FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

[Dr Jack]

Interesting that FM 3-0 only uses the word "civilian" 7 times and in 4 of those cases refers to "civilian agencies."

I did a quick search of the FM 3-0 final draft -- and the word "civilian" appears 90 times; "civilian agencies" represent 18 of those hits. "Civil authorities" appears 16 times...

[Dr Jack]

Seems to me that that's an incorrect statement. What I think we've found through seven years are two things that make that statement wrong.

- People will do what they're trained to do and if you deliberately leave something out of the training, it won't get done or at least, won't get done correctly.

- The senior folks may be slow to adapt to an unfamiliar environment but the kids down the chain were not. In fairness, some senior leaders got it and did it right early on but they were a minority.

The US Army and most units in it are quite capable of doing a lot more than too many senior people will give them credit for. I've long had a suspicion that the fear of lacking General Officer personal involvement it will not be done correctly is a contributor to that. Bad attitude; there will never be enough Generals. Captains have to be trusted; the vast majority prove daily that they can be ...

I believe this is addressed in the introduction to FM 3-0 -- that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground. This is one of the lessons of the past seven years...

The high quality of Army leaders and Soldiers is best exploited by allowing subordinates maximum latitude to exercise individual and small-unit initiative. Tough, realistic training prepares leaders for this, and FM 3-0 prescribes giving them the maximum latitude to successfully accomplish the mission. This requires a climate of trust in the abilities of superior and subordinate alike. It also requires leaders at every level to think and act flexibly, constantly adapting to the situation. Subordinates’ actions are bounded by the higher commander’s intent but not circumscribed by excessive control. This is a continuing tension across the Army, aggravated by advanced information systems that can provide higher commanders the details of lower echelon operations. The temptation for senior leaders to micromanage subordinates is great, but it must be resisted.

[wm]

The US Army and most units in it are quite capable of doing a lot more than too many senior people will give them credit for. I've long had a suspicion that the fear of lacking General Officer personal involvement it will not be done correctly is a contributor to that. Bad attitude; there will never be enough Generals. Captains have to be trusted; the vast majority prove daily that they can be ...

Actually Ken, I think it is more correct to say there will always be too many generals because they are too interested in doing the work that should be left to their captains, lieutenants and senior NCOs.

When I was a new 2LT, a senior officer who was about to retire told me that the Army does things backwards. He thought the toughest job for an officer is to lead a platoon. He felt that leading a platooon ought to be the capstone of one's career, not its beginning. He went on to justify this claim by saying platoon leadership requires more specialized knowledge and skill than any newly-commissioned 20-something can possibly be expected to have. The most important part of that knowledge is not learned from books: it is knowing how to work with people, which can only be learned by working with people.

While I may not completely agree with all of this sentiment--I suspect company command may actually be the toughest job an officer every gets the privilege to hold--I do think it has a lot of truth to it. I guess that's why we are lucky enough to have those crusty E7 platoon sergeants around to make sure the LTs don't screw the pooch too badly. I know mine certainly saved the tails of me and the rest of my platoon more times than I care to recount.

I would gladly have fewer generals if it meant I could have more well-qualified E-6s,-7s, and -8s in the force.

[Rob Thornton]

“There will be people who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high-end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of operations,’ ” he said. “What we have found through seven years is that is not the case.”

I’m not sure that is strictly a face value observation – I think it goes deeper – it speaks to leader assessments of training and employment. What I mean is that if a unit leader believes that all he needs proficiency in is lethal operations – without ever doing an assessment of conditions he is going to operate in, then its going to take him longer to adapt to the conditions as they are vs. those the leader wanted them to be – regardless of what his subordinates may be telling him. NSPD 44, DoD Directive 3000.05 and the Army Campaign Plan for Stability Operations are all linked and directive – the doctrine now reflects the decisions about the role of military force in other then strictly offensive or strictly defensive operations. It does not divorce the former from stability operations, it marries them – it says that these are all components of full spectrum operations and only by being prepared physically and mentally to conduct all components of full spectrum operations, and transition between them smoothly will we achieve the political objective – be it the one we began with, or the one that got adjusted as the war evolved.

