I have been researching this for the past 5-6 years (which is no proof I'm right). Here's what I have concluded from studying the UK.Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
I suspect the US is not much different, but I may be wrong.
@ It's all based on opinions. There is little actual evidence, but there is some which is usually dismissed as not giving the right answer. - and this I have written proof of.
@ There are no well articulated principles of organisation. Again, just an arbitrary collection of opinions.
@ Huge amounts of time and money have been wasted asking the wrong questions, EG:- How should the section be organised, not "How do we develop task organisation." - this is usually only done in respect to discrete activities like Patrols.
@ People believe that Section organisation is what enables Fire and Manoeuvre. - so major sections of doctrine, like Core Functions - have no impact on squad/section organisation!
@ The need to be able to sustain casualties, and continue the mission, is usually argued as an absolute statement of numbers and not a percentage of overall organisations. - EG: A company suffers 3 dead and 6 wounded. A Platoon suffers 3 dead and 6 wounded. A squad/section suffers 3 dead and 6 wounded. - so thus 9 casualties makes the 9 man Squad unsustainable, so you need bigger squads. What is a Platoon suffers a 100% loss of one APC/MICV?
@ Cost is the major driver. How much money a section/platoon takes to equip, train and sustain, is actually the base line for most decisions. Organisations beyond the platoon, EG: How the Company and Battalion is organised impacts disproportionately on the platoon.
@ The payload and equipping of APCs and MICVs is seen as being a driver in terms of manning and equipment costs, despite the fact that, logically, infantry should be organised to fight dismounted and not organised for transport. To support the MICV, the vehicle crew is established as part of the squad.
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