Intro to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars

[Jedburgh]

...Small Wars...,...Partisan Warfare...,...Irregular Warfare...,...Guerrilla War...,...Unconventional Warfare...,...Insurgency/Counterinsurgency...,...Low Intensity Conflict...,...Military Operations Other Than War...,...Asymetric Warfare...,...Fourth Generation Warfare….

Next?

[slapout9]

How about "Undeclared Warfare" ?

[RTK]

How about "Undeclared Warfare" ?

Unleavened Warfare

[Martin]

Active unfriendliness.

[Bill Moore]

PLAYING WITH WAR
The western way of war in the 21st century is a pale shadow of the warfare it waged in the 20th. The reason is simple: for western societies war is no longer existential. Instead, it's increasingly about smoothing market flows and tertiary moral concerns/threats. As a result of this diminishment of motivation, western warfare is now afflicted with the following:
Operations of low lethality. Western militaries do not have the desire, nor the sanction, to conduct the high casualty operations typically associated with real wars. Technology has been leveraged to increase the precision of attacks to limit collateral damage and save the lives of soldiers. The corollary to this is that western militaries are also fiercely protective of the lives of their soldiers. Warfare, increasingly, is supposed to be costless. What this means is that we will not see Sherman's 'March to the Sea' or Hama in the near future - and - the loss of a hundred soldiers in southern Lebanon will be enough to stop the Israeli army.
Marginal placement within national priorities. Militaries are increasingly professional (with a trend towards the use of mercenaries) and conscription has become impossible. This drastically limits the number of soldiers that can be applied to any conflict. In addition, to retain competitive positioning on the global stage, states and their economies are operated as if war is not going on. To wit: military budgets are considered just another line item on a more complex national budget. Gone are the days of massive mobilization and economic restructuring for war.
Muddled objectives. Given the lack of the cohesive and singular reason for war -- the survival of the state and its people through the elimination of its enemies -- the reasons for warfare will drift. This translates into a constantly shifting landscape of military objectives, where current objectives recede in favor of replacements before they can be reached. The result is confusion, mission creep, and conflict escalation.

This was recent post on John Robb's Global Guerrilla site. The underlining and bold print are mine for emphasis.

Terminology is critical to facilitate clear thinking, and since several terms were thrown out at random to try to describe what we're dealing with in OIF and more important globally that indicates to me we don't have a clear understanding of what we're countering. Clausewitz fans know the importance of knowing the absolute importance of clarifying the nature of the war you’re about to enter, or in our case have already entered so you can develop a suitable strategy. I concur with Mr Robb's thought that the reason for the conflict will drift if we’re in a prolonged conflict. This phenomenon is compounded when the nature of the war changes concurrently with our objectives. I concur with our President when he said this will be a different type of war. I think the military has not evolved its doctrine sufficiently to deal with it. Using the past as prologue is useful only to a point.

[SWJED]

Here is a link to Robb's Global Guerrillas post - Playing with War.

Herschel Smith also addressed this subject matter on his The Captain's Journal blog in a post called Small Wars:

... Mr. Robb probably knows about one thousand times as much about the current subject as I do. So it is with all due respect that I say that I think that his characterization of the problem(s) is incomplete.

Having a son in the Marines, I study everything I can get my hands on pertaining to his training, the history of the Marines, the nature of the current conflict, and what he will likely be doing in several months.

One of the more interesting things that I have learned is the concept of “small wars.” I highly recommend reading the Small Wars Manual, and I especially recommend visiting the Marine Corps Small Wars web site and another site called Small Wars Journal. I make a daily visit to these sites (and sometimes more).

What Mr. Robb describes has already been described in detail in the Small Wars Manual. In fact, the Marines have known this not since the publication of the manual in the early ’40s, but essentially since the birthday of the Marines, 10 November 1775.

Since their birthday, the Marines have been engaged in small, low intensity conflicts at the behest of the President, oftentimes without the support of the public, without a declaration of war, and without clear goals or orders, while battling both regular forces and insurgencies and while also having to deal with more pedestrian issues such as electrical power and the restoration of government. Such engagements have often relied upon rapid, mobile and robust force projection.

The above paragraph is not an advertisement. The Small Wars Manual is as salient today as it was when it was first published. It is an admonition for the Army to consider its future. The Marines have had to adapt, modify, adjust and make-do based on the changing conditions of the over three hundred low intensity engagements in its history. The Army will do the same, or it will become irrelevant to the twenty first century.

If this type of warfare is not new, then what has changed? My contention is that politics has changed...

[Martin]

This was recent post on John Robb's Global Guerrilla site. The underlining and bold print are mine for emphasis.

Terminology is critical to facilitate clear thinking, and since several terms were thrown out at random to try to describe what we're dealing with in OIF and more important globally that indicates to me we don't have a clear understanding of what we're countering. Clausewitz fans know the importance of knowing the absolute importance of clarifying the nature of the war you’re about to enter, or in our case have already entered so you can develop a suitable strategy. I concur with Mr Robb's thought that the reason for the conflict will drift if we’re in a prolonged conflict. This phenomenon is compounded when the nature of the war changes concurrently with our objectives. I concur with our President when he said this will be a different type of war. I think the military has not evolved its doctrine sufficiently to deal with it. Using the past as prologue is useful only to a point.

Sorry, Sir, I'll turn serious again.

What do you think about Joint Publication 1-02?

The following two threads on the Professional Soldiers forum may interest you:
Some definitions
Insurgency-Civil War