Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (catch all)

[pinoyme]

Hi:

This is a clipping from the Philippine Daily Inquirer. I decided to open a new thread.

Military says LGU funds go to NPA


By Delfin Mallari Jr.
Inquirer
Last updated 01:51am (Mla time) 11/25/2006

Published on Page A15 of the November 25, 2006 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer

LUCENA CITY—Portions of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of some local government units and villages in Southern Luzon go to the coffers of the communist New People’s Army rebels, military officials alleged here Thursday.

Maj. Ramon Rosario, commander of the Civil Relations Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Southern Luzon, said some municipal and village officials in the Bicol region have been allotting at least 10 percent of their IRA for communist rebels.
“But lately the NPA wants their share of the IRA to increase to 25 percent. The officials have resisted and most of them are now seeking the help of government forces to end the extortion,” Rosario said.

Lt. Col. Rhoderick Parayno, spokesperson of the military’s Southern Luzon Command based here in Camp Nakar, said they also received reports that portions of the IRA of some municipalities, and even villages, in some parts of Southern Tagalog were being used to pay taxes to the rebels.

“Those government officials kowtowing (sic) with the enemies should now think twice. The enemies are robbing their own people and yet they were all willing participants,” Parayno said.

Col. Amado Bustillos, commander of the Army’s 74th Infantry Battalion based in the Bondoc Peninsula in Quezon province, said he, too, has the same piece of information.

“The NPA also demands parts of the IRA especially from those in the remote villages,” Bustillos said.

He said the rebels have been imposing two kinds of taxation—socialized and centralized.

Socialized taxation, according to Bustillos, refers to money collected from individuals—from the village councilman, teachers to urban professionals while centralized taxes refer to money imposed on businesses operating in rebel-controlled areas.

“But whatever it is, it is plain and simple extortion and banditry,” the Army official said.

Armin de Guia, spokesperson of the NPA’s Apolonio Mendoza Command (NPA-AMC) that operates in Quezon province, laughed off the military’s allegation.

“Revolutionary taxation through the IRA is pure hogwash. There is no such thing in Quezon,” he said in a text message.

He also denied that communist guerrillas have been collecting taxes from individual wage earners and professionals.

“The collection of revolutionary tax is only being directed against capitalists and landlords and not against the masses,” he said.

The head of the Quezon village chieftains association also denied that barangay officials in the province have been paying taxes to the rebels.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

A case can be made that macArthur's refusal to recognize the contribution of the Huks to the anti-Japanese resistance in World War 2 contributed greatly to the start of the rebellion. Or at least to the tensions leading to it.

The old Communist Party's original agenda was to engage in parliamentary struggle after World War 2. And most of the Huk leaders were peasant socialists, not Communists.

The latter were mostly Manila intellectuals and professionals.


As for the 1972 to late 1970s MNLF rebellion? Somebody still has to write a book on Marcos' Machivellian tactics to beat them.

Clever rogue that Marcos. No wonder he fooled a lot of people then. This included a lot of American policymakers.

As for the NPAs? Jose Ma. Sison is a very interesting fella.

Cheers.

[charter6]

Pinoyme,
I'd disagree with your first statement that MacArthur's antipathy towards the Huks contributed greatly to the start of the Huk Rebellion.

I think that the basic motivating factor behind what became the Huk movement was the changing nature of the tenancy system in Central Luzon -- traditional relationships between tenants and their hacenderos broke down over the issue of non-contractual benefits as the Philippines began to modernize governmentally and legally under American control, and the firm grip the landowning class had on most organs of government and the courts led to peasants seeking alternative means of addressing their grievances, first in the form of striking and general unrest, and later in the form of armed revolution.

You do bring up the point that Communist Parties, and the PKP in particular, were committed to competing politically rather than militarily after World War II. The PKP did in fact compete politically in the form of Popular Front politics in the 1946 elections. It was only after their failure in these elections, at least partially due to widespread voter fraud and corruption, that they turned military struggle.

