FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

[Ken White]

Dr. Jack said:

"I believe this is addressed in the introduction to FM 3-0 -- that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground. This is one of the lessons of the past seven years..."

Good. However, that's been a tenet for the US Army for the over 50 years I've been intimately familiar with it -- correct me if I'm wrong but my impression is it's been ignored pretty much in the last 40 or so and that increasingly as time went on. Hopefully we'll reverse the trend.

Another question is why on earth is the idea that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground can be touted as a lesson of the past seven years when we have over 200 years of US Army history that show that and far more knowledge of the issue on a worldwide and historical basis. I always found it interesting that I was more trusted as a young Marine Corporal responsible for 12 lives in Korea or as and Acting Sergeant at Fort Campbell in the mid 50s than I was years later as a fairly senior DAC responsible for an 80 plus bod staff section with no risk to life...

WM said several very correct things, one of which was this:

"Actually Ken, I think it is more correct to say there will always be too many generals because they are too interested in doing the work that should be left to their captains, lieutenants and senior NCOs."

That is too true, numbers matter. The Army has essentially held on to the number of Generals with which it ended WW II for over 60 years. There are too many for the size of the force and that's what causes them to micromanage (along with a skewed philosophy). Smart aggressive guys will find something to do. Too many Sergeant Majors, too

[Eden]

Ken, truer words rarely spoken. At one point during my last combat tour in Afghanistan we had more general officers working in the country than we had infantry companies. It seems to me if you look at our most successful counterinsurgency campaigns of the last forty years, they have all had a flat, light command structure. Could it be true that success is inversely proportional to the number of senior leaders intimately involved?

[MattC86]

Is there a comparable revision of Marine Corps doctrine in the works?

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Although this may fit better in other threads we've brought it up here - and I think we can make it fit – one of the best pieces of wisdom I’ve heard attributed to a senior leader – was that he only did those things which only he could do. I’ve made mention of that before, but I think it also has relevance here. If we expect our senior leaders – in this case GOs to take on responsibilities which have broad and deep requirements – then we need to put them in positions to where they are informed – preferably in a manner that allows them to verify by seeing. I’m not sure that you can do this out of theater – you can trust up to a point – but to get the type of context that allows you to testify before Congress and convince them of your argument – you need the type of context that they cannot get by reading the Post or through the many people who have access to them – to include those who for one reason or another fly over, make an assessment, and fly back to reinforce and argument they’d already decided on prior to departing CONUS – this requires a persistent presence. This is particularly important in small wars where there tends to be more influcence of domestic politics based on the perception of how that war impacts us - e.g. "is it important enough to sustain our will and why."

I’d also add that were they not there – we’d probably point to the lack of risk and hardship sharing – and that there was an obvious gap in understanding due to geography. There is also the leader development piece – what are the most relevant experiences a 1 star is going to carry forward into his follow on assignment? If we can get a 1 star into a job where he or she gains more experience that better prepares them to assume a 2 star command – we should do so – and so forth up the CoC.

Now – there is a balance to be struck – doing what only you can do – means allowing those under you to do what they can do without much oversight and guidance – trust. To tie it back to the discussion at hand – I think the doctrine emphasizes it well enough – but it can’t force a leader to follow it – a culture change along the lines the LTG Caldwell and others (leaders in general) have argued for can. The culture change can either foster the type of leader development we want, and / or winnow out those who don’t adapt. Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

critical part...

. . .
...Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.

Best, Rob

(emphasis added / kw)

Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?

[Rob Thornton]

A couple of other thoughts ref. a leader’s role – I personally know at least 2 one star type GOs who have been, and currently are working real hard on flattening organizational communications by empowering tactical leaders with the tools and authorities needed to do so – I think there is also a organizational cultural aspect to that as well, because without one or the other it only works in a disjointed way. This meshes well with the doctrine you see in 3-24, 3-0 and will see in 3-07 Stability Ops – and it facilitates coordination not just laterally, but vertically and gets beyond service and even Joint uniformed – and speaks to Inter-Agency, HN, Coalition Partner, IOs, NGOs, private and public domains. The doctrine builds the framework – the leaders must do the empowering.

I was also thinking about my remark on who testifies before Congress, and who communicates in general. This is important – when I came back of a TT, I was asked to participate in a HASC survey ref. the broader Advisory Mission. Having EMs, NCOs, LTs, CPTs and FGs participate in this type of dialogue is important, as I believe is the importance of having them write articles, blog, be interviewed by the media – it provides a perspective that otherwise might not be represented. This is vital to our culture of “Checks & Balances”. On the other hand, the perspective offered up is predominantly “tactical”, although it could have much higher implications. So how do we offer Congress and the greater public the operational and strategic picture, the consequences of actions and inactions? How do we ensure legislators have the best information and opinion to make judgments on? Go back to GEN Petraeus’ and AMB Crocker’s testimonies before Congress – the testimonies were not simply informed by their time in Iraq, but by years of development and service – how do we build leaders who can do that – time and experience for certain, but there is also the pieces that come from the DOTMLPF.

Early on I’d mentioned that it was important to consider where LTG Caldwell made his remarks, and to who the various audiences were. Why would the CAC CDR offer up testimony to Congress on Army Doctrine? Because they need to know – they need to know what steps we are taking to better prepare ourselves, and they need to understand our capabilities.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,

Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?

I think the first thing that must be emphasized is that the system - is a form of bureaucracy - if allowed to crank along by itself it will be left to operate a average performance - see a hole, fill a hole - miss a hole, miss the next hole, etc.

It is leadership that animates the machine in such a way that we improve ourselves vs. settling for mediocrity. You can't just build this machine and walk away - you have to constantly be engaged with it - because our machine is built out of real life people who have ups and downs, good days and bad ones, different levels of understanding, different capabilities, etc.

So while the doctrine can provide the framework and the justification - its application, implementation and success are commensurate to the quality of those who employ it. It takes me back to my personal preference for the descriptive aspects - but we can't afford a one size fits all approach.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...I personally know at least 2 one star type GOs who have been, and currently are working real hard on flattening organizational communications by empowering tactical leaders with the tools and authorities needed to do so – ... – the leaders must do the empowering.

and I mean that sincerely. My question is why do they have to work hard on what we SAY, doctrinally and Army mythically, we have been doing all along?

I don't question the need for Generals -- some of my best friends are Generals (honest) -- however, I do question the need for excessive numbers of them and their tendency to oversupervise. I've surfaced those issues to some of said GOs. friends, acquaintances and none of the foregoing included, over the years and most of 'em broadly agree. So why do we not do what we say we do and what most think we should do?

It all goes back to the USSR's highest placed Mole, Robert Strange MacNamara. He didn't trust anyone and he alone had all the answers. That attitude percolated into DoD and the Army and it hit at a bad time; the first big batches of WW II senior Officers were retiring and they knew peopl, knew their jobs and trusted people. They left and were replaced by clones of MacNamara's Whiz Kids, incredibly bright young things with no people skills.

Those guys went to Viet Nam and commanded Battalions full of Instant Sergeants and Lieutenants who were dedicated, aggressive and who knew little; so the Bn Cdr had to micromanage. He came back and grew into a General in the 80s and 90s and he selected replacements in his own image...

The question is not where we are, I know where -- and I know why. The issue is not where Generals learn or need to be, that's obvious. The problem is one of selection and attitude. The question is the one I asked above; how do we turn around a system that has inadvertently grown to stifle imagination and innovation into one that fosters those traits...

Because that's what need to happen.