"Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?

[selil]

From Steven Aftergood at FAS and passed along for you a CRS.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34333.pdf

This report is intended to provide information that might be of interest to Congress on the current debate surrounding the creation of special U.S. Army units and organizations, which some believe are needed to address current and future security requirements. While the Army has recently changed from a division-based force to a brigade-centric force, it has resisted the creation of special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations. In contrast, there have been a number of proposals to create new units and organizations better suited to address the challenges of these mission areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s recent challenge to the Army to organize and prepare for asymmetric warfare and advising and training foreign armies could renew and elevate this debate.

[Ken White]

That's always scary...

All in all not a bad review though my antennae twitch in frenzied disagreement at the way he's pointing. He says early on; "While the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and future military operations may indeed require that Army leaders be “pentathletes,” it may prove to be an unrealistic expectation that the majority of Army NCOs and officers will attain this extremely high standard of performance." That's garbage, the Officers and NCOs can handle it, all the Army has to do is train 'em right. He pronounces the soft bias of low expectations -- and he very subtly continues to head that way.

All the while ignoring one simple fact -- a volunteer Army and its costs today can only be so big. With an Army of a given size, if you over specialize, you decrease your capability in all specialties and I question whether we can afford to do that. We have no guarantee that we will conduct any COIN or stability operations in the next few years and we have proven that we can adapt to do that if required. We do generally agree that we can afford to bobble COIN -- we cannot afford to lose a major conventional war. Ergo we have to be prepared for the big one and cope with the smaller ankle biters.

One thing of interest; "For example, the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, used to include only about 30 hours of counterinsurgency course work for the majors attending the year-long course but now includes 200-plus hours of counterinsurgency core courses and another 40-plus hours of counterinsurgency electives." Don't know whether that's true or not but it would seem to directly contradict something said on the topic only last week on this board.

[Cavguy]

One thing of interest; "For example, the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, used to include only about 30 hours of counterinsurgency course work for the majors attending the year-long course but now includes 200-plus hours of counterinsurgency core courses and another 40-plus hours of counterinsurgency electives." Don't know whether that's true or not but it would seem to directly contradict something said on the topic only last week on this board.

First, no way of 200 hours devoted to COIN.

From what I understand, It's all in the definition. There is no separate class on COIN at CGSC in the core, as I understand from my friends currently in it and some briefs I have seen. Instead it is "integrated" into the curricula to varying degrees.

I would reference again to the post on Abu Muqawama's blog here, from a current student. I know several CGSC professors lurk here, maybe they could add some clarity.

[CR6]

First, no way of 200 hours devoted to COIN.

From what I understand, It's all in the definition. There is no separate class on COIN at CGSC in the core, as I understand from my friends currently in it and some briefs I have seen. Instead it is "integrated" into the curricula to varying degrees.

I would reference again to the post on Abu Muqawama's blog

Krepenevich discussed a similar trend at CGSC in the 1960s. In The Army and Vietnam he discusses how Leavenworth responded to directives to increase the hours in the curriculum devoted to low-intensity conflict by labeling core courses as LIC-related, while continuing to teach standard Corps and DIV operations. Thus the new requirement was "met" with no substantive change to business as usual on the banks of the Missouri.

[sullygoarmy]

Having finished CGSC last year,we had about 7 classes (figure 21 hours) dedicated completely on COIN. We did some base analysis then looked at case studies in Malaya, Algiers and Afghanistan (1979). Now there were history classes which touched on COIN and I believe that counted towards the total hours. But there is no way you hit 200 hours of COIN instruction. I did take the COIN elective (A527). That consisted of somewhere around 12 class meetings totally dedicated to studying both the theory (Galula, Trinquer, etc) and practical applications. Additionally, the terrorism electives (A529 and A538), to me covered just as much COIN, if not more than the CGSC core course.

This is dated by about a year now. Regardless, I though that background report brought out some good points by highlighting the pluses and minuses of each argument. It also, however, gives the politicians the ability to spin the report any way they choose!

[Ken White]

The CRS and I go back a long way...

