French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)

[Ken White]

... he fit into the supporting Vietnam loss-narrative that had Creighton Abrams as the guy who got it right because he understood the so-called primacy in any Coin op of the “people” and Westmoreland as the conventional minded, big battle fool (Andre Birtle’s excellent new book on the history of Coin in the American Army goes a long way at debunking this myth) because he purportedly only wanted to go out and kill people and blow things up...

Could you please provide the title of Birtle's book; cannot find it or him through Google. I'll be interested in reading it.

Can't speak for anything in Viet Nam after my last trip in '68 but from 62 until the fall of 68 with two short trips and two tours and fairly diverse service in all four corps areas, I'll be interested to see if he properly gives credit to the Division and Brigade commanders like Harry Kinnard and Willard Pearson who did what needed to be done in spite of MACV and to Bruce Palmer, the DepComUSMACV who like Westmoreland, understood the problem.

The difference between Palmer the Calvaryman with Pacific experience and his boss, the Artillerist turned Infantryman with European experience was that Palmer also knew what needed to be done while Westmoreland did not...

...Writers like L. Sorely in the 90s created the notion that the Vietnam war was winnable if we had just allowed General Abrams to continue his “population centric” approach. But alas those pesky politicians, the will-lacking American people, and the evil MSM pulled the rug out from under him, or so the story goes.

I have read Sorley's book and while not in country during the period, the narrative is, IMO, totally credible. Yes, that's the way the story goes -- and there's a great deal of validity in it. I suggest the the problem was not will-lacking people or the evil MSM (they aren't evil, just stupid) but the politicians did have an effect -- and there is no question that the US Army bears the brunt of the responsibility for failure in Viet Nam due to inept political guidance (outside the Army's control) and inept tactics from 1962 until 1968 (the Army's purview).

I have argued in other places that the American Army’s current operational doctrine is no longer FM 3-0 but instead FM 3-24 counterinsurgency. In fact one could prove this by simply taking Galula’s book, removing the historical and contextual references by bringing them up to date, give this document to a LT or SFC just returned from Iraq or Afghanistan, ask them what they had just read, and you would get an answer like, “Oh I just read a summary of FM 3-24.” Ask these same individuals to summarize the Army’s new overall operational doctrine or FM 3-0 and they could not even come close...

I suggest that since what the troops are now doing has a significant impact on what they think and read, that the fact they spew COIN is to be expected -- and that it is no big thing; they can adapt and will if they have to. As Schmedlap pointed out elsewhere, regardless of bad command decisions, the troops on the ground figured it out and did what needed to be done in spite of poor command guidance. That was true in Viet Nam and is true in Afghanistan and Iraq. It'll be true tomorrow as well...

I'd also suggest that the average LT may be aware of FM 3-24 and that may not be true of FM 3-0. I very strongly doubt the average SFC pays much attention to either. That's okay, too...

...Is our Army, as General Casey has warned, “out of balance?” I think it is.

Possibly true, certainly the focus now -- understandably -- is on COIN and training is strongly biased in that direction in units also understandably because that's what they're doing. My spies tell me that ain't necessarily true in the schoolhouse...

And that is a good thing.

... main cause of the lowered levels of violence but the neo-con spin machine would have us believe otherwise (see in this regard Kim Kagan’s newest oped running today in the WSJ.)

I don't pay any attention to the domestic politics of the situation because various ideologies come and go and most are meaningless froth. The neo con foolishness of today is not nearly as inimical to the nation as was the the liberal foolishness of the 60s. I do agree that, militarily, the surge had little bearing on the overall effort in Iraq. As to whether that surge adversely impacted the institution that is the US Army; possibly. Too soon to tell. I do know that the Army's been around for over 200 years and has seen worse times than today. It's seen worse times in my lifetime for that matter...

... How else does one explain recent criticisms of certain Nato countries conducting Coin in Afghanistan?

Never underestimate the power of a Spook to say A to cause B to happen to provoke C to do D...

Galula needs to be challenged and read with a historical mindedness; that is to say we should not be looking to the past as a pool of lessons learned to be plucked at will, turned into doctrine, then applied dogmatically on the ground. This is not history but a pop-process of the production of lessons learned. It is hurting us more than helping us.

We can agree on the bulk of that; my only reservation is on the last sentence; I'm not at all sure it has done that at this time. It has the potential to do that and you are wise to counsel avoiding that result. It would also be wise not to return to total disavowal of COIN...