Software bugs are seemingly universal in modern military equipment - the extreme example being the AMRAAM, whose software spent the better part of 15 years in development. Things like software bugs and logistical issues like spare parts don't seem to me to be that big of a deal - as long as they get sorted out ASAP, and aren't putting people's lives in undue risk in the meantime.

I don't understand a great deal about the thinking behind the MGS concept - as Van says, the tank destroyer concept has long been problematic. It's as if the Army is hybridizing a vehicle without a truly separate niche to fill. It's analogous - at least to me - to the battlecruiser concept of the early 20th century - cheaper, lighter, faster than a battleship, but more capable (in theory) than a cruiser. Of course, without a true combat niche, commanders used them like battleships, with disastrous results (Jutland, HMS Hood, etc, etc).

If the idea is to get tank-like gun firepower into an SBCT's TO&E, wouldn't it eventually end up like the battlecruiser? That is, when they really need an M1, an MGS just won't be up to the task? After all, the point of the ATGM was to enable a lighter vehicle (or infantry) to kill a hard target, correct?

One final question. What's the difference between the MGS and the canceled M8 'Buford' air-dropped light armor concept? I think a lighter vehicle could have real benefit in stability ops - firepower without the intimidation and nuisance factor of the 68-ton tank, and the airmobile idea would give airborne capabilities more like the old Soviet airborne had - some of which proved effective on occasion in Afghanistan.

But if the MGS's role is truly substituting for tanks in the SBCT, I think there exists the dangerous possibility of using them like tanks, which they are not.

Matt