Also worth noting that the Manila faction was essentially wrapped up in 1950 when Lava and the rest of the Secretariat was captured. After that you have peasant leaders like Taruc running the show almost exclusively.

[pinoyme]

Hi Charter 6:

The Popular Front did not fail in Central Luzon. That was where they got Congressment elected through the Democratic Alliance Party.

These Congressmen were unseated, allegedly by deft maneuvers by then-President Manuel Roxas. The DA opposed amendments to the Philippine Constitution , which would grant Americans parity rights in the economy.

I shall not argue with you over economic theory, as I personally believe economic protectionism has what has stalled the Philippines from fulfilling its potential.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that with the DA out, the way was paved for amendment of the Philippine Constitution.

On the social tensions prevailing in Central Luzon beginning the 1930s, I agree with you on this.

But non-recognition of the Huks' contributions to the guerrilla effort was a grave historical injustice and contributed greatly to tensions in Central Luzon immediately after World War 2.


Rascal though he was, it was to Marcos' credit that he finally recognized the Huks in the mid-1970s shortly after he declared martial law.

Incidentally, the incident which finally sparked the Huk rebellion was the murder of a popular Left-leaning peasant/labor leader in Central Luzon.

The Cold War is over now. The Huk rebellion can now be examined for what it was: yet another peasant rebellion in a country full of such rebellions.

Cheers.

[charter6]

Right, but overall the PKP did not accomplish its goals in the '46 elections, and that was when party leaders began to look towards armed struggle as the answer.

I'm not arguing over your characterization of non-recognition of the Huks' contribution in World War II -- it was an injustice. I just don't think that injustice really played too great a role in causing the Huk Rebellion, regardless of the public statements made to that effect by the PKP. Central Luzon was a powder keg, and had been since the 1930's. The Roxas government did nothing to diffuse the tension there after the war, and paid the price.

[pinoyme]

Charter 6:

In 1946, the goal of the PKP was parliamentary struggle. This was to be done through Popular Front tactics. The Democratic Alliance was made up of left-inclined liberals, agrarian populist/socialists, intellectuals, and a faction of the hard line nationalist movement.

The PKP had no illusions about its overall strength. Its base was confined to Central Luzon, and parts of the Southern Tagalog region also in Luzon. It had small pockets of influence in Manila--among left-leaning intellectuals and a labor federation, the Congress of Labor Organizations. It had a toehold among port workers in the in the Western Visayas in the central islands of the Philippines.

The decision to overthrow the government through armed struggle was made in 1950. However, between 1946 and 1950, there were several skirmishes between the Huks and the Philippine Constabulary, town policemen, and armed civilian guards of landowners.

In 1946, the Huks registered with the government. In the 1960s, Maoist leader Jose Ma. Sison pointed this out as a glaring example of the inept leadership of the PKP by the Lavas.

I am anti-Communist. But historical facts are historical facts. After all, the Cold War is over.

Cheers.

[charter6]

We're not really disagreeing on too much here, except I take serious issue with the idea that between '46 and '50 there were only "several skirmishes". By '48, Quirino had committed the regular army to the Huk fight after the failure of the constabulary to control the situation -- the Huks it should be noted more than held their own. Aurora Quezon was killed in April '49. Most of the literature on the Huk Rebellion marks the events of 1950, particularly Magsaysay's appointment, as the turning point of the war, not the beginning of the war.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

From 1946 to 1950, the PKP was still trying to broker a modus vivendi with the national government.

It was only in 1950 when the PKP politburo decided to call for a revolution which would put them in Malacanang, the presidential palace within two years.

The skirmishes were localized incidents, but they were several. President Quirino called in the Philippine Army, because the incidents were already too many. Besides, the Philippine Constabulary had the bad habit of cozying up with local power brokers.

Let it be pointed out that the PC was basically a police force with M1 Garands and a few 30 caliber machine guns.

Meanwhile, it seems you are citing Philippine literature of the Cold War. This must be now be taken with some skepticism and a more sober examination of the facts.

Quirino had been demonized, but it turns out he was a very capable leader even if aristocratic.

