Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post

@ Rather, I'm arguing that tactical and operational successes have not always resulted in strategic success--which, in the end, is the purpose of military force. Indeed, they might mask and ultimately exacerbate shortcomings in fundamental political strategy.

@ The Israel's failure in 2006 was only partially the consequence of airpower doctrine. A shorter and more closely focused set of air strikes, and/or a limited, successful set-piece ground strike, might have delivered more political and strategic gains.

@ It was a conventional COIN military campaign.

@ In the case of the WBG, although neither would put it in these terms, the disengagement strategy of Sharon, as well as Olmert's current diplomatic position, are in many ways based on the notion that Israel was too good at "operational" occupation/COIN, ....
@ If tactical and operational success cannot gain strategic success, then it's probably something military force cannot solve.

@ Risk is the coin of warfare. Israel's risk-averse strategy gained far less than it should e.g.- failure! Thus Israel's "failure" is a consequence of on an objective that was not achievable by military means.

@ Show me another COIN campaign where a nation has partially occupied another sovereign nation who is in the midst of a civil war, to create a buffer from diverse and competing terrorist organisations, with external sponsorship (Syria and Iran) that that focussed on attacking a regime (Israel) that is not involved in the civil war that they are supposedly party to. The 1970 US invasion of Cambodia is the only thing I can think of that is even close.

@ It was expressly and explicitly put in those terms, and from talking to those I talk to, that is the consensus amongst the informed public in Israel.