Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[Jones_RE]

Hezbollah initiated a course of violence for two reasons: 1) it wanted something and 2) it thought it could accomplish something violence. They wouldn't launch an attack for no reason. They also wouldn't launch an attack that would be doomed to complete failure.

Marc MacYoung, from No Nonsense Self Defense, describes the concept of a "Secondary Victory." He was speaking of the sort of "victory" achieved by a violent criminal or an inmate in a correctional setting. The perpetrator doesn't beat the police officers in the sense that he "wins" or gets away. But by making cops sweat and work for it he gains esteem among his peers - other criminals or inmates. If you think about it, this makes a lot of sense. There's no way that a prison inmate will ever beat up all the guards - they have him outnumbered and have better weapons. But if it takes six men with pepper spray, clubs and stun guns to drag him out of his cell think about how tough that guy is!

Hezbollah has scored the same sort of "victory" here. They haven't achieved a true victory: IDF troops stopped of their own accord. They were not bloodily repulsed or routed in a conventional sense - all engaged IDF units remain combat effective and are ready to resume operations at any time.

However, it's undeniable that Hezbollah has achieved a secondary victory. Their power and prestige on the Arab Street, among Arab governments, in Lebannon, in Europe, in the UN and in Syria and Iran couldn't be higher right now. That makes them immensely difficult to deal with.

If you want to prevent a group like Hezbollah from getting violent, you have to set things up so that they cannot get what they want through violence, cannot achieve a secondary victory, and offer them something that they do want through another means (namely, compliance with your demands).

Israel is only moderately successful at the first part. Hezbollah has a very difficult time achieving much in the way of violence against Israel proper. Rockets and mortars usually miss. Raids and sniping are hard work (and dangerous!). The border is pretty well guarded. A true success would be a heavily patrolled border, backed up by human intelligence work in Lebannon. The IDF should have stopped Hezbollah's raid before it even started by being alert, well trained and fully prepared for battle. Hezbollah wouldn't have dared launch it if they'd known it would fail.

Israel has NOT been successful at the second part. By reacting with a lot of force in a big, conventional operation they already show some weakness. But having that operation fail is utterly unacceptable. Israel has to go a long way towards developing the kind of human intelligence contacts and surveillance operations that would have enabled it to defeat Hezbollah quickly and clearly. A willingness on the part of the IDF/the Isreali government/Israeli society to accept higher military casualties would be a good start - it opens up rougher operations.

Israel has not even attempted to offer Hezbollah another way out. Right now there is no negotiation. There are no contacts. If violence is the only means Hezbollah has then they'll use violence, regardless of the cost or the odds.

A proper strategy of deterrance has to hit all three key points: deny the antagonist the ability to achieve victory, make sure the antagonist knows that there's nothing to be had from defeat either (i.e. no secondary victory) and finally offer the antagonist another way to recover something from a bad situation.

Israel needs to seriously step up its intelligence work and enter into negotiations with Hezbollah. Not so much to argue about details, but to offer the leadership of Hezbollah a plausible alternative to fighting. In their place, I'd be more than willing to trade Hezbollah prisoners in whatever numbers for Israeli citizens/soldiers. The IDF can always get more of them, after all. Shebaa farms is another matter. Israel can also offer reparations for damage to civilian infrastructure or offer humanitarian aid. Disarming Hezbollah will probably not happen. Israel is too weak to negotiate that much of a concession. Once Israel establishes its ability to achieve all three steps of deterrance, then they can demand compliance from Hezbollah on rockets or possibly full disarmament.

Note that a beefed up UNIFIL and forward deployed Lebanese army would make it more difficult for Hezbollah to achieve even a secondary victory - too much chance that their initial operation would fail in a humiliating fashion.

[Jedburgh]

If the current situation remains as planned then Hizbollah has lost the ability to rebuild what they help get destroyed. Oh, they will try but it is going to be difficult under the eyes of the entire world this time. It would be up to the UN to manage the rebuilding as such.