I certainly agree that we are capable of adapting and adjusting at every level. Some of the most astute observations and initiatives have come from junior leaders – look at the some of the newest articles in the SWJ – the subjects are often on politics, culture and economics – they are being written by company grade leadership! I think we also have to put LTG Cladwell's comments in the greater context of some of the stuff he’s recently said, written about (and we’ve discussed here) – things like ensuring our soldiers and leaders can be free to communicate and compete with our enemies in the areas of ideas, or the role and authorities given to junior leaders who actually can conduct on the ground assessments. Remember who the article says he is addressing – Law Makers – those inside 495 – and who largely are limited to what they know about current military affairs by what they are told – by think tanks, pundits, special interest folks, staffers who may have had military service some time ago, but maybe not within the last 8 years (althugh I've met some who have in the HASC).

So its not just the “If I can do” – it’s also the resources and training – and mental energy that are attributed to the belief that doing one set of tasks exclusively automatically prepares me to do the other things I may be asked to do, and then stifling subordinate initiative to do anything else. That I think is the concern reflected in the remark.

One thing I wholly believe in is the ability of empowered leaders at all levels to conduct a good assessment of what needs to be done, and when given the authority and resources, they will tackle it. What I think the new 3-0 does is give us the doctrine to accept risk and empower ourselves – we can say “look our capstone manual says these are equally important and we must be full spectrum”. Equally important is all the other things that will drive across the DOTMLPF spectrum – the doctrine is an enabler. It bears witness to what many of us already believe – we are capable at all levels to take on a greater width and depth of missions then we’ve given ourselves credit for in the past, and now we have the doctrinal authority to do it – which cannot be undersold since it drives so much of the OTMLPF.

Remember,

In an interview, he called it a “blueprint to operate over the next 10 to 15 years.”

By that statement we are looking beyond - at least as beyond as we can reasonable do. To me, this statement says - we're in this for the long haul - there is no going back to the luxury of focusing exclusively on single components – be they in peace time or other. This also is in line with our assessment that “persistent conflict” does not end with a change in Administrations. I like this because it speaks to the pitfalls of life – the old “you may not have an interest in War, but War has an interest in you!” We can be rolling along post OIF and OEF, happily back in our comfort zone where authority is restricted (or at least restrained to what it was) and free to focus on the ways we think policy should employ us and then the heavy shoe of something messy drops – and we are scratching our heads wondering why we chose to abandon all those things we learned how to do in OIF and OEF.

I’ve got a piece I’m reading right now entitled “Pacification” that was copied and distributed up here at the SFA conference – its a compilation of lessons from Vietnam by those involved in the SFA to the South Vietnamese. I’m not sure I could have read it prior to a couple of years ago and assessed its value – but it could have been written yesterday. Its been available I’m sure – just few people wanted to look for it, or would have understood its importance in say 2001. It is more then just our ability to forget, its our ability to forget coupled with our desire to make things easier on ourselves, and to emphasize what we believe we are best at – regardless if that is the reality we must live in. Injecting reality where it cannot be ignored is paramount to how we go forward – it should be injected into everything we do.
Best Rob

[Rob Thornton]

On the walk up this morning I got to thinking about the challenges associated with putting forward good doctrine. In this case 3-0s challenges are that it most be descriptive enough so that no one component of the full spectrum is emphasized to the point where it becomes prescriptive – it must allow the user to determine where he places emphasis based on the conditions in which he and his unit must operate.

This is no small challenge, particularly given the impact of doctrine across the DOTMLPF spectrum, and the timelines we associate with doctrine. Its worth while I think to talk about how we communicate doctrine and what its various uses are. Recently SWC member Mike Innes put up the “Chaoplectic” article on the “Hybrid Wars” thread. Within this piece it talked about the various modes we use to explain things. It discussed the clock as the Neo-Classical model whereby we decided that the nature of “whole” of something could be discovered by examining its various parts. Whole scientific treatises emerged on the nature of the Universe as a result (although certainly some folks had contemplated it prior to the 18th Century). Just as important as allowing us as individuals to think about things – it allowed us to communicate ideas, and that allowed us to leverage each other’s ideas to get further then any one person unto themselves would be able.