They and the GAO bear considerable watching -- and skepticism. There is ALWAYS an agenda...

[Rob Thornton]

that if you start yanking on the "O" thread in the DOTLMPF (that being the "Organizational" one), you have to remember that the other threads are attached - some more, some less. You start impacting the number of folks available for "full spectrum" operations - those missions left over after you create a specialized force to be used under a specified set of conditions - you start to gamble that you're remaining force structure will be of adequate capacity when called on to do those "other missions". At that point there are some less then happy choices left - one of which is re-equip & re-train that specialized force to meet some immediate need - which puts that force in a bad position. At that point conditions may have made the situation worse then if we could have responded more appropriately.

In an unconstrained resource world - where everybody got everything they needed to meet every possible contingency, at no penalty - I'd say go for it, but this is not the way of the world, and any increases in force could be whittled away as soon as the politics call for it - we tend not to remember more then about 5 years at a pop - and we tend to look at history in a very deterministic and linear fashion vs. a contingent and non-linear fashion - this sets us up to see things as we prefer vs. as they are or were.

I've thought about this quite a bit, an I personally believe there are better ways to meet those challenges through other parts of the DOTLMPF non-linear equation. I think first and foremost, its a matter of doctrine and training - I think the doctrine piece includes training in it - you don't inculcate it by osmosis (although you can get it by practicing it - even if you don't realize you are practicing it) This I believe also includes education - but all of them are not mutually exclusive - they go hand in hand, and often occur in the same place at the same time. To me proof of what is capable in terms of the quality of our leaders and soldiers is their effectiveness in carrying out the missions they are assigned - be they engaging in a counter-insurgency, participating in SFA (Security Force Assistance - training and advising of foreign forces), or conducting a BCT level Combined Arms attack on a uniformed enemy - all of which we've done pretty well in terms of adapting over a short period of time and turning the supertanker by any historical military standard I'm aware of - it speaks to the quality of both the men and women of the military and the institutions which support them.

The thing I think could help us do things better is in the "P" area (Personnel) - we have to get better at identifying skills, attributes and experiences, and then matching those folks up with the right jobs. Most of this has to do with how we decide to track these folks, but it can be done, and progress is being made in doing so (we do it in other areas). The second part is once we've identified them, getting them into the right slots at the right time.

The easy fix seems to be to go for the "O" or the "M" - but both create all kinds of waves that few anticipate, or wind up having to deal with once they launch the idea. Our ability to get folks to PME is linked to OPTEMPO - if we can't break them free because OPTEMPO is too high, or the mandated fills (the must dos) claim these bodies - we hurt the larger force - the one that is both capable and winds up doing the full range by default - #### happens after all.

The rest of the Inter-Agency (IA) does not have the PME opportunities we do - if they send a guy or gal to a school, the job goes unfilled - as such, not many IA folks get to go to professional schools throughout their career which enhance both the individual, the organization, and the mission - we often don't realize how fortunate we are until you show up and compare your professional education opportunities with your Inter-Agency peers. Put a larger OPTEMPO requirement on a smaller portion of the force in order to create specialized units - and you jeopardize your PME some. With regard to the "M" - Material - it creates lots of other requirements that ripple across the spectrum - because it effects logistics, training, facilities, etc..

So first - my answer is that I don't think we need another specialized force - we're doing pretty well, but can probably do better through better personnel management - I think we are doing this, but it takes awhile to even nudge the super-tanker.

I don't mind people asking a good question - it gets people thinking, but I've come to believe that when the GIF (Good Idea Fairy) visits there are a few things that should be asked prior to introducing it to the general public (unless the intent is stated to generate discussion)

Some of these questions are: what are the repercussions, consequences and impact of this idea in related areas?; what is the scope which it will impact?; is this a problem or a condition I'm proposing a solution for?; Is there an easier answer, that while not optimal, will get the job done, and will not unravel other areas and create other problems?; what are the potential un-intended consequences that will have to be dealt with?; who is going to have to live with my GIF?

If you can reasonably answered those questions, and feel the risk is justified or mitigated, then its probably safe to introduce and pursue a GIF.

