Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[SWJED]

30 August Reuters - U.S. Considers New Military Command for Africa by Will Dunham.

... With several war-ravaged regions and great expanses of ungoverned territory, Africa presents optimal conditions for extremists aiming to secure a foothold, many experts contend.

"There is certainly an increasing awareness of the strategic importance of Africa," said U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter, a Pentagon spokesman, "because in the post 9/11 world we have a much better appreciation for (threats emerging from) ungoverned territories."

The Horn of Africa region is of particular concern for U.S. counterterrorism officials. The State Department says Somalia and the sparsely populated Trans-Sahara region, especially Mali and Mauritania, offer safe haven for militants.

Al Qaeda, responsible for the 2001 attacks on the United States, is thought to have a presence in eastern and northern Africa, and Islamic fundamentalism appears to be increasing in some parts of the continent.

The State Department says a small number of al Qaeda operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continue to pose the most serious threat to U.S. interests in the region.

Although it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups are present in western and central Africa, the department has said fund-raising, recruiting and other efforts by al Qaeda and its affiliates in South Africa, Nigeria and across the Trans-Sahara region remain a serious worry.

Carpenter said populations in certain parts of Africa are vulnerable to extremists due to ideology, poverty and disease.

"Many of the militaries in Africa desire to have interaction with the U.S. so that we can help to improve their capabilities, to defend their borders, to prevent the transit of terrorists, to be able to realize their economic potential," Carpenter added.

A U.S. military task force in the Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti, has about 1,800 troops. Its mission is "preventive in nature," Carpenter said. The task force aims to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups in the region, denying them safe haven and outside support, officials said.

Officials offered no timetable for a decision on an Africa Command and said no decisions have been made on where it would be headquartered or how many troops would be devoted.

"The intent of (creating an Africa Command) is not to put troops in Africa. It would be to streamline the focus and give appropriate undivided attention to the continent," a Pentagon official said.

[sgmgrumpy]

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/P...inter/henk.htm

The novelty of the post-Cold War strategic environment is reflected in the changing jargon of American military professionals. "Humanitarian assistance" and "peace operations" were hardly key concerns of the national military establishment in the mid-1980s, though they have become prominent a decade later. Since the early 1990s, US professional military literature has been increasingly preoccupied, some would say obsessed, with discussions of what are identified as unprecedented roles for the national military establishment.

Interventions with military forces often figure in discussions of US involvement in Africa; indeed, in the 1990s no part of the world has seen a greater number of such interventions than Sub-Saharan Africa. However, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian relief operations, and peace support interventions tend to obscure the more enduring and more significant diplomatic and economic links between the United States and African countries. They also obscure routine military-to-military relations in the region, which have expanded in the wake of the Cold War.

The United States conducts military operations in Africa, just as it exercises diplomacy and provides aid, to further US regional objectives. The demise of the Cold War had an obvious effect on US objectives in Africa, and while each US administration is expected to put its own imprint on the nation's foreign policy, some American activities reflect enduring interests. This article identifies a set of desirable conditions that appear to have become de facto US national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

[Eddie Beaver]

I explained my opposition to this in more detail on my blog earlier.

Essentially, the US needs to do a lot more on non-military fronts before they set an Africa Command up for failure.

A secondary point; an Africa command should be considered a test lab for tactics, organization and strategy. Why do we need to have a huge typical command structure? Such a command could be heavily focused on a small number of key personnel who help train African militaries in peacekeeping and stablization operations, develop important relations with governments, NGO's & civic organizations to counter AIDS, rampant crime and terrorism and place a heavy emphasis on developing the capabilities of police and auxilary forces to deal with natural disasters, disease epidemics, refugee crises and urban disorder. Why not focus on light infantry training (i.e. what H. John Poole advocates in "Terrorist Trails")?

If this command is focused on counterterrorism, it will be a tragic missed opportunity.

[Tom Odom]

Eddie,

I know you have read my book and my comments on support to Mobutu. I agree with your concerns and you state them well.

I would also say, however, that barring establishing an Africa Command, the continent will be what it has been to date, a European Command or Central Command after thought--until something like Rwanda or Sudan gets those commands' attention.