Doctrine serves some similar functions, but also suffers from some of the same limitations. I’ve mentioned before that I thought one of the functions of doctrine was to try and take what might be described as “art” – or the intuitive decisions of a commander or leader to gain an advantage and place his enemy at a disadvantage – and make it into science – something that can be explained so that all of us may benefit from it. This is not new – we do this in all our endeavors – Donald Trump writes books on “how to make millions”, but it doesn’t guarantee that by reading it you will become one – you still have to apply the ideas, be in the conditions to which they can be applied, have the resources to take advantage of opportunities or recover from missteps, recognize opportunities and risk, etc. Doctrine I think is very similar – it provides a framework for actions to solve problems within conditions – it is not a silver bullet unto itself – or there is no success through osmosis.

It also must account for its audience – the broader and varied the audience, the less precise it can be. For example – I used the word component to describe a mental model offered by one of the figures in 3-0 used to depict the range of full spectrum operations. There is a tough call to be made when using a figure to illustrate what is by nature complex and more or less vague depending upon the conditions – where does one component begin and the other leave off for example? One of the things I do like about 3-0 is the use of multiple types of figures to communicate that complexity – however, even this is no guarantee that it user will not home in one in particular and become wedded to it – human nature is to boil down and simplify. Sometimes I lament that not enough people read Clausewitz – or that they only look to one aspect of what he wrote, picking a particular quote and building independent context around it and divorcing it from the rest of the work. Much has been written about why many prefer Jomini to the dead Prussian – I think its because the dead Swiss tried to boil it down to a set of principles that said if you do these things – you’ll be a success like the Corsican Bonaparte. Jomini made something very complex, that is interactive, and has a non-linear nature into something that it is not – however, he did understand we’d like it to be that way, and the principles he offered are useful – but only when placed in the context of the conditions that are subject to the nature of war. There is probably a balance to be struck between teaching "how" to think - Clausewitz, and "what" to think - Jomini - they are often simbiotic - and different folks require different measures of each - it allows us to get over blocks and humps.

This I think is the fundamental challenge of Army & Joint doctrine – how do you develop doctrine that empowers both the individual and the system to make the changes that keep it relevant in changing conditions? How do you make it so the science can be taken and processed and provide the basis for art? While I think there is both good and bad doctrine – even the best doctrine is going to be limited to how it is employed. I think it is necessary and has helped us become the Army we are – it touches things in ways I think most do not consider – often the ideas that go into doctrine are those that are spread throughout the force by other means. I heard someone remark recently after being exposed to 3-24 for the first time that he was surprised – it was pretty much what they’d been doing, but he’d never seen it linked together so that he could see the whole idea in its entirety – that is a pretty powerful remark.

Doctrine, when combined with access to various information technologies allows us to communicate – not only a finished product, but the process which produces it, and the opportunity to influence it consciously and subconsciously with like and competing ideas. 3-0 I think reflects this – now that its core ideas are in a releasable format – the process of implementing it, and providing feedback can shape the direction it takes.

Finally, the last challenge I think doctrine must address is relevancy outside the classroom - there is a challenge - in a classroom at the schoolhouse - there is the opportunity to introduce, reflect, confer, etc. in comparably benign conditions. However, doctrine should also address the leader or staff guy who requires some help at 0200 in the morning in conditions that don't remotely resemble the school house. These also should ideally be seen as one or the other - we want to find ways and places to introduce ideas when they can take root, then we want to be able to refer to those ideas in a range of conditions and make use of the context that was formed when the stakes are not so high.

Best, Rob

[TROUFION]

DO any of you have a link to the new FM 3-0?

[Ken White]

Dr. Jack said:

"I believe this is addressed in the introduction to FM 3-0 -- that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground. This is one of the lessons of the past seven years..."

Good. However, that's been a tenet for the US Army for the over 50 years I've been intimately familiar with it -- correct me if I'm wrong but my impression is it's been ignored pretty much in the last 40 or so and that increasingly as time went on. Hopefully we'll reverse the trend.

Another question is why on earth is the idea that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground can be touted as a lesson of the past seven years when we have over 200 years of US Army history that show that and far more knowledge of the issue on a worldwide and historical basis. I always found it interesting that I was more trusted as a young Marine Corporal responsible for 12 lives in Korea or as and Acting Sergeant at Fort Campbell in the mid 50s than I was years later as a fairly senior DAC responsible for an 80 plus bod staff section with no risk to life...

WM said several very correct things, one of which was this:

"Actually Ken, I think it is more correct to say there will always be too many generals because they are too interested in doing the work that should be left to their captains, lieutenants and senior NCOs."