Current plans are simply to disarm Hezballah; to eliminate them as a armed militia independent of the Lebanese government. "Under the eyes of the world" only matters in that context. The organization retains its representation in the Lebanese parliament, and they will also retain all of their social welfare infrastructure. The only obstacle to their engaging in reconstruction is the continued IDF presence in certain areas. In all other areas there is nothing to stop them from moving forward with rebuilding.

As regards disarmament, I - along with countless others, I'm sure - am waiting to see how the process is going to turn out. An Israeli general has already spoken out against integrating former Hezballah fighters in the Lebanese Army. Some other form of actionable DDR program has to be put into place for disarmament to be effective.

I don't consider the Lebanese government a victim. I consider them a co-dependent of Hizbollah and blaming the current U.S. administration for allowing Lebanon to take their own medicine is not a mistake in the long term. I see no sense in the U.S. enabling the government of Lebanon into taking half measures as being good enough. Thus, the U.S. focusing on other problems rather than enabling Lebanon was not a mistake.

This is a nation that was just recovering from roughly 15 years of civil war followed by years of foreign domination. While Israel occupied a southern "security zone", the Lebanese central government was not only weak, but effectively under Syrian dominance, if not outright control. After the Israelis finally withdrew from south Lebanon six years ago, most Lebanese wanted to see Hezballah disarmed. However, with Hezballah being a client of Syria, the Lebanese had no choice but to accept their armed presence and provocations on the border with Israel. The Cedar Revolution provided an opportunity, but the Lebanese government and security forces were still too weak, and Hezballah and the Shi'a too unwilling, to disarm and integrate the organization without descent into a new civil war. There was a moment when the U.S. and the West could have stepped in and achieved a strategic victory - without force of arms. It passed.

...you stated that Israel didn't win anything and then later claimed Israel won militarily.

I never "claimed" that Israel won militarily. I simply said that "Israel did not lose this fracas militarily". The mere fact of not losing does not automatically translate into a win. There was no clear military victor in this campaign. The IDF certainly has the lead by measure of pure destruction, but Hezballah continued to inflict casualties and fire rockets up until the cease-fire. There were not many head-to-head engagements in the campaign. When that did occur, the IDF hammered Hezballah. But Hezballah, like any other irregular force, prefers hit-and-run engagements. These resulted in casualties on the IDF side, and sometimes resulted in the deaths of the Hezballah ambush teams. Did they hurt the IDF militarily? No. But the Israeli public is extremely casualty-conscious (far more so than the U.S. public), so Hezballah achieved a little IO victory with each IDF WIA/KIA. Did the IDF hurt Hezballah militarily? Yes. But not to the point of crippling the organization to a degree from which it can't recover in the near-to-mid term.

As stated above, the key to how this all turns out in the near term lies in how the mandate for the new "peacekeeping" force is structured - but in the long-term the Lebanese government and security forces need to be strengthened in order to ensure stability. And they have been crippled by this campaign to a greater degree than has Hezballah.

[Culpeper]

Could you expand on the moment the U.S. could have helped the Lebanese government? You keep referring to it and I don't see the light yet. In my current frame of mind, even though their government was more democratic than before, it still immediately resulted with Hizbollah pulling the strings. Similar to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and so forth. Even now, the Lebanese government is reluctant to cross the river as directed under the current cease-fire. I'm having a difficult time separating the government from Hizbollah. I always have.

[Strickland]

It is impossible to separate Hizbollah from the Lebanese Government, due to the fact that Hizbollah has popularly elected officials in positions of influence within the Lebanese administration. This would be akin to trying to separate the Republican or Democratic Party from our government?

Yes, Hizbollah - the Movement has a militia, but so does the ruling party of Iraq, and we havent put it on the Foreign Terrorist Organization List yet.

Here's a thought - is our refusal to deal with Hizbollah on a political basis over their remarks concerning the illegitimacy of Israel in any way similiar to our dealing with the Japanese, yet not asking them to publicly admit to killing and raping millions of Chinese during WWII? In the end, are we not picking and choosing which statements or lack of statements offend our general political and moral sensibilities?

