The problem with paintball is that the technology itself creates tactical tendencies that are suited purely for a paintball world.
best
Tom
Not sure why the use of paintball. While I have not been part of an urban training program for 7 years, I was impressed with the then state of art simunitions - especially the colored ones that could quickly identify fratricide incidents. You also got a significant reduction in "John Wayne" tactics then you did with MILES - simunitions at least hurt a bit when you got hit.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wax_bulletsUnlike normal wax bullets, simunitions are not an inexpensive substitute for live ammunition — costs for simunitions cartridges are as much as three times the cost of live ammunition. Simunitions do, however, provide the most realistic training available.
Besides the rounds, you have to purchase conversion kits for each of the weapons you plan to train with.
The problem with paintball is that the technology itself creates tactical tendencies that are suited purely for a paintball world.
best
Tom
True Steve. MILES has its own gamesmanship built into it, a fact we have contended with here for years and still deal with. On the other hand, MILES does reinforce the critical skill of marksmanship and the hide behind grass gamesmanship can be mitigated with a "God gun" in the hands of the OC walking the unit.
I suspect that the IDF will have to--as we have many times and other armies have done--go back and look at its basics, rather than its press (especially the press as the latest Lebanon incursion opened). Paintball may help.
Best
Tom
Does anybody knows what happened to "Egoz" unit after 2000? Were they disbanded, used in Gaza and West Bank (not completly their environment but could be usefull) or soemthing else?
Historic-Battles forum moderator
Pain tends to teach us a leason far sooner than a beep or or the CO barking. Growing up in Northern PA and having been shot by a PO'd farmer with rock salt brings back some fond memories. Paintball at least smarts and still gets the job done far cheaper than OUR MILES. Yeah, a lazer is far more accurate and faster than a paintball. Bring back those basic training days when a M2HB was fired over your head to really appreciate just how fast 3000 FPS is and what it really means when the DS says you never hear the round that kills you.
This bit of advice has served me well. Still alive, albeit a little bid of a pain in the ass at times. Right Tom ?
Regards, Stan
Defense News, 20 Nov 06:
Does Technology Undercut War Leadership? Post-War Probes Target Israeli Command Failures
....in Lebanon, Israel's first digitized ground war, after-action probes found egregious cases where commanders relied on situational awareness provided by the sensor-fused data streaming into command centers instead of moving forward to assess critical points in the evolving battle.
"This war underscored the limitations of plasma, especially when it is accorded disproportionate priority over training and discipline," said Matan Vilnai, a retired major general and former Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) deputy chief of staff, now a prominent member of Israel's Labor Party.
In post-Lebanon War Israel, "plasma" has become derisive shorthand for the virtual command and control provided through networked operations and the dangers of digital-era interpretations of the Follow Me! principle....
I spent 18 months in the 509th at Polk (that's the OPFOR at JRTC) and I have nothing but the deepest contempt for MILES gear. I watched unit after unit come down there fully trained to fight in a MILES environment. It really does encourage the "John Wayne" mentality. As for SIMS, they are great for short range ie. CQC but they lose accuracy very quickly at ranges greater than, say, 30 - 50 meters. Furthermore, the conversion kits mean that you either have to take the optics off of your own gun and figure out how to mount them on the conversion barrel which may or may not have a rail and in cold weather the rounds have an annoying tendency to stick in the barrel. I have used paint balls a few times and although it does not work the marksmanship aspects, it does a great job otherwise. There is no question of weather or not you got hit. You know it and so does everyone around you, it hurts and pain tends to cut down on the "John Wayne" factor. A more ideal system would be an updated version of SIMS that does not require a conversion kit but until then paint ball is just fine for force on force.
SFC W
The Economist, 20 Jan 07: It's The Little Things That Make an Occupation
During 2006, according to B'tselem, an Israeli human-rights group, Israeli forces killed 660 Palestinians, almost half of them innocent bystanders, among them 141 children. In the same period, Palestinians killed 17 Israeli civilians and six soldiers. It is such figures, as well as events like shellings, house demolitions, arrest raids and land expropriations, that make the headlines in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What rarely get into the media but make up the staple of Palestinian daily conversation are the countless little restrictions that slow down most people's lives, strangle the economy and provide constant fuel for extremists....
USIP, Feb 07: From Rejection to Acceptance: Israeli National Security Thinking and Palestinian Statehood
...findings lead to several conclusions:
- Most Israelis are prepared to accept a withdrawal from most of the West Bank that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This may facilitate future negotiations.
- However, those who want to establish a limited, constrained Palestinian state through a unilateral process will create a self-fulfilling prophecy: a Palestinian state that is irredentist and in continuous armed conflict with Israel.
- The United States and its allies must try to prevent this development, which is detrimental to their interests, by encouraging dialogue between the two parties, and a negotiated settlement. At the very least, the United States should strive to turn a unilateral Israeli process into a cooperative process.
- The United States needs a policy that can accommodate renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the reality of Hamas holding public office. A nuanced, cautious policy of engagement may be the best option.
• From the Israeli perspective, the question of Palestinian statehood is deeply intertwined with the following three scenarios:
1. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations resume following a Palestinian national dialogue that leads to positive changes in Hamas policies.
2. Negotiations do not resume, because Hamas does not modify its positions, and Israel pushes ahead with unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. The recent war in Lebanon made this unilateral option less popular in Israel, but it is likely to reemerge.