That is too true, numbers matter. The Army has essentially held on to the number of Generals with which it ended WW II for over 60 years. There are too many for the size of the force and that's what causes them to micromanage (along with a skewed philosophy). Smart aggressive guys will find something to do. Too many Sergeant Majors, too

[Eden]

Ken, truer words rarely spoken. At one point during my last combat tour in Afghanistan we had more general officers working in the country than we had infantry companies. It seems to me if you look at our most successful counterinsurgency campaigns of the last forty years, they have all had a flat, light command structure. Could it be true that success is inversely proportional to the number of senior leaders intimately involved?

[MattC86]

Is there a comparable revision of Marine Corps doctrine in the works?

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Although this may fit better in other threads we've brought it up here - and I think we can make it fit – one of the best pieces of wisdom I’ve heard attributed to a senior leader – was that he only did those things which only he could do. I’ve made mention of that before, but I think it also has relevance here. If we expect our senior leaders – in this case GOs to take on responsibilities which have broad and deep requirements – then we need to put them in positions to where they are informed – preferably in a manner that allows them to verify by seeing. I’m not sure that you can do this out of theater – you can trust up to a point – but to get the type of context that allows you to testify before Congress and convince them of your argument – you need the type of context that they cannot get by reading the Post or through the many people who have access to them – to include those who for one reason or another fly over, make an assessment, and fly back to reinforce and argument they’d already decided on prior to departing CONUS – this requires a persistent presence. This is particularly important in small wars where there tends to be more influcence of domestic politics based on the perception of how that war impacts us - e.g. "is it important enough to sustain our will and why."

I’d also add that were they not there – we’d probably point to the lack of risk and hardship sharing – and that there was an obvious gap in understanding due to geography. There is also the leader development piece – what are the most relevant experiences a 1 star is going to carry forward into his follow on assignment? If we can get a 1 star into a job where he or she gains more experience that better prepares them to assume a 2 star command – we should do so – and so forth up the CoC.

Now – there is a balance to be struck – doing what only you can do – means allowing those under you to do what they can do without much oversight and guidance – trust. To tie it back to the discussion at hand – I think the doctrine emphasizes it well enough – but it can’t force a leader to follow it – a culture change along the lines the LTG Caldwell and others (leaders in general) have argued for can. The culture change can either foster the type of leader development we want, and / or winnow out those who don’t adapt. Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

critical part...

. . .
...Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.

Best, Rob

(emphasis added / kw)

Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?

[Rob Thornton]

A couple of other thoughts ref. a leader’s role – I personally know at least 2 one star type GOs who have been, and currently are working real hard on flattening organizational communications by empowering tactical leaders with the tools and authorities needed to do so – I think there is also a organizational cultural aspect to that as well, because without one or the other it only works in a disjointed way. This meshes well with the doctrine you see in 3-24, 3-0 and will see in 3-07 Stability Ops – and it facilitates coordination not just laterally, but vertically and gets beyond service and even Joint uniformed – and speaks to Inter-Agency, HN, Coalition Partner, IOs, NGOs, private and public domains. The doctrine builds the framework – the leaders must do the empowering.

I was also thinking about my remark on who testifies before Congress, and who communicates in general. This is important – when I came back of a TT, I was asked to participate in a HASC survey ref. the broader Advisory Mission. Having EMs, NCOs, LTs, CPTs and FGs participate in this type of dialogue is important, as I believe is the importance of having them write articles, blog, be interviewed by the media – it provides a perspective that otherwise might not be represented. This is vital to our culture of “Checks & Balances”. On the other hand, the perspective offered up is predominantly “tactical”, although it could have much higher implications. So how do we offer Congress and the greater public the operational and strategic picture, the consequences of actions and inactions? How do we ensure legislators have the best information and opinion to make judgments on? Go back to GEN Petraeus’ and AMB Crocker’s testimonies before Congress – the testimonies were not simply informed by their time in Iraq, but by years of development and service – how do we build leaders who can do that – time and experience for certain, but there is also the pieces that come from the DOTMLPF.

Early on I’d mentioned that it was important to consider where LTG Caldwell made his remarks, and to who the various audiences were. Why would the CAC CDR offer up testimony to Congress on Army Doctrine? Because they need to know – they need to know what steps we are taking to better prepare ourselves, and they need to understand our capabilities.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,

Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?