I think we all forget that Hizbollah and Hasan Nasrallah publicly denounced the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

[Jedburgh]

Hezballah Wages a Propaganda War in the Rubble of South Beirut

...Ghassan Darwish is supervising the erection of dozens of red banners, in English and Arabic over the huge piles of debris left by the air raids...they carry sardonic messages like "Made in the US", "The New Middle East", "Smart bombs for stupid minds" and "Extremely precise target".

The message Hezbollah wants to get over is that this is a civilian area deliberately bombed to rubble by Israel - people's homes, businesses and social centres buried under thousands of tons of crumpled concrete.

The extraordinary thing is that hundreds of people - from the whole Lebanese political and confessional spectrum - are walking through this dusty scene of devastation.

Bulldozers supplied by Hezbollah have cleared safe walkways through the wreckage and yellow tape prevents visitors from entering unsafe buildings or areas not yet cleared of unexploded munitions.

Young men in red baseball caps saying "Ja'a Nasr Allah" (literally, "God's victory has come", but also a pun on the name of Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah) are moving through the crowds.

They hand out copies of a letter from the local Hezbollah leadership giving details of how people can receive money for temporary accommodation from the movement and promising "the return of our people whose homes have been damaged by the Israeli aggression".

"We will rebuild this whole area," Mr Darwish proudly tells me. "Hezbollah is not just about rockets and fighting, otherwise people would have left us long ago. We will be victorious in the reconstruction, just as we have been victorious against Israel's army."...

[SWJED]

From the Vital Perspective Blog - Background Briefing: Iran's Historic and Present Ties with Lebanon, Hezbollah.

The origins of Iranian involvement in Lebanon:

Iran first became involved militarily in Lebanon when a 2500-strong Iranian expeditionary force drawn from the Revolutionary Guard land army was sent to Syria in 1982 to assist in confronting Israel during the Peace in Galilee campaign.

Although the Syrians prevented actual Iranian participation in fighting, with many of the troops being returned to Iran, the remainder (1000-1500 men) stayed on to camp in the Bekaa Valley in the midst of the Shiite population. The force established a permanent military and logistic infrastructure at Camp Sheikh Abdallah in Baalbek, (which it had captured from the Lebanese Army) and at the Zabadani Camp in Syria, northeast of Damascus. In addition, command posts, field intelligence and operations units were established at Baalbek, Beirut, Zahleh and Mashgara (south Bekaa).

However the most distinctive accomplishment of the Iranians in Lebanon was their ability to cause disparate Shiite groups (which had been operating as local clan militias) to unite under one organizational umbrella called Hezbollah ("the party of Allah"), to indoctrinate their leaders with the extremist concepts of the Islamic revolution, and to train them in the military techniques and methods of the Revolutionary Guards.

Assistance by the Revolutionary Guards to Hezbollah prior to and during the present confrontation:

Iran did all it could during the present confrontation to stress its moral support for Hezbollah, as being part of "the historic struggle against the Zionist cancer and the USA". At the same time Iran strenuously denied any military involvement in the crisis. In fact, Iran was totally involved in these events.

This involvement was led by the Quds (Jerusalem) Force, an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards. The Quds Force commanded by Qasem Suleimani is in charge of Iranian military operations and terrorist activities world-wide, and Lebanon is one of its main theaters of operations.

The Revolutionary Guard force in Lebanon is the spearhead of Iran in its campaign against Israel. It expresses an Iranian strategy that sees Lebanon as a beach-head, and so cultivates Hezbollah and its strategic abilities as a means of reacting to Israel, to wear Israel down with the ultimate aim of destroying that country, and meanwhile maintaining a balanced deterrent against it.

Over the years the Revolutionary Guards strengthened Hezbollah's military capabilities, granting it over $100 million annually. Iran also supplied the organization with varied weaponry, some of which was used by Hezbollah in the recent conflict. Some of these weapons were used independently and others required Iranian consent before use, such as the C-802 missiles...