3. A mixed scenario in which unilateral Israeli steps are carried out in parallel with Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over less than comprehensive agreements. This scenario is more feasible than the first and more promising than the second....
What some of you say, regarding use of paintball for training purposes is true, it can teach bad habits, just as MILEs and any other form of training
can. The KEY is having skilled instructors who can distinguish what is right and wrong. Once the proper ROE is adopted, misuse drops. Limited ammo, magazine exchanges and use of specialized pellets (invisible to those being shot at) are all factors which can increase usefulness of paintball. Bottom line, it's useful when put into its proper context. It's also far cheaper, approximately .04 cents (US) compared to other force-on-force alternatives. MILEs uses blanks, which cost .25 cents or more depending on caliber, while Simunitions and UTM options costs range between .45-.65 cents per round. Cost is a huge factor driving the military's move towards paintball, just as anyone who has been to the Mech site at Knox, or through some of the training that's taking place at places like Bragg, Carson and Bliss can atest.
Anyone wanting more detailed information on MIL-SIM paintball is free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Andrew Van Der Plaats
Non Lethal Training Munitions, LLC
sales@nltm.us
When a hard frost would set in, we played this game as kids where one brother would hide behind some boards leaned against a shed and the rest of us would gather frozen calf turds to use a projectiles. The kid beind the boards had a safe zone about 20' away on each side of the boards and he was fair game in between either safe zone once he sprinted out and away from the board shield. When we switched to using BB guns in warmer weather, we would seldom leave the security of the board shield and sprint for a safe zone. Risk was much higher in 'real war' even though we would cup a hand on the side of the head shielding the eyes. I think the same applies to paint balls - risks and moves will be taken that wouldn't be in real combat.
Last edited by goesh; 07-05-2007 at 03:06 PM. Reason: more bad speling
I've trained with MILES gear and, although useful, it doesn't create the lesson that simunitions does. While the ringing of MILES gear may cause you to think a little, it's mostly just fun. However, looking down at a big red splotch of paint plastered right over your heart gives you a wake up call. I thought about that for days afterward. Concealment does not equal cover!
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
This post suggest that may very well have happened.
Meanwhile the Russians who supplied the air defense system to Syria and sold a similar one to Iran are furiously trying to figure out what happened....
The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.
...
There is a reason why Israel is being so quiet. I'm inclined to think it's something new and high tech, but it could just be that after Lebanon they are employing a little ancient wisdom: all warfare is based upon deception.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/914887.html
Last update - 16:29 19/10/2007
Report: Syria dismantling facility targeted by IAF
By Haaretz Service
Syria has begun dismantling the ruins of a site that was bombed by the Israel Air Force on September 6, the Washington Post reported Friday......"
Moderator's Note
This thread is the result of merged a small number of threads; it was originally about IDF COIN and now has included CT. There are other threads on the wider Middle East conflict and smaller matters (ends).
The attached article was submitted by a former IDF Lt who led an IDF Arab platoon and provides his perspective on Arab culture.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2014 at 10:13 PM. Reason: Add Note
In a thread on British policy in Northern Ireland (and parallels or non-parallels to Iraq), Wilf made a passing comment that stuck with me today:
I think it is an interesting question how "effective" IDF COIN has been. In Lebanon (1982-2000) I would argue that it was a disastrous failure: the PLO survived, efforts to install a friendly government and blunt Syrian influence ultimately failed, and a relatively neutral Shi'ite population (many of whom were happy to see the armed Palestinian presence go) were transformed into one of Israel's bitterest and most effective foes: Hizbullah.
In the Palestinian territories, by contrast, the IDF (and Shin Bet) have clearly very successful at a tactical and operational level in containing and limiting armed activity by Palestinian factions, and indeed maintaining a foreign military occupation for more than forty years. The IDF has certainly shown professional skill, and this has been coupled with extremely effective intelligence collection (a product, I would argue, also of Palestinian vulnerabilities and poor organizational discipline and OPSEC). Whether this has translated into strategic success or failure, however, is rather less clear--in part because the nature of Israeli strategic goals is both unclear and has changed over time. Measured by efforts to blunt the growth of Palestinian nationalism and maintain the position of pro-Jordanian notables, it was a failure. Measured by efforts to disrupt planned attacks, it has been a success. Measured as part of an effort to maintain control over large areas of the West Bank (clearly an aim under Likud governments), its probably a failure. Measured as part of an effort to protect Israel pending a territorial compromise, it is a possible success (if you're Olmert). Measured as an effort to facilitate settlement activity, its a success--but then whether settlements are a national goal or a fundamental national security liability is much debated in Israel. And so forth. (I made an earlier comment of this sort here.)
This really cuts to a core COIN dilemma: COIN is, in FM3-24 terms, fundamentally political. Yet the political goals are not always clear. And, as a consequence, its very hard to know whether tactical and operational military successes contribute to, or may even undermine, strategic objectives.
On another note--which cuts closer to the original focus of Wilf's post on ROEs, professionalization, etc.--it is interesting to note the vast formal and especially informal differences in IDF rules and behaviour in Lebanon and the WBG. A friend and colleague, James Ron, has written about this in the broader context of state violence, an interest spurred in part by his experience as an IDF paratrooper in south Lebanon.
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