Suggestions for Small Wars Essay Contest?

[Uboat509]

What about an essay about the roles of SOF and conventional forces in COIN? Prior to OIF, the attitude in the big Army was that COIN was the realm of SOF and they wanted no part of it. That attitude has changed (though not gone away completely) but there is still a disconnect between SOF and the conventional forces. What should each one's role be? What responibilities should be shared and what ones kept sepparate?

Also I was reading one of Kissinger's books and he talked about how the concept of holding the state to the same moral standards as the individual is a relatively new one. At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? The state must of needs do things that the individual would find unpleasant or even abhorent. How do we find and define the line that the state must not cross, even to defend its citizens?

SFC W

[Ron Humphrey]

Also I was reading one of Kissinger's books and he talked about how the concept of holding the state to the same moral standards as the individual is a relatively new one. At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? The state must of needs do things that the individual would find unpleasant or even abhorent. How do we find and define the line that the state must not cross, even to defend its citizens?

SFC W

Good Topic

I would find my personal inclination in this to be that

When and if it becomes more about the security of the state then about the security of the people the line has probably been crossed.

Well intended powers for well intended leaders without taking into account future leadership possibilities can generally lead to this.

It would be a good study

[William F. Owen]

why not ask for paper that Usefully inform practitioners as to the conduct and understanding of modern conflict.

I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it.

[JJackson]

I would like to read the thoughts of others on the responsibilities of States that embark on small wars - or as seems increasingly common - give the nod to others. How to keep a small war from becoming a long war, several related small wars or just a major conflict.
Looking at Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia my concern is differences between transient political regimes are leading to disproportionate humanitarian crisis for the largely innocent civilian population. Would Ethiopia have invaded Somalia if not given tacit permission by the US, and why would the US back such an adventure if not in the hope of recovering some embassy bombing suspects; was the predictable disaster justifiable given the potential gains? Were the UIC really that big a threat?

So in short ethical questions for nation states and I second,

Selil --ethics in small wars?

Uboat509 --At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? [and I would add the state's obligation to protect other civilians from direct and indirect consequences of its actions]

JJ --Rednecks, should they be trusted with guns - discuss?

[Jedburgh]

Intelligence support to small units in urban operations.

Balancing killing and building when conducting SSTRO in a major urban center.

IDPs, refugees, ethnic/sectarian tension and terrorist infrastructure in an urban environment.

Interagency, coalition and host nation cooperation, collaboration and interoperability at the small unit level.

[Rank amateur]

Since war is politics by other means, and we're a democracy, what does the average voter need to know about small wars?

How do we finance small wars? How can we weight the costs versus the benefits?

[Rob Thornton]

Well - One term is now becoming solidified in my new lexicon - Security Sector Reform (SSR). The new FM on Stability Ops is not too far out - Security Force Assistance (SFA) will be a part of it (big hat tip to SWC member Old Eagle for some damned fine witting!).

I vote one of the topics incorporate the broader topic of SSR - this will allow potential authors to cover everything from Inter-Agency work in SSR to Rule of Law.

Under the broader topic we can also include sub and related topics of: advising, working with/in support of indigenous forces, FID, PRT, building partner capacity, etc. While these are often parts and pieces of the same things, or cross into multiple areas which together work toward stability - they fall under the SFA and SSR umbrellas.

I'll sign up to be on the review board.

It will also help our effort here at JCIFSA (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance) by identifying folks interested in the topic, and by some possible ideas from those thinking or working in other areas. Some good threads might be spun off from the papers.

Best Rob

[SWCAdmin]

...who prefers to remain anonymous for some unknown reason. Author does credit the discussion here for some of the thought.

FYI, I got the dreaded SWJ Server Death Grip when I tried to post this yesterday. Fortunately, I can recognize it and know who to call. Need to change our host, and apologies to all the people who aren't reading this now because they can't get through.

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One characteristic of many small wars is that they are asymmetric: one actor possesses considerably more “hard” or military power than the other. Yet many ostensibly weaker powers seem able to negate this advantage through the use of information. Manipulation of existing news outlets (e.g., newspapers and magazines), and creation of new media outlets (e.g., blogs and websites), may permit weaker actors to achieve end states otherwise unattainable. Under what conditions are such information operations most likely to succeed (e.g, during more traditional military operations, such as the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, or during less traditional military operations, such as the pacification of Anbar)? What are the most efficient ways for weaker actors to use information operations to negate their opponents’ military advantages? Conversely, what are the most efficient ways for stronger actors to deny weaker actors such capabilities (e.g., embedding, foreign-language websites, etc.))? Which branch or branches of the US Government are best able to conduct such operations, and in what ways?

The US military has sought to learn counterinsurgency lessons from the experiences of other militaries as well its own. But to some extent, each military is unique. With respect to the US military, to what extent can lessons from other militaries be applied, to what extent are lessons from other militaries inapplicable, and why? What are the dimensions one should assess when importing lessons from other militaries? What makes such lessons applicable or inapplicable – the nature of the US political system (e.g., division of responsibility for prosecution of wars between Congress and the Executive), the nature of the US military (e.g, dissimilar from the British regimental system), the absence of unity of command within a theatre and separate lines of authority between DOD and State, etc.? For example, to what extent should one apply British COIN lessons from Malaya or Kenya, or Russian COIN lessons from Afghanistan, and what rationales dictate which lessons should be applied when (e.g., British lessons should be applied because the British political system is more similar to the US one, or Russian lessons should be applied because it too lacked a small wars tradition)?

The concepts of guerilla war, unconventional war, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, asymmetric conflict, and terrorism – to name a few – overlap to a considerable degree, but also diverge to a similar degree. Not all insurgencies take place within the context of unconventional wars (e.g., actions during the US Revolutionary and Civil Wars), nor do all asymmetric conflicts necessarily involve insurgencies (e.g., the Israel-Lebanon/Hezbollah 2006 war). Accordingly, distinctions between small wars and large wars may be considerably overstated: a war might be characterized as “primarily” “small” or “large,” but nevertheless contain large components of each. To aid to the complexity, militaries – and organizations more generally – can arguably change only slowly and painfully at best, and/or be capable of doing only one thing. Finally, while the United States is currently waging (at a minimum) two counterinsurgencies, the potential of major or large regional conflicts cannot be discounted entirely. Accordingly, to what extent – if at all – should the US military attempt to organize (or reorganize) itself for small wars? Or, conversely, should the US military be content with the progress it has made in drafting FM 3-24, and reorienting itself toward small wars, and decide its change has been sufficient? What tradeoffs, if any, should be made?

[SteveO]

Not only private contractors, but all non-state armed groups. USG-contracted armed groups fighting ideological or criminal armed groups - sort of like what's happening in Colombia. Is that a small war?

Another idea for an essay prompt. Influence or information operations and strategic communication in small wars - winning minds and wills - both in the area of operations and in the global public square.

One last one, a couple of people have mentioned it. The interagency in small wars, but not just the Federal IA - public, private, nonprofit, and even super empowered individuals in coalitions of the willing. How could we attract all, or many, of the elements for good into a unified effort? should we?

You may want to include an option for people to write whatever they want to keep the new ideas flowing. You never know what you're gonna get.

[SWJED]

[Geoff]

What about the simple ones, I'm probably re-hashing some of the things that have been discussed, c'set la vie.

Reconstruction after conflict - an invaders responsibility?
The soldier of the future - a geek, sneak or killer?

I do like the idea about Rednecks and guns, does the use of Monster trucks in modern warfare follow on, or is it assumed?

Cheers

Geoff

[wm]

I do like the idea about Rednecks and guns, does the use of Monster trucks in modern warfare follow on, or is it assumed?

At last the mysterious attraction for MRAPS is revealed--Is it the Monster of all Monster trucks?

[Cavguy]

I'd offer a contest for the tactical level.

I would like to see a contest focused to the tactical level - BN and below. We have a plethora of studies, think tank reports, op-eds, etc. on whole of government and larger issues.

What we are not seeing is a large density of high quality work on the small stuff that makes tactical level COIN successful or unsuccessful. For the most part the branch journals have a hard time attracting these sort of articles, and when they are published they don't hit the mainstream.

SWJ should encourage the works of the CPT/LT/SGT level, which aren't as common.

Just my thoughts.

[slapout9]

I'd offer a contest for the tactical level.

I would like to see a contest focused to the tactical level - BN and below. We have a plethora of studies, think tank reports, op-eds, etc. on whole of government and larger issues.

What we are not seeing is a large density of high quality work on the small stuff that makes tactical level COIN successful or unsuccessful. For the most part the branch journals have a hard time attracting these sort of articles, and when they are published they don't hit the mainstream.

SWJ should encourage the works of the CPT/LT/SGT level, which aren't as common.

Just my thoughts.

Ditto, all this Strategical Stuff tends to overshadow the fact that sooner or later it gets down to the tactical level of how are you going to do this.

[Adam L]

why not ask for paper that Usefully inform practitioners as to the conduct and understanding of modern conflict.

I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it.

Well said, I know exactly what you mean. In the past few years, I have found in almost every area I have studied this almost irrepressible movement to categorize and separate issues to death. In theory, everything can be separated, analyzed and turned black and white. In reality everything is one big greyish area. To try to "keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict" (William F Owen) is akin to not allowing surgeons to consult non-surgical specialties.

Adam L

[Bodhi]

---The Irony of "Small" Wars: They're Not Just for the Military to Execute
---Are Small Wars Any More "Political" Than Conventional Wars?
---AS/D SOLIC: The Case for a Similar Arm within Each Governmental Department
---Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War"?
---If Small Wars Are So "Small," Then Why Do Great Powers Struggle With Their Execution?

[slapout9]

1-SBW theory (Slapout Based Warfare) VS: Small Wars Theory

2-History of Law Enforcement influcene COIN TTP's.

3-Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less.

4-Economic Targets as The Key to Winning Small Wars.

5- How The Police Would Fight And Win Small Wars.

[Ken White]

"I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it."

and I think Bodhi summed up the question fairly well:

"--Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War"?"

so I'll second the motion on that question.

I think Slapout has a valid point on costs (of all sorts) with his number 3 topic:

"3-Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less."

and second it.

Also suggest:

-- Improving Officer and Enlisted accession training to better prepare for future threats.

And, channeling Steve Metz:

-- Will the American body politic support small wars that can be lengthy?

For JJackson, who above suggests:

"JJ --Rednecks, should they be trusted with guns - discuss?"

That also is a good suggestion, seriously -- as it implies we Americans are not to be trusted with dangerous toys, a valid question.

While I'm sure many in the world would agree, I'm equally sure many more would not and would rather we, with all our faults, have them than some others. In any event, to reassure him, I can attest that this heir to all the Scotch Irish Presbyterian genetic flaws has six firearms in the house; that all three of my sons have about the same on average and none of us thus far have killed or wounded anyone we weren't supposed to; therefor he can sleep soundly. Unless he suffers a home invasion -- a phenomena which for some really strange reason seems to be a great deal more prevalent in his locale than it does in mine...

So, these four for consideration:

-- Who Rightfully Defines the Term, "Small War," and Is There Really Such A Thing As a "Small War?" (Seconded, from Bodhi)

-- Small Wars on $5.00 a day or less. (Seconded, from Slapout)

-- Improving Officer and Enlisted accession training to better prepare for future threats.

-- Will the American body politic support small wars that can be lengthy?

[Adam L]

-- Improving Officer and Enlisted accession training to better prepare for future threats.

I'll second that.

And, channeling Steve Metz:

-- Will the American body politic support small wars that can be lengthy?

I think this is a little too narrow and already answered (possibly.) How about expanding it to include possible methods to employ in order to increase understanding of small wars. Perhaps an essay about the best methods to depoliticize the discussion an analyis of Small Wars. Basically an essay about how to improve Small Wars PR.

Adam L

[Surferbeetle]

What about an essay about the roles of SOF and conventional forces in COIN? Prior to OIF, the attitude in the big Army was that COIN was the realm of SOF and they wanted no part of it. That attitude has changed (though not gone away completely) but there is still a disconnect between SOF and the conventional forces. What should each one's role be? What responsibilities should be shared and what ones kept

Uboat509,

This quote of yours has been pinging around in my head today, that and the iPhone comment you lucky...

I would like to share an experience with you that changed my thinking about things SOF. "No ####, so there I was..."

The 2000 copy of FM 41-10 has figure 1-1 which provides a nice clean visual about the continuum of conflict and how we CA-bubbas try and drain the swamp throughout the full-spectrum of things. This is the picture that was in my mind when I hit the ground in Iraq in 2003.

Iraq covers about 167400 square miles / 433400 square kilometers depending upon which website you quote and in this large area I was very aware that SOF were in short supply and conventional forces were plentiful. My AO was too large for me to cover every day but the 101st did a damn fine job of it. When then MG Petraeus shifted the whole DIV from 'Cordon and Search' to 'Cordon and Knock' operations I realized that US conventional forces are capable of COIN op's. When MG Petraeus had his BCT commanders meet with the locals, id problems and work to resolve them I saw that with the right leader and given time and experience conventional forces can excel at COIN. Necessity is the mother of invention and with the current situation Big Army has no choice but to excel at COIN and to keep those skills sharp or risk losing this fight and future fights.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and we have learned this lesson in spades. For SOF, I am of the opinion that we need to ensure that we are regularly inserted further upstream in the time continuum in AO's of concern to US interests to conduct our missions before things get to where they are today. SOF must also effectively educate, advise, and train with our conventional forces on our mission just as we do with host nations. Failure to effectively execute either of these missions is harmful to the nation. In the meantime we all need to play team and kick some ass.

My 0.02 cents,

Steve