Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)

[Surferbeetle]

"Very few media outlets in the US seem to have noticed, but Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmednejad and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah were back together again the other day on the occasion of the Hajj."

From: http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/

[tequila]

Gulf-Iranian rapprochement / acommodation? Prof. Marc Lynch ("Abu Aardvark") in the CSMONITOR:

'Everywhere you turn, it is the policy of Iran to foment instability and chaos," Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned Gulf dignitaries in Bahrain last month. But in reality, everywhere you turn, from Qatar to Saudi Arabia to Egypt, you now see Iranian leaders shattering longstanding taboos by meeting cordially with their Arab counterparts.

The Gulf has moved away from American arguments for isolating Iran. American policymakers need to do the same.

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are accommodating themselves to Iran's growing weight in the region's politics. They remain key parts of America's security architecture in the region, hosting massive US military bases and underwriting the American economy in exchange for protection. But as Saudi analyst Khalid al-Dakheel argues, they are no longer content sitting passively beneath the US security umbrella and want to avoid being a pawn in the US-Iranian struggle for power. Flush with cash, they are not interested in a war that would mess up business.

...

Gulf Arabs have thus visibly discarded the central pillar of the past year of America's Middle East strategy. Saudis and Egyptians had been the prime movers in anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite agitation. When they are inviting Ahmadinejad and Mr. Larijani to their capitals, America's talk of isolating Iran sounds outdated.

One hears little today of the "Shiite crescent" threatening the region, against which Arab officials once gravely warned. The Bush administration's proposed "axis of moderation," joining Sunni Arab states and Israel against Iran, has quietly passed from view ...

[Ron Humphrey]

Gulf-Iranian rapprochement / acommodation? Prof. Marc Lynch ("Abu Aardvark") in the CSMONITOR:

Just because the guys who have been being hard on Iran are meeting with officials now would not necessarily mean everything is honky dory.

I think back to Godfather, mob stuff,

You tell them what you don't like and either to straighten up or else then once they realize your serious about it they come over to apologize and you explain to them how things are going to work.

Could be wrong but it seems like another possibility.

[tequila]

Lynch is certainly not saying that everything is hunky dory. What he is saying is that American-allied Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, as well as Egypt, are seriously rethinking their options about how to accomodate the bulking Iranian presence in the region. Outright opposition to Iran through a tighter American alliance, the preferred position of this Administration and perhaps the next whether Republican or Democratic, may not be in the cards.

[Ron Humphrey]

Lynch is certainly not saying that everything is hunky dory. What he is saying is that American-allied Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, as well as Egypt, are seriously rethinking their options about how to accomodate the bulking Iranian presence in the region. Outright opposition to Iran through a tighter American alliance, the preferred position of this Administration and perhaps the next whether Republican or Democratic, may not be in the cards.

But I am I guess still missing where Iran has any real Mass to its presence outside of Terrorisim connections, nuclear threats, and out and out bluster.

Where's the beef?

[tequila]

The GCC are not exactly the most imposing collection of states themselves. But they do have the oil as well as semi-disgruntled populations of Shi'i.

Iran has oil + ideology + population. They are the largest, most cohesive nation-state and the "natural" power in the Gulf region, especially since Iraq has fragmented and become the pawn of outside players for the foreseeable future.

[Ron Humphrey]

The GCC are not exactly the most imposing collection of states themselves. But they do have the oil as well as semi-disgruntled populations of Shi'i.

Iran has oil + ideology + population. They are the largest, most cohesive nation-state and the "natural" power in the Gulf region, especially since Iraq has fragmented and become the pawn of outside players for the foreseeable future.

I think there may not be as much cohesion there as stated but I gues only time and continued interaction will tell.

[tequila]

Nation-state cohesion in the Middle East, as with most postcolonial areas, is a matter of degree.

However I think a lot of the more amateurish analysts think the Azeris of Iran are much more disgruntled than they actually are, and overestimate the degree to which the Iranian state depends on Persian ethnocultural ID rather than Iranian nationalism and religion. After the Azeris, and maybe the Kurds, there really isn't a significant minority population that matters.

[Jedburgh]

The Marshall Center, Dec 07: Blogs, Cyber-Literature and Virtual Culture in Iran

....Compared to other countries of the Middle East, the Iranian people have a high level of political maturity; an organized popular movement for democratic socio-political change in Iran has a history of more than 100 years. Despite the regime’s claim of total social control, Iranian civil society seems to have thrived since the mid 1990s and has succeeded in reclaiming certain critical areas of social life. Some observers of Iran, particularly those with an insider’s perspective, are convinced that the “problem” of the Islamic Republic can only be effectively solved in the interest of the international community if the initiative for a social and political change comes from within Iranian civil society.