Best, Rob

[Old Eagle]

This is a core issue at an on-going symposium at Ft Leavenworth. Interestingly, very early on panelists moved from GPF to full spectrum forces. I'll try to update you on any conclusions/results.

[Jones_RE]

It seems to me that the authors were just assuming that this specialized force would be 1) ready when needed for a future conflict, 2) available at the time and 3) in the right area with its resources.

I sincerely doubt a specialized counterinsurgency unit could meet any of those criteria. Had such a unit existed in 2003, it's personnel, equipment and training resources would probably have been raided to make up for shortages in the line units getting ready for OIF. It also would already have deployed everyone else to Afghanistan. Finally, the process of readying and moving the unit to Iraq would have taken quite a long time.

Even when such a unit is up and running, there's no guarantee that a high intensity force would be needed to deal with a blowup like Fallujah, Ramadi or Najaf. And all three of those happened at about the same time! This hyped up advisory corps would have been storming Fallujah by itself when their Iraqi recruits folded. In Ramadi, they'd have been overrun.

General purpose forces will never be ideal for any mission. But it seems to me (as a civilian) that in war doing something now is more important than doing it perfectly.

[William F. Owen]

"Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?"

I assume I am not alone in considering the nature of the question as part of the problem. There maybe no stupid questions but this one indicates a real lack of understanding.

The Manoeuvre Warfare crowd always tout the old focus on "the enemy and not terrain" and yet that has clearly produced a very limited mindset, where enemy and terrain are seen as defining the problems and not opportunities.

One well trained and rationally equipped army can do anything you want it to. What someone needs to ask is why some armies fail to be able to do it.

[Gian P Gentile]

Sullygoarmy uses this quote from "The Centurions" after his posting. Although this is a tengent from the main thrust of this thread the quote he used got me to thinking:

I'd like to have two armies: one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, fanfares, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals and dear little regimental officers...

The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflaged battle dress, who would not be put on display, but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That's the army in which I should like to fight.

The Centurions

Well it seems to me that we have it the way Larteguy wanted it. We have the American combat soldier and combat marine who fights in Iraq and Afghanistan everyday in their "camouflaged battle dress" and then we have the Army back on display here in the United States. That display force is actually the metaphor of perfectness created of the American fighting soldier by the supporters of both wars; that is to say the notion that the American fighting soldier can do no wrong, that he is perfect in his actions because he supports and carries out a righteous ideological cause. The image at the President's state of the union address of the service members in full regalia sitting behind the president's family are examples of our actual fighting army that is on "display" to the American people. The sad irony during the President's speech is that as we looked at those brave service members on TV just hours before 5 American combat soldiers were killed in Mosul. Such is the two armies that the author of "The Centurions," Jean Larteguy called for.

[selil]

Colonel Gentile,

At first I read this and thought, "smoke on the water and lucy in the sky with diamonds", then I realized, dang he's right. Unfortunately I think you will always need a political Army and a fighting Army. I don't know if you can have both.

[Ken White]

,,, I don't know if you can have both.

Nor do you need both. People are either soldiers or they aren't. Not 'warriors' or 'warfighters' -- soldiers (or Marines). Warriors are amateur soldiers and professionals and it is said a good pro can whip a good amateur any day.

Being able to put on a pretty uniform is part of that job...

The US Army has not been to war since 1945 -- parts of it have been in several wars but the Army as an entity has not. That is a fact of life in a democracy. I'm not sure we really want to change that. In any event we now have a slew of combat experienced junior Officers and not too many Generals who have much. Luck of the draw, it could've been different. It wasn't. It isn't...

I read all of Jean Larteguy's books. They were pretty good. I'm thus familiar with his cited quote. I always put that down to someone who hadn't really thought through what he said.

[Skullbiscuit]

Once again, the Army comes up to a problem representing an external threat which does not play to its preferred COA of force on force attrition,

• goes through a lot of pain in coming to grips with the fact that it does not like to do small wars and working non-kinetic solutions

• says its got to get smart on training for COIN and training will be the solution to all the inadequacies of the current force

• says learning about other cultures is an important part of COIN and we need to do it

And finally forgets that it too has a culture and a system which fosters that culture, and that culture with its underlying system lead it in great part, to the situation it finds itself in when kinetic operations cease and then it is "now what?".

