How we fight Wars?

[William F. Owen]

My pre-occupation here is the need to differentiate between opponents rather than conflicts.

A while ago, good ole Norfolk made an interesting observation, which was that in general fighting a so-called peer-competitor required the mastery of such complex operations, such as “passage of lines,” and I would add “opposed breaching and obstacle crossing.”

He went on to suggest (and jump in here Norfolk if I am paraphrasing too much) that such operations were not present in so-called COIN. – This I believe to be generally accurate.

So we have to do things because the enemy has capabilities that force us to conduct certain types of operation? Is this correct?

This may be a statement of the bl**dy, or "Boydian" obvious, but if anyone has any deeper or more relevant insights, post away or PM me.

[jcustis]

I would argue that even in an OIF context, we still do passage of lines. It just isn't quite as detailed as it may be against a heavy-mech foe as you surge forward into an ATK Position. The coordination is still made, the weapons status can still change, etc.

This is at least in units that I think maintained a degree of "tactical professionalism" so to speak, even if engage in a fight against lesser capability.

You're on point, because most often enough, a lot of folks don't like to do things because of the time and energy involved, and thus it can be true that the only reason why they get away with it is because no one (i.e. the enemy) was able to call them on it.

[Eden]

I think if you raise your sight picture higher you'll see that we do a lot of different things and a lot of things differently depending on the nature of the war that we are fighting.

There are a lot of things that are very similar - translatable skills - regardless of the type of war. In Afghanistan I witnessed Canadians breaching obstacles, conducting river crossings, calling in air strikes, etc., all against a strongly entrenched and relatively well-equipped enemy. Some American outposts employed claymores, final protective fires, and barbed wire against determined infantry assaults. There are artillerymen out there getting excellent training in counterfire techniques, the integration of LCMR, surveillance, and aviation.

What you don't get are the higher-level command and staff functions. Just a few examples: Intelligence officers are doing things they did not routinely do in the past, such as link analysis, pattern-of-life analysis, or uncovering the economics of IEDs. What they are not doing is the deep terrain analysis and templating that used to be their stock in trade. Aviators, air defenders, artillerymen, intelligence officers, and operations officers are not planning deep strike or SEAD missions. Public Affairs officers, lawyers, and information operators are deeply involved in core staff activities in ways they will not be in high-intensity combat. Battalion and Brigade commanders are conducting - when they really know their business - complex, distributed operations but will have little opportunity to employ their units in a single operation.

Soon, if we haven't already reached that point, we will have senior leaders who have rarely commanded and controlled a battalion, let alone a brigade, in a single place for a single objective. Many field grade officers will never have participated in such an operation, even in training. They will have a schoolhouse understanding of how such operations work, but little experience in how to anticipate, overcome, or take advantage of the friction of high-intensity combat. Those skills, and many others, will rot.

It is an inevitable consequence of fighting small wars. Excellent, maybe even better, platoons and companies; a cadre of leaders who have seen the elephant; but staffs and higher level echelons poorly prepared for large-scale operations.

[Maximus]

I stated in an earlier post that "war" is "war" is "war." In my opinion, same thing holds true here. The principles / fundamentals / considerations for a successful relief-in-place operation in Korea in 1951 were the same they were for Chamberlain in 1863 and the same they are today in Iraq or Afghanistan, namely, exchange liaisons, know the battlespace, do a detailed recon, bring key leaders, UNDERSTAND OR IN "BOYDIAN SPEAK" ORIENT ON YOUR ENEMY, execution of the RIP is the most dangerous part of the operation because the enemy has exeprience on the ground and you don't, etc. Not much changes in most operations. Except today, because, as JCustis points out, some have lost their tactical skill or professionalism, we need Kilcullen to write rules such as "prep for your turnover from day 1" so that we remember how important it is to arm our successor with information about the enemy, the terrain, be this "human" or physical, weather, etc. when conducting a RIP.

WRT Small Wars might not involve opposed breaching, etc. Not always the case. Experienced much of this in Najaf in Aug '04. Insurgents rolling 55-gallon drums of fuel down hills at our tanks, booby-trapped entry ways, the entire cemetery being rigged with "IEDs" not mines. This was "war" in every sense of the word, and very similar to what Israel recently experienced against Hezbollah in S Lebanon. This is also why I think we need a balanced force that trains across the entire spectrum of operations. Dealing with this fight was very hard, but then again, trying to figure out the complex nature of the Mahdi Army after the shooting stopped was just as difficult, if not more difficult. And then rebuilding indigenous forces, fixing everything we blew up, etc. was an entirely different challenge.

WRT to differences for higher level commands and staffs... not sure that I agree. A battalion commander today generally has a much larger AO and units dispersed all over the place. I'd argue in many ways this is harder to command than a battalion consolidated in vehicles pushing North along a highway. Depending on training, maybe the battalion's lost some of the art of Desert Storm Combined Arms warfare, but even here, how realistic is it that an enemy in the future will sit in the open desert against a western military. This was one of Israeli's biggest problems; Hezbollah "hugged" the IDF ground forces, fighting from well-concealed and fortified bunkers that often didn't engage until the IDF was within danger close of most supporting arms or CAS. As to differences in intel functions, I definitely think we short-changed intel in the past and are now only catching up. For example, in OIF I, in the "conventional" phase of the war, when pushing North along Rte 7 to Al Kut and later up Rte 6 to Baghdad, I would have never thought to nor was I ever asked to take a picture of the enemy that we encountered, have a runner pass this to S-2 or e-mailing it up... yet, doing this would have armed the S-2 and potentially the entire battalion if not MEF with more info on who we were fighting based on uniform, weapons, fighting positions, etc. This would have subsequently allowed us all to better "orient" on the battlefield.

Changing subjects a bit, I find those who argue Boyd and his OODA loop are too obvious or useless, interesting. Most junior officers and SNCOs that I know, after reading Coram's book on Boyd or being introduced to the more complex version of the OODA loop, the one that emphasizes the orient phase, find this model extremely valuable in understanding the decision-making process, particularly when tryiing to understand enemy motivations, strategy, intent. These same Marines often wonder why they were never introduced to this model in formal schools...

[Norfolk]

Now this is an interesting thread. While I would qualify Wilf's paraphrasing of some of my earlier statements by saying that I was thinking of Formation-level (Brigade- and especially Division-level in particular) ops, and that I certainly do not rule out the same operations for Major and Minor Units Sub-Units, I am nevertheless in agreement with Wilf's statement about the "Opponents" rather than the "Conflict", making for a defining characteristic of the sort of War that one is fighting.

Certainly, as at both Battles of Fallujah, Ramadi, and a few other places in Iraq, and at Second Panjwai in Afghanistan, more "Conventional"-type combiend-arms operations at Major-Unit and even Minor Formation-level were required because of the capabilities of the enemy at the time and place. That said, those same opponent capabilities have largely defined both wars as Insurgencies that certainly do not require the ability of entire divisions to conduct such operations as passage of lines as needed, and found wanting, in 1991.

But as Eden has noted, this has led to a situation in which much of a generation of commanders has little or no experience in Formation- or even Major-Unit operations. Gian has been trying to get this point across for some time now, and this "Canadianization" of even the US Army may lead to well-trained Minor-Units, but also to an almost complete absense of proficiency in anything above that level.

[Cavguy]

But as Eden has noted, this has led to a situation in which much of a generation of commanders has little or no experience in Formation- or even Major-Unit operations. Gian has been trying to get this point across for some time now, and this "Canadianization" of even the US Army may lead to well-trained Minor-Units, but also to an almost complete absense of proficiency in anything above that level.

And as I said before, yes and no. By necessity, our operational force is COIN focused. Our institution is almost fully MCO focused in its education. Grab a POI for any PME course and you'll see what I mean. With 15 Brigades indefinitely in Iraq and two in A-Stan, the U.S. Army simply doesn't have the manpower to train for anything but the current fight.

The larger question remains -- not whether being COIN-only focused is bad, or whether MCO focus only is bad (ample evidence for both). The really important question is how we balance the two as these conflicts begin to wind down, and how we balance both the institutional base and the operational force to do both - and what that mix should be.

The handwringing over MCO skill loss and condemnation of COIN isn't moving the ball. Being unprepared in mindset and doctrine for COIN in 2003 has been disasterous for the U.S. Army and the national strategic posture and the future health of the force. We have to find the balance.

And I agree, there is a lot of task commonality - the same training is needed to operate an M-16 regardless of the environment. The disucssion doesn't necessairly have to change the TASKS or STANDARDS, only the CONDITIONS the task is performed under. The considerations of moving to contact is different in urban versus rural. Breaching a mehidi army obstacle in Najaf requires similar processes as a heavy breach. The condition of performing many tasks changes, and the associated considerations. There are very few new "tasks" needed for a MCO AND COIN capable force. Training them under a diversity of conditions is one partial solution.

[Eden]

I don't claim that COIN is harder or easier than conventional warfighting, or that a battalion commander has a simpler or more complex job. Running stability ops in a non-permissive environment is in many ways more demanding and more challenging than defending the Whale or the Fulda Gap. All that I am saying is that they are different and they demand a different set of skills, many of which are perishable.

For one thing, the level at which one operates is entirely different. Division commanders in conventional war are tactical leaders; they are operational leaders in COIN. Even within levels of war the same missions require different skill sets even if they share common principles. Maximus used the example of the RIP. Well, a company relief-in-place in conventional war is far different than a company relief-in-place in Anbar province. That's why we had to (re)train company commanders to do it properly and relearn a host of lessons. That's why it takes a companies several weeks to properly do a RIP in Anbar as opposed to several hours or a day in Korea. And I doubt if any company commander today could do it properly in 1863 without significant (re)training and a long checklist. Common skills also carry more or less weight, and consequently get more or less attention. Being able to put a sabot round through a pie plate at two miles while on the move was the raison d'etre of tankers at one time - that's why we had four gunnery cycles per year. I've met armor captains in the last few years who have never done a full-scale gunnery exercise. For tankers, this is the third sign of the apocalypse, and I'm sure there are air defenders and artillerymen who have similar hair-raising stories.

I make no value judgments; small wars is what we have been directed to do and that is what we need to prepare for, but conventional warfighting skills are, in the words of the Boss, "goin' fast, and they ain't comin' back." They are fragile - easily subject to skill fade - and hard to recover once lost. I think this is inevitable, and all I ask is that we recognize it as a problem - maybe one to deal with in the future, but still a problem.

[Ken White]

...All that I am saying is that they are different and they demand a different set of skills, many of which are perishable.

Totally agree -- but would submit that like all cognitive skills, once learned they rust if not used but they also come back very quickly with minimal refresher. That's why I keep yelling our initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted, needs to be improved.

For one thing, the level at which one operates is entirely different. Division commanders in conventional war are tactical leaders; they are operational leaders in COIN. Even within levels of war the same missions require different skill sets even if they share common principles.

Also quite true but the comment above applies -- and the plus is, the Div Cdr who operates at the operational level has enhanced his total skill set far beyond that of his peer who has not done so. Even more important, he and his Bde and Bn Cdrs have had no choice but to trust their subordinates by delegating (to a point as one Colonel said, "far beyond the comfort zone") and that is a very positive thing, hopefully to be recalled in the conventional battle to greater tactical advantage and less micromanagementl.

...Being able to put a sabot round through a pie plate at two miles while on the move was the raison d'etre of tankers at one time - that's why we had four gunnery cycles per year. I've met armor captains in the last few years who have never done a full-scale gunnery exercise. For tankers, this is the third sign of the apocalypse, and I'm sure there are air defenders and artillerymen who have similar hair-raising stories.

True again but the flip side is that a lot of tankers do get to shoot in-country and learn that our excessively safety and scoring oriented stateside gunnery process is not the only way to do it. I'd also suggest those four gunnery cycles were as much OER / EER oriented and based on unnecessarily rapid and high personnel turnover as much as to preclude skill deterioration. We also did gunnery to the exclusion of a lot of tactical work (because it produced a 'metric' and, in fairness was easier on the vehicles, the post environment and on the OpTempo than tactical training); we've always been pretty good at gunnery and I've seen few US tanks clobbered by better gunnery -- I've seen several, in combat and in training, clobbered by better tactics.

They are fragile - easily subject to skill fade - and hard to recover once lost. I think this is inevitable, and all I ask is that we recognize it as a problem - maybe one to deal with in the future, but still a problem.

My observation of the phenomenon is admittedly dated but I'm roughly aware of most new technology and techniques and inclined to believe that people have not changed that much. I agree with you it's a matter of concern and a problem, I'm only suggesting that it is not as difficult to regenerate those skills as you appear to believe. It's been done before.

I also believe we have an obligation to better train future entrants so they can cope with the swings in skill sets required likely to be with us for the next 30 years or so.

[Rank amateur]

I agree completely with Ken. (Though he may object to my comments.) As long as we have air and firepower superiority our enemies are going to prefer to fight danger close. A soldier who can fight and win danger close, will be able to call in CAS and probably will enjoy doing so.

(Undoubtedly it is a good idea to maintain a strong AA capability just in case the Air Force makes promises it can't keep. If we ever reduce AA capability so that we can afford to build schools in Iraq, then we've gone too far.)

[William F. Owen]

Changing subjects a bit, I find those who argue Boyd and his OODA loop are too obvious or useless, interesting.

If you want to start a thread on the OODA loop, I'll be in like a shot. I'm not going to get into it here.

[William F. Owen]

Good effort guys. Many, many thanks.

I did actually want to aim this at everyone from Sub-unit to Battle Group or formation level, so it would appear that tactical and operational dispersion, is a major factor.

Most comments here confirm a certain amount of gut feel, but I still think we may be missing something very obvious. How we do things now is not necessarily indicative of how things should be done.

[Ken White]

I didn't address your question -- but I can:

So we have to do things because the enemy has capabilities that force us to conduct certain types of operation? Is this correct?

Of course we do.

He also has to do things because we have capabilities that force him to conduct certain types of operation.

The key is to get inside his OODA loop.

Kidding -- the key is to force him to do things that are less effective for him and that expose him to our capabilities and to do that more often than he can return the favor. The goal should always be to use B.L-H's indirect approach and hit the opponent asymmetrically. That entails the bureaucracy getting innovative...

His OODA loop is immaterial, his weaknesses are the issue and we just need to turn people loose and avoid over control. So you're correct -- how we do things now is not the way things should be done.

[William F. Owen]

The key is to get inside his OODA loop.

Kidding -- the key is to force him to do things that are less effective for him and that expose him to our capabilities and to do that more often than he can return the favor. The goal should always be to use B.L-H's indirect approach and hit the opponent asymmetrically. That entails the bureaucracy getting innovative...

You know Ken, sometimes I can't tell when you're kidding!

[William F. Owen]

@ Of course we do.

@ He also has to do things because we have capabilities that force him to conduct certain types of operation.

@ his weaknesses are the issue and we just need to turn people loose and avoid over control. So you're correct -- how we do things now is not the way things should be done.

@ Thanks. I did need someone to state this explicitly. I get so tired of talking to folks who talk about surprise but can't define it!

@ So this is actually the true meaning of the so-called complex and adaptive enemy.

@ Freedom to exploit weakness as and when we find it!

The problem is Ken, you were never a fighter pilot, you are living and you use, facts combined with plain and simple language. The only way the world will recognise you utility is if you write in Chinese or German, and then die!!

[Ken White]

However, I do need to caveat what I said, just dawned on me I was too sweeping. What the President really meant was:

"...So you're correct -- how we do things now is not the way things should be done" adding in too many cases. However, in some few places and things we are belatedly doing what should be done and quite successfully (but we don't need to discuss those in the clear).

Proving that even large Elephants can pivot on occasion...

I can count to ten and ask for beer and cigarettes in both Mandarin and German but that's about it; along with limited proficiency in English, I guess I'm doomed to die unheralded -- but not just yet...

[Norfolk]

However, I do need to caveat what I said, just dawned on me I was too sweeping. What the President really meant was:

"...So you're correct -- how we do things now is not the way things should be done" adding in too many cases. However, in some few places and things we are belatedly doing what should be done and quite successfully (but we don't need to discuss those in the clear).

Proving that even large Elephants can pivot on occasion...

I can count to ten and ask for beer and cigarettes in both Mandarin and German but that's about it; along with limited proficiency in English, I guess I'm doomed to die unheralded -- but not just yet...

Before you do depart this mortal plane Ken, just know that after your departure (what, you couldn't stand us anymore?) we shall compile a book of quotations from your posts on the SWC, and publish it in Mandarin, German, English (or pidgin if you prefer), and Latin (for that "Classical" touch - unless you prefer ancient Greek of course), but not Esperanto. "Quotations From Dinosaur Ken"; now in what colour would you like your Little [fill in choice of colour here] Book to be bound?

[Ken White]

Before you do depart this mortal plane Ken, just know that after your departure (what, you couldn't stand us anymore?) we shall compile a book of quotations from your posts on the SWC, and publish it in Mandarin, German, English (or pidgin if you prefer), and Latin (for that "Classical" touch - unless you prefer ancient Greek of course), but not Esperanto. "Quotations From Dinosaur Ken"; now in what colour would you like your Little [fill in choice of colour here] Book to be bound?

The name is appropriate...

LINK

[Norfolk]

Pink!? Did you have your glasses on when you chose the colour you did, Ken? I mean, even Barney is purple.

Wilf wrote:

I did actually want to aim this at everyone from Sub-unit to Battle Group or formation level, so it would appear that tactical and operational dispersion, is a major factor.

Most comments here confirm a certain amount of gut feel, but I still think we may be missing something very obvious. How we do things now is not necessarily indicative of how things should be done.

Certainly the degree of operational dispersion may vary considerably between Irregular/LIC/COIN Warfare/SSO on the one hand, and Regular/Conventional Warfare/MCO on the other, and may make for a distinguishing characteristic between the two. In Afghanistan, Platoons may spend much of their time operating 50-100 km apart; in Desert Storm you could fit an entire Divisional frontage into 50km. The key here of course is dependent upon whether the opponents have the capability to marshal sufficient troops and firepower in a particular place at a particular time in order to seek a decision, or not.

When both sides have that capability, as in GW1, with half a million to 3/4s of a million troops on either side, heavily armed and concentrated over an area of a few hundred kilometres, and (theoretically) tightly-controlled, then you have the makings of MCO - and a decision may be reached on the battlefied within a few years or even a few days. The Operational level of war tends to begin at Corps-level, and concentrated into a few hundred km of frontage and rather more depth.

Alternatively, as in Afghanistan, when one opponent is unable to concentrate considerable force in a locality to force a decision, such an opponent may disperse over as large or larger an area than either Third Army and the Iraqi Army occupied in GW1, even though the forces on both sides may only amount to a few percent the size of what were massed for GW1. As dispersion lends itself to protraction and not to decision, the decision may take several years or a few decades to achieve, if at all. Moreover, the Tactical level of war may rise no higher at times than at the level of the individual soldier, and the Operational level begin right at Fire Team level, maybe even individual level in some cases. Strategic Corporal and all that.

In sum, a chief characteristic of Unconventional War is operational dispersion, whilst for Conventional War it is operational concentration. And from that tends to follow the lowering of the Operational level of war often to the Sub-Unit level in Unconventional Warfare, while the Tactical level of war may range right up to Divisional level in Conventional Warfare. Operational dispersion therefore may make for a distinguishing characteristic of what makes for Unconventional War on the one hand and Conventional War on the other. Plainly obvious I suppose, but this was part of what Wilf was getting at I'm guessing.

As to the future warfighting implications of operational dispersion, I'm not entirely convinced by what has been publicly revealed so far about DO, although some other experiments along more or less similar lines seem rather more realistic, given the tactical and operational possibilities afforded in part by personal radios and digitized communications possible right down to the lowest levels. Advancing/Movement to Contact in typical tactical formations from Squad right on up to Battalion is very exposed to enemy observation much of the time, and the combination of dispersion and improved communications technology may afford a way to dispense with typical open-order battlefield formations as we presently know them and adopt simpler, more subtle, and more dispersed approaches on the battlefield instead.

Some of this has already been tried with considerable success in the present Wars; we'll see what develops over the next few to several years. But if these approaches, or something like them are adopted, the distinction between Unconventional and Conventional Warfare may blurr even further. The distinctions may even be be found to be rather more abstract than real.

Having stated the unstated obvious, I will shut up now.

[Ken White]

Pink!? Did you have your glasses on when you chose the colour you did, Ken? I mean, even Barney is purple.

avatar is pink. The color I selected for the booklet you so graciously propose to have printed upon my death -- assuming I don't outlast you -- is "Norfolk Air." It's sort of bland and beige. All appropriate -- as I thought I said.

I don't believe I know Barney but since you seem to and you say he's purple, I'm sure he is. Do be careful around him, that's usual a sign of apoplexy or something else unhealthy.