JTFHOA has a broad program and I am encouraged by it. I would--like you--prefer to see much greater emphasis on AIDS as a security issue. But again without that critical unified command with its budget and focus such efforts are very likely to get the chop.

Again great post on your blog!

Best

Tom

[Eddie Beaver]

Tom,

Agreed on Africa being an afterthought without the creation of an Africa command.

Perhaps a streamlined version of JTF-HOA could establish some semblance of progress in key countries and trouble spots.

Do you think it is realistic for us to pursue a stronger strategic and mil to mil relationship with South Africa, i.e. perhaps even establishing Africa Command on the ground there? I don't think Nigeria is the better option, especially with the intensity of their current and brewing crises.

(thank you for reading my blog post, I hope to write with more clarity and understanding in both the near future with more study of the subjects involved and in the mid-future (early next year) with some travels on the ground).

Stan,
Always good to have the voice of reason and experience added to Pentagon dreaming. You ask a very critical question that begs serious concern, not only for your reasons but for the wrong kinds of attitudes people could bring (an obsession with force protection to the point of rendering goals unattainable) and a question of quality personnel in case Africa command is inevitably treated as the red headed step child of priorities in a strategic landscape dominated by contractor-driven China fear and Middle East instability.

[marct]

Hi Eddie,

Really great blog post, although I think you might be being a touch too cynical in point two <wry grin>. Sure, the US has had a disastrous history in Africa but, as Tom noted, this might well be countered by the creation of an Africa Command. Personally, I think that anew command might be a good institutional starting point for creating integrated military and non-military teams (i.e getting some non-state actors in on our side). I would also view it as a chance to allow US allies (like us guys up here in de frozen North!) to get some decent logistical support and, if necessary, backup.

Marc

[Eddie Beaver]

Marct,

I agree now that the formation of an Africa Command would be a positive step, but I just see the utter lack of comprehension of Africa at the higher levels in government.

Obviously, there are a great number of talented, devoted and highly capable diplomats, soldiers and other members of the US and Allied governments who have a good handle on Africa and understand many of the complex dangers, trends and opportunities there. Their efforts and talents are regressed though when they're being undercut by strategic neglect from above.

Cynical? Maybe, probably. Viewing the stupidity of this administration over Liberia, Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe just makes me look at the past with less of a dumbfounded expression and more of an understanding of why we continue to make bad calls.

You are exceptionally right in we could and should do a lot more to offer support and work together in joint endeavors as allies and friends in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean political and cultural spheres and on the continent itself.

[Stan]

So well put, and by no means an easy task. Just ask Tom.

These days, if and when HA funds manage around a continuing resolusion, the fish bowl we know as the country team and eventually an assignments officer (typically the most junior and the least knowlegeable member in country with an already full plate) will or should begin a precious cycle of events that were originally intended to help the host nation. Basically, hopeless and a ton of paper. When the State dude does show, you better have one hell of a good presentation coupled with fresh bodies, mines, and whatever you can come up with for dinner, cause he's staying for that too !

That was the easy part.

The idea of an African Command leaves me wondering what kind of experience these good folks are coming with. Language and customs will not be nearly enough. Most have never tasted the games of DOS. Foggy Bottom produces some of the strangest members I have ever had the pleasure of dealing with.

We sat in one of the most inhospitable places in the world, and although the JTF had some fine soldiers along, things still went tango sierra in less than 45 days. With all that sierra going on, nobody in K/town was home. Tom had assembled a team that could get along in almost any situation, including Goma. By no means a small task. Mind you, these were senior NCOs and Officers with years and years of experience.

To now assemble a team of African Specialists and simply leave them to the dogs of the country team before they even get started, will be a fate far worse than Goma, Zäire.

I wish them the best of luck !
Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Or them like us, to complete the toast, my friend.

Hopefully an Africa command would build over time--just like any unified command and take advantage of those who have been on the ground in manning.