Magsaysay will always be revered. However, historical evidence shows that had he not died in a plane crash in 1957, his shortcomings as an administrator while President would have finally been coming home to roost.

[charter6]

I just don't buy into the fact that the violence from '46 to '50 wasn't organized at a higher than local level. That just does not mesh with the facts. Stalin University was reopened in '46, Taruc re-formed the General Headquarters at Mount Arayat in the spring of '47. The assassination of Aurora Quezon wasn't a random act of localized violence -- it was a calculated escalation (one that it should be noted was disastrous for the Huk cause).

I disagree with your characterization of Quirino as capable. Quirino's failure to react in a timely fashion to the Huks, and his unwillingness to clear out dead-wood and corruption from his government were major catalysts of the rise of the Huks.

I agree with you on Magsaysay, his strength was never his administrative ability. His personal, charismatic leadership style though and his ability to connect with the peasants contributed tremendously to the fight against the Huks, and his leadership more than any other factor turned the tide of the rebellion.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

The fact that the Huks registered themselves at risk of being subject to being killed by guns for hire of the landlords shows there was no central decision to launch a revolt before 1950.

The PKP also openly supported the Nacionalista Party in the 1949 elections. Taruc, the Huk Supremo, had enough time to plead their case such as the Manila Rotary Club is further proof.

Also, none of the PKP members, the politburo out in Manila had still gone underground.

The murder -ambush of the late President Quezon's widow was done by new Huk recruits.

The Huk clashes were traditionall village vendettas. Both the civilian guards and the Huks claimed to be acting in self-defense.

AS FOR Quirino? There were other problems than the Huk rebellion. The Philippines was devasted by World War 2. In fact, only Warsaw could beat manila's destruction. Yet, Quirino was able to make the government function in spite this.

To say that Quirino could stop graft and corruption is to betray your shallow knowledge of Philippine culture and history. No offense meant when I say this.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is a capable President. But she is being sunk right now by her husband, who allegedly is engaged in influence peddling left and right.

Magsaysay BTW also had a number of crooks in his adnimistration. Sadly, a number of these were allegedly also military men he had brought into his watch.

Incidentally, the clashes between the civilian guards and the PC were what led to the rebellion.The landlords were demanding back rentals for the war years when they had fled their townhouses and sought refuge in Manila.

The decision to launch the rebellion took place in 1950 shortly after the Korean War's start. The PKP'S theoreticians mistakenly thought a new world war would start and so would a new economic depression.

Hence, their analysis of a revolutionary situation obtaining in the Philippines.

Cheers and Happy Weekend.

[charter6]

Hi:

The fact that the Huks registered themselves at risk of being subject to being killed by guns for hire of the landlords shows there was no central decision to launch a revolt before 1950.

Why is that? I don't follow the logic of your point.

The PKP also openly supported the Nacionalista Party in the 1949 elections. Taruc, the Huk Supremo, had enough time to plead their case such as the Manila Rotary Club is further proof.

Again, I don't see why this is proof of a lack of central coordination in the violence that took place before 1950. If Taruc wasn't already waging war, then why was he camped out on Arayat instead of campaigning in Manila?

Also, none of the PKP members, the politburo out in Manila had still gone underground.

Well, you're right, some of the political leadership of the PKP was still above-ground, but the military leadership of the Huks had reestablished HQ at Arayat, and squadrons were being reassembled all across Central Luzon.

The murder -ambush of the late President Quezon's widow was done by new Huk recruits.

Nope, not true. She was offed by a 200-strong detachment led by Alexander "Stalin" Viernes, an experienced commander who had served during world war II. Taruc may have disavowed the attack after the fact, but there's no doubt that it was carred out by "real" Huks.

The Huk clashes were traditionall village vendettas. Both the civilian guards and the Huks claimed to be acting in self-defense.

I don't disagree; I'm just saying that the pattern of Huk violence across Central Luzon speaks to a degree of central planning and sanction that you're refusing to recognize.

AS FOR Quirino? There were other problems than the Huk rebellion. The Philippines was devasted by World War 2. In fact, only Warsaw could beat manila's destruction. Yet, Quirino was able to make the government function in spite this.

To say that Quirino could stop graft and corruption is to betray your shallow knowledge of Philippine culture and history. No offense meant when I say this.

The degree to which the government was able to "function" under Quirino is debateable. The Huk situation steadily got worse than it had been under Roxas or even Osema.

I don't deny that my knowledge of Philippine culture and history is shallow. Every metric we have though indicates that there was a sharp drop-off in corruption at almost every level of government after Magsaysay took office, just as there had been in the army after he was appointed defense minister. Stop it altogether, of course not. There's corruption in every country, and always will be. But Quirino could have done better, and deserves criticism for that.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is a capable President. But she is being sunk right now by her husband, who allegedly is engaged in influence peddling left and right.

Okay.

Magsaysay BTW also had a number of crooks in his adnimistration. Sadly, a number of these were allegedly also military men he had brought into his watch.

Yes he did, but corruption dropped off significantly under Magsaysay, and popular approval of every level of government rose significantly.

Incidentally, the clashes between the civilian guards and the PC were what led to the rebellion.The landlords were demanding back rentals for the war years when they had fled their townhouses and sought refuge in Manila.

Wait, you're saying that the hired guards of the landowners and the PC fighting led to the war? Where do the Huks fit into that equation? I just don't think that's true.

The decision to launch the rebellion took place in 1950 shortly after the Korean War's start. The PKP'S theoreticians mistakenly thought a new world war would start and so would a new economic depression.

At this point, I don't even know where you're getting the 1950 date. The name change to Hukbong Magapalaya ng Bayan was in November '48. That's the latest date I've seen cited for the "start" of the rebellion. There was a drop-off in attacks after the Quezon assassination, and around the time of the '49 general election, but to say that the rebellion didn't start until 1950 is not something that appears anywhere in the literature as far as I've seen.

Cheers and Happy Weekend.

You too.

[pinoyme]

charter 6:


You do not get the logic of my point.

When the Huks registered, the assumption was that they were a legal organization. They gave out their names, addresses, and names of immeidate relatives.

In other words, they were giving out to their potential killers all the vital information needed for the job.

The fact that the Huks started going out to Arayat and that they were re-organizing was in reaction to the intensified clashes. They were doing so for self-defense.

As for Quirino, he became President in April 1948. At that time the Philippine treasury was empty. Salaries for government employees and worse the military were not paid on time.

War brutalized the Philippines and the Filipinos. Guns were everywhere. It was also easy to make a quick buck. Much of it by outright stealing and graft.

It is to Quirino's credit that he got the government to function somehow. He also negotiated for US aid. The import controls he put up, a necessary stopgap then, had the unintended consequence of spurring the import substitition policy--which gave short run economic benefits up until the start of the term of President Diosdado Macapagal's father.

Again, the Huks were but one of the numerous problems a post-war and newly-independent Philippines faced. There were several others.

As for the Huk commander who killed Aurora Quezon, he was a renegade leader. The province of Quezon was a marginal base for the Huks. Its strength was basically Pampanga and parts of Bulacan in Central Luzon and parts of Laguna.

It seems you are unfamiliar with Philippine culture and that is why you assume the Huks were as highly disciplined and organized as the Viet Minh.

No, Filipinos are not that way. And that is why Filipinos will never tolerate a Communist-led regime. Too much discipline which goes against the Filipino penchant for inspired improvisation and a more creative approach to problems.

If you are citing US military texts, they are then sadly outdated. Which is dangerous. Because if you will be citing lessons learned from these texts to craft strategies for another COIN campaign elsewhere, you shall be coming to grief.

Again, the top leaders of the Communist underground were out in the open. The incoherent reaction of the Huks to the 1946 to 1950 clashes shows there was no overriding strategic goal.

That goal happened when the decision to launch a revolution in 1950 finally took place. "See you in Malacanang," then became the greeting Huks gave to each other.

