And as I said before, yes and no. By necessity, our operational force is COIN focused. Our institution is almost fully MCO focused in its education. Grab a POI for any PME course and you'll see what I mean. With 15 Brigades indefinitely in Iraq and two in A-Stan, the U.S. Army simply doesn't have the manpower to train for anything but the current fight.
The larger question remains -- not whether being COIN-only focused is bad, or whether MCO focus only is bad (ample evidence for both). The really important question is how we balance the two as these conflicts begin to wind down, and how we balance both the institutional base and the operational force to do both - and what that mix should be.
The handwringing over MCO skill loss and condemnation of COIN isn't moving the ball. Being unprepared in mindset and doctrine for COIN in 2003 has been disasterous for the U.S. Army and the national strategic posture and the future health of the force. We have to find the balance.
And I agree, there is a lot of task commonality - the same training is needed to operate an M-16 regardless of the environment. The disucssion doesn't necessairly have to change the TASKS or STANDARDS, only the CONDITIONS the task is performed under. The considerations of moving to contact is different in urban versus rural. Breaching a mehidi army obstacle in Najaf requires similar processes as a heavy breach. The condition of performing many tasks changes, and the associated considerations. There are very few new "tasks" needed for a MCO AND COIN capable force. Training them under a diversity of conditions is one partial solution.
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