In order to estimate the possibilities and limitations of Iranian civil society in bringing about social and political change, it is helpful to observe its effectiveness in a sensitive area, namely that of independent public information. The beginning of the internet era in Iran has given Iranian civil society the possibility to create and defend alternative spaces for intellectual and political discourse, outside the realm of the regime-controlled established media. This paper deals with the internet as the vehicle and instrument of the new, independent Iranian information society. It starts with a recapitulation of the recent spectacular development of Persian web logs. It then looks at the ambivalent function of the internet, on the one hand offering a virtual refuge for civil society and on the other hand serving as a target of the Islamic regime and its ideological followers to expand their authority and influence. Four case studies demonstrate how the internet has supported the grassroots democracy movement both within and outside of Iran and made the disconnected communication between civil society within the country and the Iranian diaspora in Western Europe and North America possible. The paper ends with observations about some cultural-linguistic and social implications of the web log phenomenon for the future of the Iranian society. It comes to the conclusion that the independent information society will – particularly by the use of media like web logs – indirectly and only in the long run lead to political changes in Iran.....

Complete 37 page paper at the link.

[Ron Humphrey]

Nation-state cohesion in the Middle East, as with most postcolonial areas, is a matter of degree.

However I think a lot of the more amateurish analysts think the Azeris of Iran are much more disgruntled than they actually are, and overestimate the degree to which the Iranian state depends on Persian ethnocultural ID rather than Iranian nationalism and religion. After the Azeris, and maybe the Kurds, there really isn't a significant minority population that matters.

I think I would probably count myself among that number which for one is the reason I continue to work towards better understanding by this type of interaction.

That said I think an awful lot of Nationalistically strong dictatorially run organizations throughout history have paid the price for underestimating minority populace.

We'll see

[tequila]

Foreigners often make the same error, however. Saddam Hussein paid for such a mistake with much of his best armor in Khuzestan in 1982.

Also I think it is quite a mistake to characterize the Iranian system as one that is "dictatorially run", as in say, Iraq where Saddam controlled all levers of power. Iran is more like the Soviet Union in the 1980s, where many power centers competed for power and position in the security and political bureaucracies.

[bourbon]

But I am I guess still missing where Iran has any real Mass to its presence outside of Terrorisim connections, nuclear threats, and out and out bluster.

Where's the beef?

Ron, Tequila noted the oil factor - I would like to share some of my notes to further sketch out this issue.

Oil being the lifeblood for Gulf nations and the source they derive their power from, confines a part of this jockeying for power to the inner workings of OPEC. Votes on OPEC production levels – the throttle and break on the global economy, are weighted by proven reserves. Reserves are based on recoverable oil in place in the current economic environment. So the price of oil becomes an important factor, because it can increase or decrease a producing nation's voting share. As it stands now the top six producers reserves break down as such:

1. Saudi Arabia - 264,251
2. Iran - 138,400
3. Iraq - 115,000
4. Kuwait - 101,500
5. United Arab Emirates - 97,800
6.Venezuela - 87,035
(Million Barrels) Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2006

Historically Iran and Venezuela are “price hawks” - they want a high price because they have fewer reserves, while the Gulf states are “price doves” - keep the price relatively low, but sell a lot of it. Iran , Venezuela, and the other price hawks never had enough share of the vote. The Saudi's were the king of OPEC by vote share. Venezuela however has a huge amount of extra heavy crude (bitumen), roughly 90% of extra heavy crude reserves, that gets counted in its OPEC reserves when it becomes economically viable to extract. When this happens the hawks will be able to eclipse the doves in vote share. Saudi and the Gulf state's power will diminish.

Also viewed through this lens we can see how Iraq is pivotal. Should Iraq become an Iranian proxy state the two nations voting together would be able to challenge the Saudi hegemony in OPEC. And we see how Iran's ability to influence events in Iraq is directly threatens Gulf state power. Also note the Shia population of Saudi sits atop much of the key oil fields and installations in the east.

[Ron Humphrey]

Ron, Tequila noted the oil factor - I would like to share some of my notes to further sketch out this issue.

This helps to place in perspective some of the concerns out there.

I wonder, in this case (if) Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait were to vote together then what would that do. Even more theoretically what if another country were to be brought into OPEC. One with perhaps verrryyy large Reserves?

And then if Iraq actually reached a more stable point where the viable access to more resources gave them a greater share?

Does this point to why it might be so important to Iran to undermine efforts there in any way possible?

[bourbon]

This helps to place in perspective some of the concerns out there.

I wonder, in this case (if) Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait were to vote together then what would that do. Even more theoretically what if another country were to be brought into OPEC. One with perhaps verrryyy large Reserves?

And then if Iraq actually reached a more stable point where the viable access to more resources gave them a greater share?

Does this point to why it might be so important to Iran to undermine efforts there in any way possible?

Well, it could be part of a reason. But I do not think that they want to undermine our efforts by any way possible. There is evidence that before and for awhile after we went into Iraq, that Iran wanted stability and was willing to help in the reconstruction. Democracy and elections in Iraq could empower the Shia and Iran, so they could have acquired the OPEC vote that way. I imagine if they completely wanted to undermine our efforts by any means, we would see a flood of MANPADS to insurgents - ala what we did to the Soviets.