And the series of attacks against government units finally began.


Addendum:

Wait, you're saying that the hired guards of the landowners and the PC fighting led to the war? Where do the Huks fit into that equation? I just don't think that's true.

This is a copyediting issue, not an issue of fact.I committed an error most Filipino English writers are prone to.

What I meant was that Huks were clashing with either the PC, civilian guards, or municipal policemen. The last were under the control of mayors.

[charter6]

You do not get the logic of my point.

When the Huks registered, the assumption was that they were a legal organization. They gave out their names, addresses, and names of immeidate relatives.

In other words, they were giving out to their potential killers all the vital information needed for the job.

I think you're conflating "Huks" with CPP or the Communist political leadership more generally. I think if you took your average Huk trigger-man in the barrios, they were not openly participating in the political process even if some of their leaders were. What I've been trying to say is that even if there were elements in the Communist leadership pursuing the political track as late as 1950, organized and directed violence against the Philippine state had begun far earlier, 1948 at the latest and I would argue as early as 1946.

The fact that the Huks started going out to Arayat and that they were re-organizing was in reaction to the intensified clashes. They were doing so for self-defense.

So they had to defend themselves despite the fact that they weren't at war? I think you're being internally inconsistent. Either these were isolated incidents of constabulary vs. Huk violence, in which case the leadership cadres who you say were participating in the political process would have nothign to fear; or there was a war going on, in which case moves to fortified positions from where they would be safe from government reprisal would be logical for the leadership cadres.

As for Quirino, he became President in April 1948. At that time the Philippine treasury was empty. Salaries for government employees and worse the military were not paid on time.

War brutalized the Philippines and the Filipinos. Guns were everywhere. It was also easy to make a quick buck. Much of it by outright stealing and graft.

It is to Quirino's credit that he got the government to function somehow. He also negotiated for US aid. The import controls he put up, a necessary stopgap then, had the unintended consequence of spurring the import substitition policy--which gave short run economic benefits up until the start of the term of President Diosdado Macapagal's father.

Again, the Huks were but one of the numerous problems a post-war and newly-independent Philippines faced. There were several others.

I agree completely. I think there were many faults with the Quirino administration, and with Quirino himself, but nobody can argue that he faced an unenviable situation on taking office.

As for the Huk commander who killed Aurora Quezon, he was a renegade leader. The province of Quezon was a marginal base for the Huks. Its strength was basically Pampanga and parts of Bulacan in Central Luzon and parts of Laguna.

I'm pretty sure Quezon's convoy was ambushed in Neuva Ecija, one of the strongholds of Huk power from the earliest days of peasant organization in the 1930's through until the end of the Huk Rebellion.

Viernes wasn't a renegade. There's a significant amount of information on him. Nicknamed "Stalin", he had been a respected Huk squadron commander through World War II. His first split with the leadership came after Taruc disavowed the attack in response to popular disapproval of the attack.

It seems you are unfamiliar with Philippine culture and that is why you assume the Huks were as highly disciplined and organized as the Viet Minh.

No, Filipinos are not that way. And that is why Filipinos will never tolerate a Communist-led regime. Too much discipline which goes against the Filipino penchant for inspired improvisation and a more creative approach to problems.

I don't deny that I don't have your familiarity with Filipino culture. I don't think I've compared the Huks to the Viet Minh though, I don't know where you're getting that.

That doesn't mean that the four years of concerted Huk efforts to roll back governmental influence throughout Central Luzon weren't centrally organized or endorsed by the Huk leadership.

If you are citing US military texts, they are then sadly outdated. Which is dangerous. Because if you will be citing lessons learned from these texts to craft strategies for another COIN campaign elsewhere, you shall be coming to grief.

I'm a college student, I have no affiliation with the US military. My interest in the Huk Rebellion is recent. A large part of my thesis is based on a comparison of the Huk Rebellion with the Malayan Emergency in terms of how experience from both were applied to Vietnam pre-1964. Based on what I've seen here, I don't think you'd disagree with the thrust of my paper.