But no worries, we'll train ourselves out of this problem. We'll forget about Force Management, OPMS, Branches, the Senior Rater driven OER with its total subjectivity, career "tracks". In a word we will forget about OPMS politics and through training alone we will overturn (permanently) deeply entrenched institutional biases and their underlying often unspoken cultural prejudices.


I have a bridge....it is in Brooklyn

SB

[Ken White]

No worries, nothing will change...

...
And finally forgets that it too has a culture and a system which fosters that culture, and that culture with its underlying system lead it in great part, to the situation it finds itself in when kinetic operations cease and then it is "now what?".

Exactly. Now what? Isn't that about where we were five years or so ago?

But no worries, we'll train ourselves out of this problem....

Good luck with that. I don't think you can train yourself out of any problem. What you can do is train better so that you have less problems.

... We'll forget about Force Management...

That would be a good start; we survived without it for almost 200 years and through more complex times than today.

...OPMS...

That would really help as DOPMA is a big part of the problem. Only real difficulty there is Congress who forced it on the Army -- and I'll easily acknowledge that's the hardest impediment to better capability to remove from your list.

... Branches...

Great plan -- they and their parochialism are an impediment. The Marines get by without them (and at the rate the USMC is going, they'll be bigger than the Army in fifty years... ). As do other world armed forces (at least to the extent of clout we give them). Look at the bright side, the Navy's Bureaus were even more parochial and powerful than our branches, yet, the Navy finally got rid of them (They now have 'communities' ). Maybe if we did that, the M8 wouldn't disappear as a quid pro quo for Armor support of Infantry's Bradley. Maybe the troops could have a better rifle due to less Building 4 lobbying for the status quo...

...the Senior Rater driven OER with its total subjectivity...

Absolutely no way to get rid of subjectivity in personnel performance rating or evaluation. You can clarify it by adding Peer and Subordinate rating (Horrors!!!). you can also rig the OER so that no raters names show on the front page the board sees (Just joking, the Generals will never buy that).

... career "tracks"...

your quotation marks say it all, don't they? They are a big part of the problem; DOPMA again...

In a word we will forget about OPMS politics and through training alone we will overturn (permanently) deeply entrenched institutional biases and their underlying often unspoken cultural prejudices.

Well, that would be a start -- of course, if you think they're beneficial, by all means hang on to them. You'll have a lot of allies, many in high places.

I have a bridge....it is in Brooklyn SB

Really I thought that was a Tree grows in Brooklyn. The Bridge connects Manhattan and Brooklyn so it's in both. Well actually, it's over the East River, so... Oh, never mind...

Nobody said changing a monolithic organization chock full of its own long standing culture and tons of biases and skewed systems would be easy. Nor did anybody say anything about tearing up all the norms and forms. Branches don't need to disappear; they do need to lose some of their clout. DOPMA will be hard to amend; hard is not impossible. The issue is, simply -- are some changes needed? If so what? What's achievable?

Better training IS achievable and as those better trained Privates become 1SGs and those LTs become COLs over time, they will change the culture...

Of course, not giving new entrants the best possible training can always be justified by citing the cost. Has nothing to do with not wanting smarter folks. surely...

A WW II Intel Officer, David Ogilvy said:

"If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants.”

Makes sense to me.

As always for those not so inclined in any study of courses of action doing nothing is always an option.

[Skullbiscuit]

A WW II Intel Officer, David Ogilvy said:Makes sense to me.

That's it! I figured that somebody would have come up with it before I did. But my version of the OER and OPMS works like this:

1. Left to their own devices and without any checks on them (and you cannot say there are any substantive checks on SR profiles save keep it within the 49/51 distro mandated by OPMS XXI) people will pick people like themselves.