But you bring up an interesting point about Iraq. Iraq's reserves are understated, its never been adequately explored or developed, there is likely a lot more there. There is a history of suppressing Iraqi oil production; from the “red line agreement” with the partners of the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1928, to post WWII where oil companies deliberately capped production and exploration, to OPEC's creation in 1960, to the industry being crippled in the 1980's Iran-Iraq war, to post war sanctions. A lot of this production and exploration suppression has been deliberate.

So it brings up an interesting angle on why we went into Iraq and what happened when we got there. I think it shows some interesting divisions in the administration, the government, the exiles, and the Iraqi's. Just look at if for example that the oil industry had completely privatized and sold off, an idea championed by some, and blocs were divided up sold off to many different companies. It all gets very interesting and convoluted.

[Watcher In The Middle]

Ahmadinejad loses favor with Khamenei, Iran's top leader
By Nazila Fathi; Published: January 7, 2008

TEHRAN: A rift is emerging between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggesting that the president no longer enjoys the full backing of Khamenei, as he did in the years after his election in 2005.

In the past, when Ahmadinejad was attacked by political opponents, the criticisms were usually silenced by Khamenei, who has the final word on state matters and who regularly endorsed the president in public speeches. But that public support has been conspicuously absent in recent months.

There are numerous possible reasons for Ahmadinejad's loss of support, but analysts here all point to one overriding factor: the U.S. National Intelligence Report last month, which said that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003 in response to international pressure. The report sharply decreased the threat of a military strike against Iran, allowing the authorities to focus on domestic issues, with important parliamentary elections looming in March.

Link to Article

...in his decision making. Might this be part of the Iranian "issue" in the Strait of Hormuz?

Just a crazy thought that maybe the best short term policy for the US to take here is to firmly endorse Ahmadinejad's continued "leadership", because truth is, having him in place as Iran's President appears to be the best set of economic sanctions we could ever hope for. It looks like another year of Ahmadinejad as President = 5 years worth of effects of economic sanctions.

I'm trying to picture President Ahmadinejad dealing with "the enemy" endorsing his continued leadership.

I know, totally crazy idea. But if Iran's leadership is unsure as to what we are up to these days, imagine what they would think if that actually happened.

Just a thought.

[Jedburgh]

HRW, 7 Jan 08: Iran's Broadening Clampdown on Independent Activism

Individuals from an ever widening range of groups in Iran are subject to arrest on security grounds for political activism and peaceful dissent against the government. Those arrested are frequently detained in facilities operating outside the regular prison administration, most notoriously in Section 209 of Tehran’s Evin Prison, where they may be subjected to torture and abusive interrogation. After weeks or months the authorities frequently release those held on conditional bail or a suspended prison sentence, using the ever-present threat of a return to jail to intimidate them against further activism or open dissent.

Crackdowns on peaceful dissent have been a hallmark of all governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and there was already ample legal latitude for the persecution of government critics when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office in August 2005. It is the great expansion in scope and number of individuals and activities persecuted by the government that seems to distinguish the Ahmadinejad period to date.

Since August 2005 Iranian security forces have detained at least 35 members of the Iranian women’s movement in Evin 209. They have also held teachers calling for better wages and pension plans, students and activists working towards social and political reform, as well as journalists and scholars with no history of activism. In the majority of these cases, the detainees have spent some or all of their detention in solitary confinement (sometimes for months), been denied access to counsel or visits with their families, and been put under severe psychological and physical pressure to give confessions, whether truthful or otherwise.....

Complete 56 page report at the link.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 3 Jan 08: Iran and the US: Key Issues from an American Perspective

It does seem clear from past official statements that there are five basic issues that must be addressed from an American perspective for negotiations to succeed, and that the issue will be how a given Presidency chooses to address them, not whether they must be addressed:

• The history of tensions, charges, and recriminations on both sides.

• The view that the Ahmadinejad presidency and Iran’s leadership as a whole have become much more hard-line, repressive and difficult to deal with, and continued US support for regime change.

• American charges that Iran continues to support terrorism: The Problem of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.

• Iranian actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• Iran’s broader role in the Gulf and the MENA region, and

• The Iranian nuclear issue.

Complete 22 page paper at the link.

[wm]

Got to love a document that calls out five basic issues then lists six bullets. Is one of the six a late-breaking edit?

[Jedburgh]

Got to love a document that calls out five basic issues then lists six bullets. Is one of the six a late-breaking edit?

I gotta say, Cordesman's papers are always full of typos, and structural errors like the one so obvious here - but he tends to make very cogent points. Despite the rushed appearance of much of what he puts out (in contrast to some of the cleaner pubs by CSIS), I always enjoy the read.

[wm]

I admit that his content is usually engaging, but the mistakes he makes remind me of Arthur trying to count to three when he calls for the Holy Hand Grenade of Antioch. It also remind me of seeing dust bunnies under a troop's bed during inspections with my "practiced infantryman's eye." Lack of attention to detail like this tends to make one wonder about what else may be wrong with the analysis.