Quote Originally Posted by JeffC View Post
... It seems to me that even after Iraq stabilizes, the Long War will continue against Jihadists whose numbers and resolve have both increased since 2003, thanks to U.S. actions in the ME. Shouldn't that be a factor in the evolution of American Strategy?
quite strongly that the numbers and resolve might well have increased at the same or even at a greater level had we not entered Iraq. Turning the other cheek in the ME is seen as a distinct weakness and attempts at compromise in the western mode are viewed as concessions to be exploited.

We have been guilty of misreading the ME for many years but our failure to react to provocations since 1979 certainly had far more to do with the airplane fly-ins than did Operation Ajax, any support for Israel or the literally dozens of other minor contributors. The folks in the ME are born hagglers and -- they believe at least -- born warriors; they attack weakness. That's what they do. It's in the genes...

That is forgotten by many in the west who do not think at all like that average person in the ME and who too frequently try to act based on a perception that those who live there think as we do. They do not.

Steve makes a valid point in his Preface and reiterates it in the Conclusions -- he and most strategic thinkers confined Iraq to the periphery unless it popped up on the radar screen. That syndrome, too, is a facet of American strategy and has been for most of our 220 years. Our political system with wholesale changes every four or eight years causes this, always has and always will. I wouldn't change that as I for one believe the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages...