Norfolk,I do believe you have found itSome interesting stuff in there.
slap, I think that the OCRSP study may have appeared in this form:
http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=...fier=ADA074296
Norfolk,I do believe you have found it
The way we configured our mech squad was as follows:
Team A
1 TL
2 SAW
3 Grenadier
4 Riflemen/AT
Team B
5 TL
6 SAW
7 Grenadier
8 Riflemen/AT
HQ
9 Squad leader
10 240B
11 AG
12 Extra person sometimes used RTO, or placed in team, or carried Javelin, or shotgun and breach person.
There are two squads and two Bradly sections in each platoon.
The question that always perplexes mech squads is "To 240 or not to 240?"
In the 7-7 there was no slot for a 240 gunner/team. Mech units followed the "arms room concept" that allowed us to decide whether to bring one or not. The 7-7 said the Bradly was our MG support so it wasn't needed. The extra 4 slots were supposed to be manned by 1 RTO, 1 medic, 1FO, and the LT's track had an extra gunner for when he dismounted. Our second squad, used their extra man for this function (Lt's gunner). After the LT left the track, he would jump up into the BC hatch. Sometimes, if the LT wanted to stay with the track, he would dismount with a shotgun or Rifle.
I've heard arguments for and against the 240 but we usually brought them with us. I will say however, that the extra utility man did come in handy. He could carry everything from a folding latter, shotgun, to a breach ax, which gave us more room to operate. This person could also be used as a sharpshooter.
Six people would ride on each Bradly and don't let anyone tell you that more than this can fit! I had a Battalion commander that swore, that 9 people could fit in one Bradly?
If anyone knows how mech infantry is doing it now, please let me know?
Last edited by Ratzel; 12-27-2007 at 12:48 PM.
Well, I just found the latest version of the 7-7 and things have changed. It now features 3, 9 man squads. Here's a link.Originally Posted by Ratzel
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...21-71/appa.htm
However, if someone out there can tell what they know, I would appreciate it. This new 7-7 shows the squad utilizing the seat behind the gunner and I find that very unlikely. (That's where the coolers and grills go)
The new Bradley organization seems to define "square peg in a round hole". I suppose they're trying to maintain a consistent squad-level organization regardless of transport (ie Bradely v Stryker v Blackhawk).
Does anyone know how this has worked out in practice?
Ratzel, Tim:
The Brad Squads are split between (at least) two different tracks, 4 tracks of course per Platoon, with the Platoon HQ thrown in. Very messy.
One thing that always makes me chuckle a little in discussions of squad size is thinking about how human nature impacts the opinions expressed.
What leader, considering the missions he is tasked with, the often brutal optempo, and the chronic shortfalls in personnel manning, will form the opinion that the problem that he really has too many folks?
Of course everyone wants more personnel assigned to them.
(Heh, two exceptions do come to mind: Saturday night, being called by the CQ desk for the 4th or 5th time, and learning "who is drunk and in trouble now???"
The other case being any higher headquarters that I have ever seen. More bodies there = more demands on me for information. Often in triplicate. I've been a part of enough HQ's to see that you can add more folks, and everyone will still be (or at least seem) quite busy in the TOC, but it doesn't result in any greater effectiveness or efficiency...)
Personally, I do see the merit of the USMC 13-man squad, although I would vote for the 4 squads of 8-9 men each (but, I was mostly in the mech world, so I am naturally predisposed to the number "4" - heh, that's on the list of "how to tell if you are a tanker: you have a barbecue on the weekend, and all three of your friends show up). While the Marines have, noticeably, insisted on tactical transports that can accommodate the larger squad (with attachments), i.e., the the AAV7, CH-46, and now the AAAV and the Osprey, the rest of the world is stuck with less space in their transports. While many armies haven't managed it so far, I think that it isn't too much to ask a designer for an IFV or APC to stretch just a little, and fit at least 8 or 9 dismounts (I just don't think that it was considered important enough, back in the 60's when dismounted squad sizes shrank). I also don't think that a Heavy APC, a la the Israeli Nammer (the Merkava APC variant), could have room for more than 2 crew and 8-10 dismounts, after you account for the large engine needed to power such a heavy vehicle, etc. I think that the Heavy APC idea has merit, in some (but not all) applications, and I can only drool at the thought of a combined-arms battalion that had a common chassis across the tanks and APCs... heck, there is even an SP How on a Merkava chassis - maintenance headaches would certainly be reduced.
I don't think that a 300-man company is the answer (of course, it seems most contributers to this forum don't consider that to be a realistic proposal) - I'm a pretty big believer in Dunbar's number (148, or the "rule of 150", if you prefer) being the limit to a social group size, as a rifle company certainly is. At one point, when my unit was brought to full strength, it was weighing in at a little over 150 (with attachments) and I had an odd feeling that the social framework was slipping a bit (this was long before I heard of that number). Sure, make the company a bit larger, to account for casualties and folks away for school, on leave, etc... I just wouldn't go much past 180.