Further Iranian assistance to Hezbollah in the recent fighting:

Iran supplied Hezbollah with intelligence about Israel.

Technical assistance in operating weapons: This assistance complemented routine basic training held in Iran at Revolutionary Guards camps and facilities. The two main camps of the Quds Force where non-Iranians are trained are the Imam Ali base in Teheran and Bahunar camp at Kharj north of Teheran. Two Hezbollah terrorists captured by the IDF related that they had been trained by the Revolutionary Guards at the Kharj base. One of them named the commander of an anti-aircraft course in 1999 as Hassan Irelo, a senior Iranian officer in charge of training.

Courses and joint exercises held in Iran for Hezbollah included anti-tank weapons (firing Sagger and Tow missiles), and anti-aircraft missiles. Special efforts were made to train in the use of strategic missiles with ranges of over 75 and 100 km, as well as drones. Revolutionary Guards officers assisted Hezbollah in launching an Iranian drone in November 2004 against Israel.

During recent years the Iranians stepped up supply of weapons to Hezbollah by air. When humanitarian supplies were flown into Iran following the earthquakes in Bam in southeast Iran (Dec 2003-Jan 2004) at least 9 return flights were used to ferry weapons to Hezbollah.

It is estimated that some recent attempts to resupply from Iran were prevented by IDF action. But the huge arsenal amassed over the years gave Hezbollah its "second wind". Iranian leaders have recently admitted publicly to supplying Hezbollah with weapons including long range rockets that threaten Israel...

[Jedburgh]

From the Jamestown Foundation: The Man in Nasrallah's Shadow: A Profile of Sheikh Naim Qasim

Sheikh Naim Qasim, the deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, is one of the most interesting politicians in Lebanon. He is also one of the most under-covered by the Western media because he remains overshadowed by the towering influence of his boss, the charismatic 46-year-old Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Yet the life and career of the number two man in Hezbollah is important since he is the leader who would likely lead the controversial party if Nasrallah were to step down or get killed by Israel...

Additional insights into the man and his perspectives on the organization can be gained from his book, "Hizbullah: The Story from Within".

[SWJED]

1 September Washington Times - Palestinians Aim to Learn from Hezbollah by Joshua Mitnick.

Gunmen from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a militant Palestinian group known for its suicide attacks on Israel, say they envy Hezbollah even as they despair of their own inability to defeat Israeli forces.

"Even though we feel our capabilities are depleted, any chance at striking back we'll take. We have men that will eat stones," said Abu Ameed, who used a nickname for fear of arrest by the Israeli military.

"And if our generation feels a little demoralized, the next generations will not stop."

Mr. Ameed was part of a group of gunmen who spoke with a reporter in a grungy courtyard parking lot in Ramallah. Their disappointment was obvious. The Israeli military can reach them at will, and leaders of their own Fatah party want them to lay down their weapons.

But after Hezbollah held firm against an Israeli invasion for 34 days until an Aug. 14 cease-fire, the Palestinian gunmen say they have hope.

Israeli officials and analysts have expressed concern that Palestinian militants will try to replicate Hezbollah's tactics and "Lebanonize" areas such as the Gaza Strip by smuggling advanced weapons and building bunkers.

The militants, who wore black shirts, said they are trying to learn the lessons of Hezbollah's success, which they attributed partly to the militia's cohesion and discipline...

[Jedburgh]

Published in The Asia Times, 9 Sep 06: How Hi-Tech Hezbollah Called the Shots

Hezbollah's ability to repel the Israel Defense Forces during the recent conflict was largely due to its use of intelligence techniques gleaned from allies Iran and Syria that allowed it to monitor encoded Israeli communications relating to battlefield actions, according to Israeli officials, whose claims have been independently corroborated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). "Israeli EW [electronic warfare] systems were unable to jam the systems at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, they proved unable to jam Hezbollah's command and control links from Lebanon to Iranian facilities in Syria, they (Hezbollah) blocked the Barak ship anti-missile systems, and they hacked into Israeli operations communications in the field..."

