Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
I push the button by using terms like "buying off our enemies" because so many have convinced themselves that American military power has been the primary agent for the lowering of violence in Iraq in Summer 2007. I am sorry but i just dont view it that way; and a cold hard look at the evidence should cause others to question the narrative too.

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Getting at the primary mechansim for the lowering of violence in Summer 2007 is absolutely critical here. Most assume that it was American military power using new doctrine and more troops that did it. From that point to the past the narrative is built that prior to that point we just didnt get things right because we did not have the right doctrine and were not practicing the right methods. Too from that causal point into the future we say that since success in Iraq is primarily because of us we build future plans of action from tactics all the way up to national policy based on this incorrect assessment of causation. Looking at this from the opposite angle, if American military power in its form in Summer 2007 was not at all the primary mechanism for lowering of violence then the way one views the past as essentially a continuation of the same method and tactics since 2004 makes sense. And the future course certainly looks different from the path we are on now. Hence the importance i place on getting at the truth.
From FM 3-24.

6-39. Another organizational approach is establishing home guard units. In many COIN operations, these units have effectively provided increased security to the populace. Home guards are part-time, lightly armed, local security forces under HN government control. Often, career military and police officers supervise home guards at the provincial and national levels. Home guards provide point security. They guard vital installations that insurgents will likely target, such as government buildings and businesses. Home guards can also provide security for small villages and man gates and checkpoints. While home guards are not trained to conduct offensive operations, their constant presence reminds the populace that the HN government can provide security. Effective home guards can free police and military forces from stationary guard duties.

6-48. Appropriate compensation levels help prevent a culture of corruption in the security forces. It is cheaper to spend the money needed for adequate wages and produce effective security forces than to pay less and end up with corrupt and abusive forces that alienate the populace. Paying the police adequately is especially important; the nature of their duties and contact with the civilian community often expose them to opportunities for corruption. (Table 6-3 lists some important considerations concerning security force pay.)
The formation of CLC would be consistent with the published COIN doctrine. While not an exact application, as demonstrated by the consternation of the Iraqi central government at the formation of many of the CLC groups, one could argue that instead of 3-24 transitioning beyond doctrine (the starting point on how to think about COIN operations) to dogma (a "bible" that one cannot deviate from), it is serving its proper role as a way to frame a point of departure on how to operate.