I think the first thing that must be emphasized is that the system - is a form of bureaucracy - if allowed to crank along by itself it will be left to operate a average performance - see a hole, fill a hole - miss a hole, miss the next hole, etc.

It is leadership that animates the machine in such a way that we improve ourselves vs. settling for mediocrity. You can't just build this machine and walk away - you have to constantly be engaged with it - because our machine is built out of real life people who have ups and downs, good days and bad ones, different levels of understanding, different capabilities, etc.

So while the doctrine can provide the framework and the justification - its application, implementation and success are commensurate to the quality of those who employ it. It takes me back to my personal preference for the descriptive aspects - but we can't afford a one size fits all approach.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

I'll continue to await the awakening...

[Ken White]

...I personally know at least 2 one star type GOs who have been, and currently are working real hard on flattening organizational communications by empowering tactical leaders with the tools and authorities needed to do so – ... – the leaders must do the empowering.

and I mean that sincerely. My question is why do they have to work hard on what we SAY, doctrinally and Army mythically, we have been doing all along?

I don't question the need for Generals -- some of my best friends are Generals (honest) -- however, I do question the need for excessive numbers of them and their tendency to oversupervise. I've surfaced those issues to some of said GOs. friends, acquaintances and none of the foregoing included, over the years and most of 'em broadly agree. So why do we not do what we say we do and what most think we should do?

It all goes back to the USSR's highest placed Mole, Robert Strange MacNamara. He didn't trust anyone and he alone had all the answers. That attitude percolated into DoD and the Army and it hit at a bad time; the first big batches of WW II senior Officers were retiring and they knew peopl, knew their jobs and trusted people. They left and were replaced by clones of MacNamara's Whiz Kids, incredibly bright young things with no people skills.

Those guys went to Viet Nam and commanded Battalions full of Instant Sergeants and Lieutenants who were dedicated, aggressive and who knew little; so the Bn Cdr had to micromanage. He came back and grew into a General in the 80s and 90s and he selected replacements in his own image...

The question is not where we are, I know where -- and I know why. The issue is not where Generals learn or need to be, that's obvious. The problem is one of selection and attitude. The question is the one I asked above; how do we turn around a system that has inadvertently grown to stifle imagination and innovation into one that fosters those traits...

Because that's what need to happen.

[Rob Thornton]

My question is why do they have to work hard on what we SAY, doctrinally and Army mythically, we have been doing all along?

Ken, I think that is a good question - but I don't think it is an easy one to answer. You have remarked before that some guys are clearly better commanders then others - I'd agree, but the number of commands are probably higher then the number of those with the “natural” talents which we attribute to the magic they bring. To account for those with less “magic” then others – we value certain experiences and education as pre-requisites, while having a system that is supposed to identify and develop potential. This is not easy – it is subjective, and it is prone to the types of biases we see in all our human actions. It has been said that there is usually at least a grain of truth in any stereo-type – otherwise it would not have been perpetuated – I’d concur, but I’d qualify it by saying no matter how you do a qualitative assessment on someone, the weight of that assessment is going to be ascribed a subjective value based on who is doing the follow on assessment, and what are the conditions in which it takes place – I’ve never sat on a promotion board, but I can only imagine the difficulty of trying to focus and scrutinize each write up as an individual vs. consciously or subconsciously looking for things that for whatever reason – you have ascribed disproportionate value to.

So why do they have to work so hard? Because if something, for whatever reason does not seem blatantly obvious to the audience, then it gets pushed the periphery as something extraneous to “glass ball of the hour”. This goes beyond Army culture – its human nature. I think another example is how people are often pre-disposed to take information at face value without conducting any analysis of what it might mean – the process of turning information into intelligence. We often throw terms de jour such as Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding as being interchangeable – hell, the very names imply different levels of thinking.

I think the doctrine can provide the means to be who we’d like to be, but leadership is the actual vehicle to get us there.

I’m here reading the articles penned by retired LTG Cushman ref. SFA – I swear, so much of what is there could have been written yesterday. Much of it is more accurate and applicable then what was actually written yesterday. It has a gritty language that can speak to PVTs or GOs. Its interesting that you should remark on McNamara – Old Eagle and I were just talking about this – Here is Cushman on Pacification:

“It was not clear to us how this process called “Pacification” would actually take place. We knew it was a subtle process of the mind – a psychological procedure not unlike the one experienced by a young man winning the heart of his lady.

