Results 1 to 19 of 19

Thread: How we fight Wars?

Threaded View

Previous Post Previous Post   Next Post Next Post
  1. #6
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Posts
    1,127

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Norfolk View Post
    But as Eden has noted, this has led to a situation in which much of a generation of commanders has little or no experience in Formation- or even Major-Unit operations. Gian has been trying to get this point across for some time now, and this "Canadianization" of even the US Army may lead to well-trained Minor-Units, but also to an almost complete absense of proficiency in anything above that level.
    And as I said before, yes and no. By necessity, our operational force is COIN focused. Our institution is almost fully MCO focused in its education. Grab a POI for any PME course and you'll see what I mean. With 15 Brigades indefinitely in Iraq and two in A-Stan, the U.S. Army simply doesn't have the manpower to train for anything but the current fight.

    The larger question remains -- not whether being COIN-only focused is bad, or whether MCO focus only is bad (ample evidence for both). The really important question is how we balance the two as these conflicts begin to wind down, and how we balance both the institutional base and the operational force to do both - and what that mix should be.

    The handwringing over MCO skill loss and condemnation of COIN isn't moving the ball. Being unprepared in mindset and doctrine for COIN in 2003 has been disasterous for the U.S. Army and the national strategic posture and the future health of the force. We have to find the balance.

    And I agree, there is a lot of task commonality - the same training is needed to operate an M-16 regardless of the environment. The disucssion doesn't necessairly have to change the TASKS or STANDARDS, only the CONDITIONS the task is performed under. The considerations of moving to contact is different in urban versus rural. Breaching a mehidi army obstacle in Najaf requires similar processes as a heavy breach. The condition of performing many tasks changes, and the associated considerations. There are very few new "tasks" needed for a MCO AND COIN capable force. Training them under a diversity of conditions is one partial solution.
    Last edited by Cavguy; 02-06-2008 at 08:29 PM.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •