Yes, that's precisely the point of my questions (though not to that absurd extreme!).Originally Posted by wm
A lot of bytes have been spilled in related threads about what battalions, companies, platoons, and squads should look like. Many of those posts contained broad (and very, very different) assumptions such as possible engagement ranges in urban combat and the resulting relative value of ATGMs (eg Javelin) and ATRLs (eg SMAW); the value of typical company and battalion-level assets such as mortars; the relative value of various MGs; etc... Yet assertions have been made about what squads and platoons should look like, how many weapons of a given type should be included, etc.
The last 2-3 responses to my question (which range fully from "that's obvious" to "too complicated") demonstrate why the topic is both so difficult and important yet filled with the peril of assertions based on assumptions which may or may not be valid for a given set of circumstances. Such assumptions are of little consequence on an internet forum but they cost lives on the battlefield.
How does one propose a squad, platoon, company, or battalion TO&E without first agreeing upon the unit's operating environment and intended purpose? As the other threads have demonstrated each individual has his own, unique perspective on what that environment looks like which drives his proposals. As Wellington said, "The history of a battle is not unlike the history of a ball." More coarsely, opinions are like you-know-what and everyone has one!
As for my background, the relevant bit involves asking questions such as these when business people make assertions based on assumptions which may or may not be true and which may or may not be shared by everyone else with a stake in the decision. From what I've observed the typical result is a lot of talking past one another as assertions are made based on often unspoken assumptions.
It's also been my experience that it's for more valuable to hash out those assumptions/assertions first to expose differences of opinion (which are viewed as "facts" too often) which can then lead to identifying that which is truly fact, that which is opinion, and that which is truly unknown (it's also very common for people to assume facts about which little or nothing it really known!).
The Darwinian battlefield is very good at molding troops into rational TO&Es that work for a given situation. Getting to that point from the paper TO&E typically involves the loss of many lives. There's always that danger of designing a TO&E "to fight the previous war" but based on my experience it's always best to back into a solution by clearly, honestly, and brutally laying out the requirements for that solution first and then considering what that solution should look like.
So, let's start again, and maybe this a better, more direct question. Instead of asking questions about TO&Es and redundancy and designated marksmen, let's ask the first question which should drive all of those answers and which should expose a lot of assumptions for further testing.
Describe your view on the full spectrum of the "small war" operating environment. What does it look like? Opposition? Terrain? Climate? Engagement ranges? Mobility limits and enablers? Factors which limit or liberalize applications of firepower? Access and limits to logistical support? Population density and demographics? Media access issues such as native, hostile foreign, and domestic? NGO aid groups? Language and cultural requirements? Force protection requirements? Security of infrastructure? Phase requirements from initial invasion to reconstruction? What is a society willing to pay when it comes to manning and equiping this force?
As an excercise consider these questions in light of the Iraq experience and you can immediately see where assumptions made on each of these issues had a significant effect on operations. Tiny example: a friend who is deploying (again) to Iraq said that the 7th seat on the Bradley is never used due to manpower (too few) and equipment (too much). The 9-man paper squad is a nice theory but just not a reality that makes sense given his world with respect to what he has available and what he needs to do. Another friend trains units such as arty crew in combat MP duties to escort convoys in Iraq.
Bigger examples: the debate between tracked vs wheeled APCs; debate between HMGs vs autocannons on carriers; vehicle armor levels vs intended mission vs actual mission; rules of engagement during initial invasion; force-space ratio relative to taking down conventional forces vs securing the battlefield; suspected WMDs yet not all troops equiped to survive such an environment; phase requirements; etc.
Asking what a platoon should look like without first clearly identifying knowns, opinions, and unknowns about the operating environment is like asking, "how long is a piece of string?" without first asking "what sort of package is that string (platoon) going to deliver?"
So, first, what's inside that small war package?
Then you'll have a better idea (never, ever perfect!) about whether to bring Javelins or SMAWs and how many 60mm mortars should be in a weapons platoon.
The challenge is balancing needs vs wants relative to cost and the full spectrum of objectives and requirements.
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