We knew that as in courtship, indicators of success could not be tabulated precisely during the campaign. They could be subjectively judged, just as the young man does when he senses he is progressing. However the young man has an advantage; fruition arrives when his lady consents. The hamlet action could not be sure for months, probably years that the job of pacification was completed.”

Here is Cushman on his evaluation of Army company grade and young field grade leadership in the Army in about 1965. Sounds allot like conversations we've had:

“The U.S. Army lieutenant, captain or major is well equipped by background, training and heritage to assist his Vietnamese counterpart in developing these forces. Our young officers may not know much about Vietnam, but they do know how to organize, and they adapt fast. They can rapidly grasp the complex civil-military nature of pacification.”

Here is one from the Long Good-Bye on advising (and how poignant this one is)

“To assist somebody you have to understand what he is doing. And it may be that you are much smarter then the person you are advising, but you still can’t do it for him. Let’s say you are a duck hunting guide. The hunter has to rely on you to get him to the blind, get out the duck-calling whistle, make the ducks come in. He can’t do any of that. But when the time comes, he’s got to shoot the duck. Now if he works with you long enough, he might learn some tricks of the trade. It would have been wonderful if we had advisors at every level in Vietnam who were as qualified as the average northern Canadian duck-hunting guide. The trouble was they took these guys off the street – not off the street so much, but out of the Army – put’em on orders, and said, “Now you’re an advisor, go do your job.” Sometimes they got a little training,. And advisors turned over pretty fast, once a year.

So here’s this Vietnamese BN CDR. He’s been fighting the VC for ten years. Living in the rice paddies, living in the mountains. Fighting. Lucky to be alive, in his opinion. He’s got all these problems on his mind, all these troops he has to take care of. He’s not even sure he’s going to survive the next day. And here comes this new advisor, some captain fresh out of advisory school. Doesn’t know how to live in the rice paddies. Gets diarrhea the first week he’s there. Of curse he does know something about helicopters. He might know something about the theory of tactics, and he’s smart enough to know when the troops are dogging it. Nonetheless, what you have there is a very interesting situation: an advisor who has got to learn from his counterpart.

Its an art, an absolute art, to be a good advisor. The first thing you have to do is understand the situation. If you don’t you have to be smart enough not to act like you do. Don’t be popping off about it. Find out about your counterpart. See what your leverage is. You can’t be a non-entity. You can’t just come along with him to run the radio so he can get helicopters. You have to earn his respect. You come with a certain amount of respect attached, because you represent the United States of America, a powerful country with lots of resources and you represent the U.S. Armed forces”

How did we lose all of that? Why do we refer to T.E. Lawrence instead of Cushman? We made a choice to. Somewhere we decided that since we “lost Vietnam” (or did not win it), that we could not have done much right, and that whatever we did there could not be very applicable to winning this war. I’m flattened nobody has distributed Cushman mainstream – everything I’ve read so far either translates directly and clearly, or can be adapted – far easier then some of the other things I’ve been handed. Culture and Advising are not exclusive – i.e. you don’t have to learn how to advise Arab forces exclusively from someone who has advised Arabs – Arabs are people too – so depending on the who is giving the info and who the audience is - it might be more useful then someone who sort of seems more like the conditions you face, but whose message is a bit muddled. Cushman is not muddled – he talks (and writes) like one of us.

How does this relate to doctrine and why these 1 stars have to work hard – because in addition to the sender and the message, there is a receiver – and the receiver does not always want to listen for one reason or another – the sender must determine if it is either the message that needs to get restructured, or if it’s the receiver that just does not want to listen – that can be hard work – especially when it’s the same message, but multiple receivers.

Best, Rob

[Cavguy]

Great stuff Rob. I remember reading "Army in Vietnam” in 2004 and thinking the whole time I could scratch "Vietnam" and write "Iraq" in its place.

Talking to the Vietnam greybeards on Leavenworth confirmed this as well - most our "new" observations are old - adaptive junior leaders, working with HN, dealing with corruption, etc. all happened before.

I just finished a briefing with a senior officer of the Australian CGSC - The discussion waxed to Kilcullen (a friend of his) and I mentioned how reading his "28 Articles" was a eye-opening moment for me - where I went "aha!" and nothing was the same. He and the Aussie LNO here smiled and asked me did I know what Aussie company grade officers thought about it. They apparently thought it was a great document, but the collective reaction was something akin to "Duh". It was nothing new for them - that was their experience in the Malaya, Vietnam, Solomons and East Timor for the past fifty years.

That’s why for all the hyperventilating about COIN focus, my main effort is to do what I can to ensure that some measure of this learning is embedded for the future – that we don’t brain dump this again. I lost too many people I know partially because we did brain dump this following Vietnam. The challenge ahead is to codify this (re)learning and get it integrated into our institutions alongside the traditional maneuver competencies, so that in 20 years my son doesn’t re-learn everything again.

To wit, GEN Jack Keane,

“We put an army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth of the matter is: It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency. …After the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision….We have responsibility. ”
– GEN Jack Keane, 18 April 2006

I don’t want to allow it to happen again.

[Ken White]

"...the number of commands are probably higher then the number of those with the “natural” talents which we attribute to the magic they bring. To account for those with less “magic” then others – we value certain experiences and education as pre-requisites, while having a system that is supposed to identify and develop potential."

'Supposed to' being the operative words. That system also insists that all those elected are de jure and de facto equal -- an obvious impossibility. As I've said before, Congress and DOPMA have a lot to answer for...

Select talent -- subjectively, of course -- and let it do its job. That works. The criteria for selection is part of the problem. Aside from possibly not all the right criteria, our system selects potential (as you say -- and not talent) and moves it from job to job and place to place far too quickly and (this is the bad part) suppresses latent talent all too often. We do not select great Commanders; we select those who will be adequate Commanders. That worked with the mass armies of yesteryear. I simply suggest it is not desirable for the Army of today.

Smiling Jack Cushman was the Grand Guru of the IV Corps Tactical Zone in Viet Nam. I'm not a fan of him or his actions then but acknowledge he did turn into a reasonably decent writer later in life. Of the 'don't do as I do, do as I say' variety...

His statement you quote on the adaptability of "Our young officers" is correct but elides the point that some of those young officers did that job far better than did others -- as the quote from The Long Good-Bye shows. That, of course, is also my broad point on Commanders; some are far better than others and the Troops deserve better than 'acceptable.'

I think we quote T. E. Lawrence instead of Cushman for a variety of reasons, not least a bad tendency to ape the British in some areas and due to the fact -- and it is fact -- that the US Army for almost 30 years tried to bury its head in the sand about Viet Nam because any thinking soldier who was there knew that the Army -- not the media or the politicians; the Army -- had screwed the pooch there.

Fortunately we appear to have learned a little better and certainly more quickly this time around. That does not mean the underlying problem is fixed, it is not. We still subjectively select a 'type' with potential and rotate him through a series of jobs, rarely staying in one place long enough to make a difference -- and running him off if he's too good.

"How does this relate to doctrine and why these 1 stars have to work hard – because in addition to the sender and the message, there is a receiver – and the receiver does not always want to listen for one reason or another – the sender must determine if it is either the message that needs to get restructured, or if it’s the receiver that just does not want to listen – that can be hard work – especially when it’s the same message, but multiple receivers."

Sorry, do not agree. Human nature as you said is important and a factor but the downstream receivers in this case are mostly willing to listen and willing to work. The ol' bottom line is that most people will try to do their job to the best of their ability. To enable them to do this, they must have the proper education and training (we aren't too bad at that and we're getting better, still more to be done) and then they must be turned loose to do their job (we may be getting better at this, my sensing is that we are. My sensing also is that many would like to roll back that freedom...).

Unless of course, you're talking about the message UPstream from your One Stars; then I can agree that some do not want to listen. And that, as they say, is precisely the problem.

[Ken White]

Great stuff Rob. I remember reading "Army in Vietnam” in 2004 and thinking the whole time I could scratch "Vietnam" and write "Iraq" in its place.
. . .
I don’t want to allow it to happen again.

Great, even...

[William F. Owen]

I did a quick search of the FM 3-0 final draft -- and the word "civilian" appears 90 times; "civilian agencies" represent 18 of those hits. "Civil authorities" appears 16 times...

My mistake. Searched the wrong FM! Aplogies.