2. If they can't pick someone like themselves they'll pick someone who is less then themselves (no threat --- the dwarves)

3. The last thing people will do is pick people who are not like themselves and represent a threat. There be Giants!

So to bring it home. Change is a threat. Change is hard. By definition change and its tool --- innovation are challenges to the status quo --- either organizationally or on a day to day basis individually, man on man, Senior Rater vs rated officer, one world view vs another world view. The OER and OPMS tends over time to default downward by weeding out risks (threats) other people like Ridgeway or Boyd would call them mavericks. For those who lived through the draw down of the mid 90's this is all old news and was covered ad naseum in professional journals etc widely under the title of "zero defects" and officer culture. HRC's solution to the symptom (you could not survive in a tightening manpower pool with a COM report on your profile) was to make sure most everyone got a COM and thus entered the ultimate head fake --- the 49/51 profile distribution.

The dodge was the "expanded rating pool" Where now in order to avoid the hard choices forced upon you (the Senior Rater) by the 49/51 distro, you now brought in everybody within a given grade to rate. So CDR's were rated in the same pool as tier 3 functional staff officers. So no worries. No change. So I'll skip a lot of the between (there are many other aspects of "gaming" that have come about as a consequence of this 49/51 profile distribution) to get to where this comes home for organizational change --- it doesn't happen.

The old rules "never work outside of your branch" and "promote your own" and "avoid eating your own" are in effect now as they were then. So any attempt at bringing in new ideas or new functions which do not have a patron(s) in high places and which then in turn must try to survive within this system which is largely unchanged in my 22+ years of active duty is well ---- a delusion. And even if you have patrons and a new idea takes root and gets traction (the air-land battle mafia of the early 80's comes to mind). How long before today's heretics and their new idea becomes tomorrow's rigid and unyielding dogma?

If the Army want's to really change then all conversation should begin and end with a discussion of OPMS and DOPMA. Otherwise we are just merely rearranging the furniture.

Oh...and the Army did trial a 360 OER a couple of years ago. They pulled it from HRC's website without comment to the field. A potentially ground shaking event within OPMS was buried without a discussion from all stakeholders....not just a few GO's.

Ken, I hear you and I'm not saying that training can't fix things....given enough time.....but that is the rub.....time. Cultures cannot be created quickly. And the culture of head down political risk aversion which is fostered by the OER is not one to be overturned by training. Historically when the Army could not reorganize itself internally in order to cope with a new threat, it either decided to, or more often had someone outside decide for them on the creation of a new function within the Army in order to deal with the problem. Special Forces is one such example. Thus their current position of being able to do this in house without functional specialization defies their history and also ignores the parochialism the branches and respective communities (heavy, light, and SOF) have exerted over time.
SB

[Ken White]

Everything you say is true.

"1. Left to their own devices and without any checks on them (and you cannot say there are any substantive checks on SR profiles save keep it within the 49/51 distro mandated by OPMS XXI) people will pick people like themselves.

2. If they can't pick someone like themselves they'll pick someone who is less then themselves (no threat --- the dwarves)

3. The last thing people will do is pick people who are not like themselves and represent a threat. There be Giants!

You started off with the crux of it; which is great -- a lot of folks don't recognize how significant a problem those points are. In fact, I agree they are the most significant problem; that and jobs at HRC, a driver of more import than many know. Shy Meyer tried to kill the HRC Mafia and they trooped up on the Hill and they won; they outlasted Meyer and went right back to business as usual.

One of the better Generals I ever knew was on a roll one day and told me that the basic problem was that we'd made the system too competitive. He Said. "All Generals are mediocre -- I'm mediocre. If you aren't mediocre your contemporaries or their godfathers will kill you on the way up..." He'd had to tell his just entering OBC son to be good but not too good. That bothered him.

He and another guy fought the 49/51 block at the time of issue but to no avail (though I thought it had been lifted for CPT and below? I hung up my tree suit in '77 and retired from my DAC job 12 years ago, I'm beyond outa touch ). The other guy had as a COL been the Dir of OPD in the early 70s and he and the then XO came up with an OER that had all the rating chain names and signatures on the reverse and which the Board would not see -- it got rave reviews as it circulated in the building until it hit the first GO reviewer. Where it died...