...The ability to hack into Israel's military communications gave Hezbollah a decisive battlefield advantage, aside from allowing it to dominate the media war by repeatedly intercepting reports of the casualties it had inflicted and announcing them through its television station, Al-Manar...

[SWJED]

14 September USA Today - Israeli Military Studies Hezbollah's Resilience by Yaakov Katz.

Israel's military has ordered a series of investigations to examine why its armed forces were unable to crush Hezbollah militants during a month of fighting in Lebanon.

Hezbollah guerrillas proved a resilient foe for Israel's vaunted military, inflicting casualties and firing missiles into Israel despite a punishing air campaign. Even after Israel sent thousands of troops into Lebanon, Israeli military commanders were still surprised by Hezbollah's capabilities.

“This is by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world,” said Brig. Gen. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162. His division lost 12 soldiers during an effort by Israel to gain ground days before a United Nations-brokered cease-fire went into effect Aug. 14...

Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year occupation in the south. Hezbollah used the past six years to build a complex network of tunnels and other fortifications in southern Lebanon. Some of these bunkers were found a couple hundred yards from the border with Israel.

Israeli troops, Saguy said, walked into traps Hezbollah had been preparing for six years.

Hezbollah is rearming after Israel lifted the sea and air blockade of Lebanon, allowing the group to get smuggled weapons, some experts say.

“Hezbollah is working to recover its arsenal and will be in several months where it was before the war,” Ganor said.

[Bill Moore]

1. Hezbollah lost several foot soldiers in the conflict. Are they effectively able to recruit replacements? There is a big difference between supporters waving Hezbollah flags and volunteering to fight. If their recruiting trend is improving that would be an area of concern.

2. What is the trend of public support for Hezbollah? Understandably there was mass support for Hezbollah during the recent spat between Israel and Lebanon, since Hezbollah was the only effective force countering "perceived" Israeli aggression; however, now that the dust has settled is the Lebonese public reconsidering their position on the Hezbollah?

If anyone can provide answers to these questions it would be most appreciated.

[Tom Odom]

Bill,

I can provide experienced-based SWAGs:

a. Recruitment will not be a problem among the young Shia in Lebanon. Hiszballah's "victory" may be perceptions-based but that constitutes reality in this matter.

b. Larger support for Hizballah will be greater at least for the near term. Hizballah damage payments to locals and earlier civic minded efforts all work in the organization's favor.

The central questiuon will be how Hizballah, the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army, and the Israelis react to the expanded UNIFIL, one with a much more aggressive mandate and larger troop list.

Frankly, Zur's comments are somewhat obfuscatory; Hizballah's record against the IDF was not a state secret hidden from IDF leaders. And the open press--especially Poole's book on their tactics--had very accurate portrayals of what could be expected, especially the use of caves and caches.

Best

Tom

[CPT Holzbach]

Hezbollah laid ambushes throughout southern Lebanon's hilly terrain, hitting Israel's tanks with some of the world's most advanced anti-tank missiles...Israel's military has asked the government for $2.5 billion to purchase a system capable of detecting and tracking anti-tank missiles and countering them with a launched projectile.

OF COURSE that's what they want to do. They would get better results faster if they just practice their defile drills. Accept the idea that tanks must have significant infantry support in broken, complex terrain (hills, mountains, cities). The tanks by themselves won't be enough. The IDF loves it's flashy, 3rd gen, manuever warfare, but in complex terrain, it's slow going; no faster than the slowest fat ass in the accompanying infantry. The IDF should send units to train with the US forces in Korea. Defile drills are the name of the game in the mech forces there. And it would cost less than $2.5 billion.

[selil]

Hezbollah cracked the code
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationwo...orldnews-print

Hezbollah guerrillas were able to hack into Israeli radio communications during last month's battles in south Lebanon, an intelligence breakthrough that helped them thwart Israeli tank assaults, according to Hezbollah and Lebanese officials.

Using technology most likely supplied by Iran, special Hezbollah teams monitored the constantly changing radio frequencies of Israeli troops on the ground. That gave guerrillas a picture of Israeli movements, casualty reports and supply routes. It also allowed Hezbollah anti-tank units to more effectively target advancing Israeli armor, according to the officials.