Remember, Stan, that guys like COL Fields and LTC Ball in 1993 and 1994 were allowing DHS to close African stations without comment. DHS closed the African Bureau and consolidated it with the Middle East Bureau. Fields wanted to close us; I saw MG Leide in Pretoria in Nov 93 and convinced him to keep us open. And then the fight to stand up a station in Rwanda took me 18 months to win--and cost me any chance of getting anything but another "prize" assignment, regardless of how much Jim Clapper, Jack Liede, or Pat Huges liked me. Those are the kind of guys (Ball and Fields) an African Command does not need.

Manned correctly, a dedicated command would do much to make courtship of the country teams an easier romance. For one thing, it would serve as a counterpart to State's African Bureau as well as Langley--and you know how much I love Langley.

Best regards my friend,

Tom

PS Your hardcopy book went in the mail today

[Stan]

Remember Ambassador Wells ? She could have been a Sergeant Major with diplomatic skills !!!

She not only was one hell of a lady, she also knew how to run the shop and could quickly identify people accomplishing their missions even in the sight of death. She later came to Estonia shortly after my retirement.

Although the Flags of the DHS were indeed tending to their own agendas (I hated what they were doing to you and, as an E7 other than my abilities and experience, had little to offer you), I still believe that if the Ambo is professional as was Mellisa (sp?) and able to recognize who was pulling their load, and keep the other bone-heads in check (that she did well) our bung hole in Goma would have been far easier to cope with and we probably would have had immediate help.

I think you told me on several occasions, that our ordeal in Goma would be settled or handled inside the Beltway. How correct you were. Goma simply provided the excitement and tourists.

I would then have to conclude that Flags will once again provide that fatal penstroke and fate of some fellow NCOs and Officers.

Thanks in advance for the Xmas gift ! I am pondering over yours.

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Wells I never met. I remember you speaking of her wisfully everytime you had to deal with the Charge or his Deputy.

But Dave Rawson in Rwanda followed by Bob Gribbin were completely different than the clutch of village idiots we faced in K Town. Just as the RPA impressed us both when we crossed the border, so Rawson (and later Gribbin) impressed me. It was almost like the "diplomats" in K-Town were mimicking the FAZ while we operated like the RPA in Kigali.

I remember blowing my stack one day in Goma because the Deputy accosted me and complained that General Nix and I were not keeping him informed of what we were doing. He in his very best British accent* proclaimed, "Tom, I am a 3 Star equivalent!"

I was tired and you were not there to drag me away. I told him, "You are a 3 Star Asshole!" and then followed with as polite an explanation as I could muster that the General and I were busy doing things like bringing in aircraft and God knows what else. He was so shocked by my initial burst that he actually listened and nodded his head at everything else I had to say. But he did leave the next day

It all goes back to leadership--if the leaders are self-interested prima donnas, the rest of the mission will tend to follow in their paths.
Best

Tom

*the gentleman in question was from Oklahoma

[Stan]

Thanks Eddie !
I enjoyed the refreshing opinion you have RE AFRICOM. Even as late as 84, the NGOs and CDC were buried in AIDS. We at least thought that "somebody's doing something" even though the task was far beyond reality and any funding.

I think (you know what they say about opinions and A holes) Pretoria is probably too far away from Central Africa, but from an NCOs point of view, would have to say it's at least stable enough for your team to come back to and relax. That, or burn out. Tom knows what that does....he watched me progress to that point with no way out. Sounds kinda dumb, but little details seem to be often overlooked on the beltway. Even in 85 we carried 2 passports. One with a South African visa and the other with whatever.

Medical and R&R required a South African visa.

I think that holds true to this day in that neck of the woods.

Regards, Stan

[Stan]

Tom,
I would only later read about you and Rawson. I wondered, should I contact Tom, see what the F is going on there ? My DATT, a Navy 05 told me Rawson was not one to leave things idle and watch, rather get the troops in the mud. Hence all the press in DC.

Likewise, I said to the Commander, if the Colonel is still there, the troops are already in the mud !

I think we cooked this thread !
Regards, Stan

[Eddie Beaver]

Is the US relationship with Rwanda stable and viable enough then for some form of proposed AFRICOM detachment there? I have heard a lot of promising things about their performance in Dar Fur....

Understood about the distance with South Africa, but one wonders about a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe... which I suppose the South Africans may want to handle much as they did Mozambique in the 90's....