two things are quite the same thing. There is such a thing as over training -- and also overkill...

Best is the enemy of good enough (as the old saying goes...)....

Fair enough but I still maintain that the Rangers perform a specific mission set that requires a higher level of skill and training than is possible in a regular Army formation.

Hmm. Don't recollect the 77th having much problem with that back in my day. Biggest bitch was having to wear Unassigned brass and having Teal Blue Guidons...

And the Beret, didn't have that then either. Long before Bill Ruddy got to put his on JFK's grave..

I'm fully aware of how the Smoke Bomb Hill and Gela Street view each other, lived on both. Gruber Road does not connect them, nor does Ardennes... ...

I am only 36 so I will have to take your word for that

You can ask anyone who's ever left the Eighty Twice for a potentially greener pasture (no pun intended) anywhere aside from SF and that attitude's pretty much the same. You can also ask anyone who left Group of his own volition how he was treated when he announced that he wanted to leave......

I haven't honestly seen that attitude much in group but then not many leave either.

I'm also aware of the number of Big Army Gen-Gens who mightily distrust SF; been that way probably back to the time of the Pharoahs. Fortunately, there are always a few smart guys around who control the dumb ones. That antipathy existed back in the day but rarely hampered ops and on the odd occasion when it did, briefly, it got fixed quickly.....

My issue is not so much with the GOs who are haters. I don't deal often with them, that is why we have 18As. My issue is with the field grade officers who are haters. My experience during my last trip was that working for or around big Army is a huge pain in the ass. It got really old, dealing with all the friction.

As you know, there are also people in the Groups who totally despise the rest of the Army and are not shy about flinging their beret in everyone's face....

Sadly true.

Some fault on both sides there, I suspect. Used to be, anyway.

I don't have any hard and fast concerns over it but I do believe that ID and UW are Army and not SOC missions. Aside from the potential budget and staffing issues, I imagine SOCOM if honest would say the same thing -- therein, I think, lies your problem, the JSOC mode will generally win and IMO, SF will lose in the long run; hope I'm wrong. We'll see...

We will have to disagree on this one as well. I don't think that DA is the only SOC mission, or even the most important one. It just happens to be the most sexy. Big Army doesn't do UW at all and only does FID when forced to do so. There are a lot of things that we do these days that need to stay on the SOCOM side of the house.

SFC W

[Ken White]

This is why we have the finest infantry in the world, but you are correct. They could absolutely be better.

Amen!

Fair enough but I still maintain that the Rangers perform a specific mission set that requires a higher level of skill and training than is possible in a regular Army formation.

I'm out, clearance long gone but my understanding is the former primary mission has gone back to where it was long ago and the new mission as I understand it I don't think is beyond a decently trained light infantry unit. Still, probably more than enough said on the subject and we can disagree a bit.

I am only 36 so I will have to take your word for that

It is not nice to brag...

My issue is not so much with the GOs who are haters. I don't deal often with them, that is why we have 18As. My issue is with the field grade officers who are haters. My experience during my last trip was that working for or around big Army is a huge pain in the ass. It got really old, dealing with all the friction.

Hear that, best solution I found was to ignore most of it and them and take subversive steps to lessen contact; exercise that old Group innovation quotient...

We will have to disagree on this one as well. I don't think that DA is the only SOC mission, or even the most important one. It just happens to be the most sexy. Big Army doesn't do UW at all and only does FID when forced to do so...

I'm not totally sure I agree with ID and UW being a SOCOM mission -- and I base that primarily on pure numbers required versus likely numbers available in some scenarios (Iraq being one) AND in some cases and some senses wasting a Cadillac to do a Ford job...

You might give those two factors some thought. I do agree that the Army doesn't want to do ID or UW (either... ); to my mind the question isn't who wants to do what but how the nation is likely to be best served.

...There are a lot of things that we do these days that need to stay on the SOCOM side of the house.

SFC W

I know and I know what some of those are. There a couple that I don't think Group should be doing; Strat Recon for example is highly specialized and requires a special breed of cat. So does UW and the two are not similar missions. A really good guy can do both; problem is that even in the Groups, everyone isn't a really good guy...

I'm just questioning whether what we're doing is the best solution. Having done most of those missions for real, I'm not convinced we're being all that smart about the allocations. Still, that's just my opinion and I certainly don't expect many to agree with me, much less everyone.

[Distiller]

Somewhere further up there was the notion that aerial supply can be with commercial freighters, and the Berlin air lift also came up.

Uh, hello! If you can fly in with a commerical transporter, you don't need a lot of combat troops for the operation. Certainly not a "Airborne Expeditionary Unit".

And Berlin airlift was a non-contestetd ops. These days you could that with the CRAF.

No, the question is how to supply an air mobile unit after air drop.
Assuming that you can't drop them over the target, but only right outside the red zone, they have to have some motorisation/mechanization. At that moment the tonmile requirements explode.

And if you can drop them right OVER the target, then it's probably some sort of more-or-less unopposed grab-the-airstrip action. Secure the objective, wait for the C-17s to arrive. Not a big logistic challenge.

We did the numbers back then for Eurocorps and then the EU Battlegroups, and quite simply, even for a few hundred kilometers away from homebase (like accross the Med, or into Caucasus), there were not enough transporters in all of EU-land to sustain even a brigade sized mechanized combined arms formation purely from the air. No secret.

A dash-grab-and-hold (for some time) is possible. Exactly what the Soviets had planned for, btw. Against HQ, SAM sites, missiles launch areas, &c. Possible but suicide. None of these troops were expected to be welcomed back on Red Square.