Whoever said that it is better to consider the squad as part of a company organization, rather than in isolation, made a great point.
I would be very interested in some head-to-head study, of a standard Marine Rifle Company TO (including wpns platoon, of course) going against a company composed along Army lines, only with 4 platoons (e.g., company mortar section, and 4 platoons, each with three 9-man squads and a full weapons squad of 9 men). Doing the rough calculations in my head, the personnel total is about the same, and the number of leaders (starting with Fire Team leaders) is roughly the same. There would be nine large Marine squads, with MG and SMAW teams running around, maneuvering against what could be thought of as eight pairs of 9-man squads (and each pair of squads would have a M240 and a SMAW-analog). I'm guessing that training and leadership would play a much, much larger factor in success or failure, but it would be interesting.
I don't know if it will help anybody or not, but in looking at other issues I found this paper that looks extensively on how composition of the squad and platoon (infantry) and the weapons effect ratio's of fire.
Jordan, K. C., Right for the wrong reasons: S.L.A. Marshall and the ratio of fire in Korea, The Journal of Military History; Jan 2002; 66, 1; Pg 135
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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While looking for that article I found another intersting one.
http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/han...ll+item+record
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Excellent Kiwi, I read the synopsis I'll have to put some more time into it.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
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Sounds excellent, but all my reading of Marshall, is that he was mostly wrong. Roger Spiller shot down his research methods and a lot of his theories and ideas have since been disproved. IMO, Ardant Du Picq did all before Marshall and did it better.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Read the article first. The author isn't defending Marshall. He points out that Marshall's conclusions about rates of firing in Korea may have been correct, but not for the reasons that he (Marshall) used to defend that conclusion. Jordan traces the higher rate of fire back to the reorganization of the infantry squad that took place before Korea, not the training method Marshall claimed was responsible (and actually didn't come into use until after the conflict was over).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Actually Spiller said a Brit Captain William Siborne predated Du Picq by about 50 years, and that Marshall appeared to be pretty violently opposed to the idea that any work on soldiers came before him. Facts not being that important I guess (page 65-66).
Spiller, Roger J., S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire, RUSI Journal, 133:4 (1988: Winter) p.63-71
Last edited by selil; 04-23-2008 at 12:38 PM.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
I never really have trusted Marshall's work after reading Hackworth's disturbing account of his research methods during Vietnam while acting as his assistant in "About Face". He was literally making stuff up.
Thanks to several people here on SWC/J I have a fairly substantial body of literature that says SLA Marshall was a journalist in the finest tradition of them. The story had to be good, but it got appropriated for policy and not even looked at fully. That is according to his supporters...
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
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I didn't think he was. Few people who study Marshall find anything positive. That's why I never understood Grossman's work. I find his contention that soldiers don't like killing, utterly unsupported by the evidence - that and heavily dependant on a reading of Marshall.
IMO, and others, Marshall confused a lack of aggression with the effects of suppression and low combat participation.
Wigram (1943-44) and Fitz-Gibbons observations (1982) tend to support Marshal's figures - but Wigram was not aware of Marshall - he was KIA in 1944, and having spoken to Fitz-Gibbon, I know he was also unaware of Marshall's observations. The weight of fire that Platoons and sections produce is effected by a vast number of variables, but the key is the number of men who are not suppressed, when they can successfully and effectively engage.
The other damage done by Marshall was the 2 x BARs in Korea and the loss of the .30 M1/M2 Carbine.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Why were these problems?
I agree with the rest of your comment but am curious about these two...
Ken in the previous article the author discusses the addition of a BAR to each squad and the removal of the carbine. The idea appears to make a squad with heavier weapons and more fire power, but remove the flexibility.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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Saw that but am searching for more depth
in his rationale. The BAR was not an ideal solution to the problem but it was what was available at the time due to Ordnance corps failures to push the envelope. It worked and adding one to the squad was beneficial.
The Carbine was a good and reliable weapon, functionally and it was light and handy -- unfortunately, it was not a man stopper due to an inadequate cartridge. Shame, really but it did need to go on that basis. Those comments are based on using both weapons at one time or another.
I'll forego comment on the 5.56...
Then we're likely in fair agreement then Ken. An Army Major told me something the other night and that was that the BAR actually took three to run. One to pull the trigger, one to load, and one to carry/replenish ammo. Hope I haven't mangled that. Seems like the squad automatic weapon was an attempt to reach the ultimate of having BAR/M60 like capability with a single troop carrying/deploying it. My preference though is for flexibility and sustainability with standardized ammunition, weapons in the squad reinforced as needed by other heavier weapons.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
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