Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post
To disparage any irregular force because of their inability to "hold ground" against a professional army is to completely miss the point.

Hezballah was able to inflict casualties on the IDF, take out some armor, and continue to launch rockets into Israel until the very end of the conflict. And since Israel withdrew once again - without achieveing its objectives, in the end, that's all that matters.

Regarding the "defeat" of Hezballah, I think Tequila put it quite clearly:

The statement "Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory." is really a false analogy: President Bush has been roundly mocked for his statement, both here in the US and abroad, while a significant chunk of the region's populace perceives that Israel was humiliated during their summer excursion.
Thanks, Jedburgh. I agree with that completely. Although a couple sources I read (some in the info you gave me for my RFI) said that, particularly for a irregular force, Hezbollah stood and fought rather effectively in some villages with a Chechen-type decentralized defense effort.

My question, then, from this, is what is the larger strategy against Hezbollah, Hamas, and other nonstate actors who in many cases have more popular legitimacy and power than weakened states in the regions they operate. If kinetic action (even if better planned and executed than the IDF's in 2006) is non-decisive, and may actually further their political popularity and strength (leading to more military potential in terms of manpower and potential outside support), and the indigenous government is too weak to reign them in - i.e., Lebanon - then what is the approach? Attempts to moderate them or co-opt them diplomatically? A combination?

This seems to lie outside our current COIN thinking. Or at least MY current COIN thinking. . .

Oh, and can we please agree on a universal spelling for Hezbollah? Drives me nuts. Just tell me how to spell it and I'll do it. . .
Matt