[Norfolk]

Spinning off some of the ideas on the Gavin's Paratroopers thread back to this one, Rifleman (drawing on Mike Sparks) and Wilf raise some pretty important points for the potential employment of Airborne Forces.

Rifleman's reminder of Spark's proposal to mechanize (when and where appropriate) one of an Airborne Infantry Battalion's rifle companies and Wilf's thoughts on the CVR(T) in support of Abn Inf Bns form an outline of one possible way to maximize agility>surprise>shock effect during Airborne Operations. And right from the beginning, when it counts most and success or failure is immediately in the balance. While the M-113 doesn't really appeal to me, and I have doubts about the CVR(T) series (Spartan is the APC version, isn't it?), the CVR(T) may provide a most useful starting point for considering the role and types of armoured vehicles that might be useful in Airborne ops. The Scorpion CVR(T) light tanks rendered surprisingly useful service in the Falkands during a sustained land campaign, and the CVR(T) possess the added advantage of being able to be underslung some heavy-lift helicopters for short-length hauls. Scorprion of course possessed a 76mm that fired HESH - good for close support - as well as others, and Scimitar of course had a 30mm.

Drawing on these musings, might an Airborne Expeditionary Unit profit considerably (rather than only marginally) by the possession of an organic light tank platoon as well as sufficient light APCs to mechanize a Rifle Coy, if and when deemed necessary, particularly during Airfield seizures in HIC or sustained campaigning in LIC/MIC?

[reed11b]

If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures. I feel it is more important to be capable when you arrive, then to arrive quickly. Want expiditionary warfare? Buy sealift, not planes. Intelligent unit sizing and rotational readyness would do more for our ability to quickly project force globaly then light airborne armor would.
Reed

[William F. Owen]

If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures.
Reed

Concur. - unless you believe that there have been more successful airborne operations that amphibious ones!! - some poor folk do!

Drawing on these musings, might an Airborne Expeditionary Unit profit considerably (rather than only marginally) by the possession of an organic light tank platoon as well as sufficient light APCs to mechanize a Rifle Coy, if and when deemed necessary, particularly during Airfield seizures in HIC or sustained campaigning in LIC/MIC?

CVR-T had/has massive limitations. Main armament was never stabilised and the levels of protection were near non-existent. It is a 1969 design, and has an aluminium hull. There is a version with a 90mm gun, but carries less than 20 rounds and (IIRC) can only fire while halted! - an assault gun?

Stormer however is the 1997 version and a very capable beast. - and it could be more capable. - however the world is currently set against <20 tonne tracked APCs or AFVs for a whole raft of silly reasons.

Partial mechanisation is a valid and respectable solution especially for COIN/LIC. However armies generally want to keep this quiet in case the accountants try and make it "the solution" versus "a solution."

[TT]

Reed posted: If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures. I feel it is more important to be capable when you arrive, then to arrive quickly. Want expiditionary warfare? Buy sealift, not planes. Intelligent unit sizing and rotational readyness would do more for our ability to quickly project force globaly then light airborne armor would.

I have been following this thread with some interest.

Your post, Reed, captures the issue that the Army seeming has been grappling with since 1991/2 very well (and it touches on an important issue related to my research on mil change in the US Army). It does relate at least obliquely to the thread, but if this is well off topic, my apologies.

The issue is/was that the US Army found itself in the 1990s, to use my irreverent colloquialism, ‘too light to fight, too fat to fly’, and this has been a driving concern – if not always obvious - since the first Gulf War behind the movement towards the Objective/Future force concept and, to a lesser extent, Modularization.

As everyone remembers, the US' initial 'rapid response' to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait was to deploy the 82nd Airborne to Saudi and there was concern at the time that should the 3 Iraqi divisions on the Kuwait/Saudi border drive south that the 82nd Airborne would be little more than a ‘speed bump’. (As an ignorant outsider this seemed a bit of an overstatement to me - think airpower support but then I am easily ). By contrast, to deploy armour divisions took many months, until Oct 91 for a ‘defensive’ force and Feb/March for an offensive force. Gen Sullivan (and others ) recognized that the US was moving into an era of expeditionary ops and was concerned about the future role of the Army due to this problem. So he instigated a process of thinking through how deal with it (and other issues) through the New Louisiana Maneuvers Experiments and then the Army After Next concept studies (and the Force XXI plays at the margins vice C2 for smaller sized units that the AAN was playing with conceptually).

The same problem emerges in Kosovo. Reportedly, the US considered inserting the 82nd Airborne into Kosovo very early but decided against doing so out of concern that the Serb military would go after them with deadly consequences for the 82nd (too light…) In contrast – again – was Task Force Hawk which demonstrated again the logistics/deployability problem (too fat...). TF Hawk was embarrassing for the Army and of course spurred Gen. Shinseki to take the bull by the horns and start the process of developing the Objective/Future force with its very tight deadlines for deployment into theatre and for combat readiness once on the ground (essentially arrive combat ready and capable). In other words, to be irreverent again, the FCS is supposed to be ‘fat enough to fight, light enough to fly’.

So Reed's observations - as well as others - seems to me be quite relevant given the current development problems with the FCS system (or ‘system of systems’, if you will ) and underscores the problem the US Army still faces in becoming an 'expeditionary force' capable of a rapid response with combat capable forces (and I acknowledge that 'combat capable' may or even likely depend on the 'enemy' to be faced). Clearly finding a solution to the problem - if one thinks it is a problem - is very difficult.

Anyway, thank you all for your comments on the thread, for they all have helped me make more sense of the issue/problem, thereby lifting a little bit of my fog of ignorance.