Now this is an interesting thread. While I would qualify Wilf's paraphrasing of some of my earlier statements by saying that I was thinking of Formation-level (Brigade- and especially Division-level in particular) ops, and that I certainly do not rule out the same operations for Major and Minor Units Sub-Units, I am nevertheless in agreement with Wilf's statement about the "Opponents" rather than the "Conflict", making for a defining characteristic of the sort of War that one is fighting.

Certainly, as at both Battles of Fallujah, Ramadi, and a few other places in Iraq, and at Second Panjwai in Afghanistan, more "Conventional"-type combiend-arms operations at Major-Unit and even Minor Formation-level were required because of the capabilities of the enemy at the time and place. That said, those same opponent capabilities have largely defined both wars as Insurgencies that certainly do not require the ability of entire divisions to conduct such operations as passage of lines as needed, and found wanting, in 1991.

But as Eden has noted, this has led to a situation in which much of a generation of commanders has little or no experience in Formation- or even Major-Unit operations. Gian has been trying to get this point across for some time now, and this "Canadianization" of even the US Army may lead to well-trained Minor-Units, but also to an almost complete absense of proficiency in anything above that level.