So I hear you and know this is the truth:

"If the Army want's to really change then all conversation should begin and end with a discussion of OPMS and DOPMA. Otherwise we are just merely rearranging the furniture.If the Army want's to really change then all conversation should begin and end with a discussion of OPMS and DOPMA. Otherwise we are just merely rearranging the furniture."

Sad but accurate. As I acknowledged earlier that's the ol' big pole. Still, we both know frontal assaults are a bad idea. Flanking is in order. That or trap some Beavers and put 'em to work on that pole...

"Ken, I hear you and I'm not saying that training can't fix things....given enough time.....but that is the rub.....time. Cultures cannot be created quickly..."

Totally true this one has been building for over 200 years and in its current form, since the end of WW II. It will be exceedingly difficult to turn around. It will also take time. I mentioned the LTs to COLs -- it'll, I think, take two iterations of that to achieve marginal success in changing the culture (unless we have a big war and someone finds another Saint George -- difficult in this age).

"... And the culture of head down political risk aversion which is fostered by the OER is not one to be overturned by training..."

I agree, in my view it'll take a minor internal revolt; a mass exodus; or an exceptionally strong CofS,A pulled up a couple of stars. The latter is an admittedly unlikely prospect, the other two are, unfortunately, more likely.

Much of this as you know is thanks to Congress which is a BIG part of the problem and which fostered DOPMA to preclude the Armed Forces from being 'unfair' to anyone and give everyone an 'equal' shot at the gold ring. They did what legislators are too prone to do, they tried to guarantee equality of outcome when what was needed was equality of opportunity

"...Historically when the Army could not reorganize itself internally in order to cope with a new threat, it either decided to, or more often had someone outside decide for them on the creation of a new function within the Army in order to deal with the problem. Special Forces is one such example. Thus their current position of being able to do this in house without functional specialization defies their history and also ignores the parochialism the branches and respective communities (heavy, light, and SOF) have exerted over time."

Having been on SB Hill in another lifetime shortly after the birth and before there was a Beanie, I hear that. The same mission argument was around then. With a serving son, I get random unclas updates from time to time. Not all that much change. Like you said, the culture is old and deeply embedded.

The problem is that the "new threat" seen by the pachyderms is rarely the evul enema -- it is any threat to the institution; they will put aside branch and personal squabbles to repel boarders in a heartbeat. Still, most of 'em I've met, though constrained by the system they grew up in, generally mean well. They will select those in their own image and conformity is the guiding mantra as you say. What remains to be seen is whether they will act on the realization that I suspect most have deep in their minds -- all today is not well in the institution and some changes will HAVE to be made. Many will try to keep those changes to an absolute minimum, no question. You may be right and the minimalists will win -- but I'm a hopeless optimist; there's gotta be a Pony in there somewhere...

[Skullbiscuit]

.......that and jobs at HRC, a driver of more import than many know. Shy Meyer tried to kill the HRC Mafia and they trooped up on the Hill and they won; they outlasted Meyer and went right back to business as usual.

Yes HRC and the assignment officer, the latter I liken to a Vegas card dealer who plays you with a stacked deck. Only he knows what cards are in the deck, if he has all 52 he won't show them to you, unless you're a personal friend, or your a "hitter", or potential patron.

One thing most officers in the Army today don't realize is that their file at HRC has a classification on it; "A", "B", or "C". And that classification determines what quality of assignment the desk officer offers (he slides the card across the table) the officer.

The assignment game becomes like momentum stock speculating in the stock market; fundamentals (who you are today) matter far less than what investors (senior raters) have thought about you in the past. Thus the possibility of a breakout or a turn-around from a bad report (only mediocre report is needed to hurt you in an inflation prone profile scheme) becomes almost impossible.

Again it is HRC as broker --- essentially the "decider" of where you go and what you do. A black hole of politics without any transparency. No excuse for this. Especially in an era of real time online information. All assignments could be online and available for all to see 24/7; and even more heretical --- allow you to apply for them directly and go through an interview process with an impartial 3rd party --- cut the branch assignment officer and branch or functional area politics and strength management out. I could go on. But it is because of these and other practices from HRC that about ten years ago I started to refer to them as the true "Great Satan".

