Bill, I don't believe anyone is stating that in the "old days" they executed better - or that we are mirror-imaging ideals of yore onto the COE. However, I still argue that much of those hard-learned lessons of our predecessors, learned at the expense of blood and national treasure, were ignored by the conventional Army until we reached a crisis point. Despite the differences between now and then, there are many insightful pieces dissecting the many mistakes made at the time that have only been brought into professional discussion after we are faced with near-disaster. The almost complete ignorance/dismissal for so long of such a large chunk of material in the professional development of soldiers and leaders was inexcusable. Particularly in the light of the nature of ops we were executing even before OEF/OIF. Thankfully, we are doing much better in that regard these days. Although I would also state that there are still great gaps between operational reality and TRADOC POIs in how we are training many critical MOSs.Originally Posted by Bill Moore
We also didn't do so well with small wars during the Cold War era because we often focused too much on the bipolar superpower conflict in each case and ignored the real underlying issues in the conflict. This permitted the warring parties to manipulate the superpower standoff to gain support of one or the other to their own ends, and the superpowers went along with their focus narrowed by blinders....Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I agree with you wholeheartedly. Lack of proper planning and poor target selection achieves results commensurate with the effort. However, a massive chunk of that resides at the national political level and there is little the military can do except plan and execute to the best of its ability within the parameters that the political leaders provide.Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Bookmarks