"We were able to monitor Israeli communications, and we used this information to adjust our planning," said a Hezbollah commander involved in the battles, speaking on the condition of anonymity. The official refused to detail how Hezbollah was able to intercept and decipher Israeli transmissions. He acknowledged that guerrillas were not able to hack into Israeli communications around the clock.

The Israeli military refused to comment on whether its radio communications were compromised, citing security concerns. But a former Israeli general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Hezbollah's ability to secretly hack into military transmissions had "disastrous" consequences for the Israeli offensive.

[kaur]

Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/p...icyFocus60.pdf

[kaur]

After reading this report I'm wondering how would Hezbollah perform if they could use SAM's as close protection agains Israeli air force. What is your oppinion?

I didn't find any mention of mortarts used by Hezbollah. Couldn't be mortars effective counter measure against infantry that covered Israeli tanks. Report says that Israelis couldn't intercept short range Katyushas. Can we make parallel and say that Israelis are not able to spot possible Hezbollah's mortar batterys. Does anyone know if mortars in that kind of conflict are vulnerable to Israeli counter-battery radars? Is this kind mortar tactics already passed phase on Hezbollah's learning curve?

[Strickland]

I just finished this report last night, along with those "Lessons Learned" pieces on the subject by CSIS - Cordesman. Based off what I read, it appears that Hizb'allah did a considerable amount of damage regardless of the fact as you point out, that there is no mention of the use of mortars or SAMs. However, the report estimates that they were able to engage 48 of 400 tanks that were involved in the operation, and hit over 6,000 homes/business with their rockets, killing or wounding 4800. Thus, while incapable of mitigating the damage done by the Israeli Air Force, they certainly could counter a ground offensive. In the end, our friends the British, Germans, Vietnamese, and Serbs all demonstrated that a determined foe can survive and thrive during a sustained air campaign in the absence of a credible ground threat. In the end, Hizb'allah surely appear to be the "winners" if there was one.

While Hizb'allah is on the short list of FTOs with the US, I definitely think it would cross-over into a different category with the US and the EU if they received a significant quantity of SAMs. I would imagine that the "most-likely" nightmare scenario for most counter-terrorism folks remains a civilian airliner being downed by a missile fired from a lone gunmen (SAM operator).

[Jedburgh]

I believe this is the CSIS piece that Strickland is referring to:

Preliminary "Lessons" of the Israeli-Hezbollah War

[aktarian]

After reading this report I'm wondering how would Hezbollah perform if they could use SAM's as close protection agains Israeli air force. What is your oppinion?

If they would be MANPADS IDF/AF would counter it with different flying procedures and defence measures (something similar to what Soviets had to do in Afghanistan), if it would be any sort of radar guidiance those radars would be first and high priority targets for ARM strikes.

[kaur]

As far as I did understand, big part in countering the rockets was done by armed drones.

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/....html#comments

Katyshas with lower trajectory went unnoticed. The same phenomena was/is in Iraq, where guerillas shot mortars with very low angle. This kind of modus oprandi was very hard to detect for counter battery radars.

In Afganistan the appearce of Stingers changed Soviet tactics against guerillas. They had to fly much higher which ment that accuracy of their attacks was never the same.

In Kosovo/Serbia campiagn the SAM threat made US Air Force very careful. There was unbeliveable number of Wild Weasels per bombers. It would be great media boost for Hezbollah to have 1 downed F-16 or even drone. ... but maybe Iranian sponsors knew that Israelies have some kind of counter measures that make all attempts futile. If I remember correctly Isrealis boastes some time ago that their Air Force does have contermeasures against S-300 (aybe they ment those decoys that US used also against Iraq). There has been talk about anti-SAM lasers for airliners. Maybe fighter planes have those also. If palnes could afford them, I doubt drones do.

It would be very interesting to know why Hezbollah didn't use those simple portable weapons despite the fact that sponsors could afford that.