Revise the OER, open up assignments to a more competitive and dynamic pool of human capital outside of HRC's control; and to paraphrase Brando's Kurtz "our problems here would soon be over"

I retired last summer. I miss soldiering. I have nothing but contempt for OPMS. I could have stayed on but understanding how the personnel mgt system works, and knowing that the only thing meaningful to them at the end of the day is "do we have the bodies?". The only meaningful gesture for me was to deny the system my labor. The only time I have ever seen the beast wince and try to change is when it did not have the bodies it needed. And that "change" was wholly cosmetic and temporary --- the beast painted itself a new color and shouted "Look at us! ....we're kinder gentler now!" So short of a military catastrophe that threatens the nation OR the inability of the system to recruit and retain the numbers it needs ---- I am not as optimistic as you.....I see no pony in there.....only the same ole Army jack_ss

We "succeed" today because of our technological over match, wealth, training and institutional support is "good enough" to avert the recognizable spectacular headline grabbing defeat, and that those on the fence and not actively opposing us are willing to concede we mean well even though the giant bumbles and stumbles in the china shop. Had we a threat with deeper pocket books, better technology, and without the constraints of our personnel mgt system to systematically suffocate innovators and mavericks....things could be different.

And

......it is any threat to the institution; they will put aside branch and personal squabbles to repel boarders in a heartbeat. Still, most of 'em I've met, though constrained by the system they grew up in, generally mean well.

Yes but the road to Hades was paved with such intentions. An officer I knew back in the 90's put it to me succinctly when we were discussing the crisis in the Army at the time (on the Army Times a prominent O6 BDE CDR was profiled as leaving the Army because of the Army's identity crisis --- this was circa 98-99). This officer said to me not to expect the GO Corps to do anything substantive to change the Army. He said they are all "made men". I asked him why is it that these men allow their nuts to be chopped off in order to take the stars? He said; "you don't understand....they give them their nuts willingly"

[Ken White]

I've long told every Officer I meet, "When you get to be Chief of Staff, nuke the Hoffman Building."

The only thing that keeps me optimistic is the kids -- the LTCs and below make it work in spite of the impediments in the system. The technology and the massive amounts of money help keep us from looking like bumbling idiots -- but the kids do their part and more as well and that in spite of the way they're trained (or not) and treated.

All you say is true, two things you say are particularly important, I think:

"...Revise the OER, open up assignments to a more competitive and dynamic pool of human capital outside of HRC's control; and to paraphrase Brando's Kurtz "our problems here would soon be over."
. . .
Had we a threat with deeper pocket books, better technology, and without the constraints of our personnel mgt system to systematically suffocate innovators and mavericks....things could be different."

True dat...

Keep the faith.

[Skullbiscuit]

I've long told every Officer I meet, "When you get to be Chief of Staff, nuke the Hoffman Building."

The only thing that keeps me optimistic is the kids -- the LTCs and below make it work in spite of the impediments in the system.

Ha! That is what I told my O6 senior rater (I was an O5 then and retired as one last year) in Iraq in 2005. I told him; "Sir, I've been in the Army for 20 years in spite of OPMS, not because of it. And the reason that I've been in the Army as long as I have is because there is only ONE ARMY. Because if there was a second Army in this country I would have taken my labor to it a long time ago if for no other reason then to show my disapproval with this Army's officer personnel management practices"

So we bumble forward because there are only two meaningful choices for someone thinking about the profession of arms in this country:

1. Choice #1: Army, Navy, Airforce, or Marines
2. Choice #2: Once inside one of them, do I stay or do I go?

Because as you pointed out the system fosters systemic risk aversion and mediocrity, it survives because of the valor and sense of duty (and no other place to exercise those qaulities within a profession of arms framework --- in a word the government both enjoys and suffers from its monopoly status as a sole source employer for those seeking the profession of arms) of the jr. and field grade officers which have to make things work on the ground.


A helluva a way to run an organization within a country which has become what it is through the workings of good laws, free enterprise, and free labor markets.