As for the sources I've used on the Philippines: I've done a significant amount of archival work here stateside, but I'm also leaning heavily on sources like a couple RAND Corporation econometric studies of the conflict, SSI papers, some Huk-sympathizer works like Benedict Kerkvliet's The Huk Rebellion and contemporary publications.

Again, the top leaders of the Communist underground were out in the open. The incoherent reaction of the Huks to the 1946 to 1950 clashes shows there was no overriding strategic goal.

That goal happened when the decision to launch a revolution in 1950 finally took place. "See you in Malacanang," then became the greeting Huks gave to each other.

And the series of attacks against government units finally began.

Some of the CCP leadership was out in the open. What became the Manila cadre was out in the open. The military command was operating out of Arayat as early as '46.

I think your terming the pattern of violence from '46 to '50 incoherent is off base. The Huks steadily rolled back government influence in congruent, strategically important blocs of Central Luzon through this period. A Huk squadron captured Nueva Ecija in the summer of '46 after fairly intense firefights with government regulars. Through 1947 you've got a patterns of raids and ambushes in Bulacan, Tarlac, and Pampanga. These weren't isolated instances of localized violence, these are full Huk squadrons engaging in operations aimed at denying entire provinces to the Philippine army and constabulary.

This is a copyediting issue, not an issue of fact.I committed an error most Filipino English writers are prone to.

What I meant was that Huks were clashing with either the PC, civilian guards, or municipal policemen. The last were under the control of mayors.

Okay, sorry for the misunderstanding.

[pinoyme]

think you're conflating "Huks" with CPP or the Communist political leadership more generally. I think if you took your average Huk trigger-man in the barrios, they were not openly participating in the political process even if some of their leaders were. What I've been trying to say is that even if there were elements in the Communist leadership pursuing the political track as late as 1950, organized and directed violence against the Philippine state had begun far earlier, 1948 at the latest and I would argue as early as 1946.


Hi Charter 6:

Going to the mountains in self defense and to flee oppression appears to be an act embedded in the subconscious of Filipinos. It all started during the early years of Spanish colonization.

Mt Arayat has special significance for this. In Pampanga province, it is also a mystical mountain. It has also been the haunt of syncretic Philippine religions that blend pre-Hispanic animism with folk Catholicism.

Going up Mt. Arayat was therefore a natural reflex for the Huks.

The Huk membership in Central Luzon consisted primarily of members of the peasant associations that had been forming there since the beginning of the 20th century. In the 1930s, they constituted the core of the Socialist Party of the Philippines.

It was the Socialist Party of the Philippines that merged with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas in the 1930s, as part of the Popular Front strategy then enacted by the Third Internationale.

Nonetheless, all this was Greek to the peasant members who constituted the backbone of the Socialist Party of the Philippines.

Membership in the Hukbalahap taught several peasants military skills. Up until War 2's eve, civilian guards of landowners were used to pushing around the peasants.

The landlords fled their haciendas during World War 2, and a good number collaborated with the Japanese. After the war, they tried to collect back rents.

Old habits die hard. They used their armed guards. This is how separate clashes without direction from the PKP leadership started.

Peasant leaders, who were Huk commanders and socialists at heart, repeatedly tried to broker peace agreements. To which the national government was predisposed to.

Hence, the registration of the Huks.

Trying to defend one's self with guns when the other side also has guns does not automatically constitute an act of war or rebellion. The Philippine Criminal Code--which freshmen in any college of law in my country illustrate this clearly in its definition of the crime.

Dona Aurora was on her way to Baler when ambushed and killed by the Huks.
This was her hometown and this was in Quezon province, which in the past was called Tayabas province.

There is no town named Baler in Nueva Ejica, which is a few kilometers north of Pampanga. It had Huks, but was a peripheral area. I wish Philippine newspapers of that time were now archived in the National Library of the Philippines.

Unfortunately, they are not. Because if they were, I would have asked you to check them out.

Having a glittering war record is no guarantee that one remains faithful to the Huk cause all the time. Many guerrilla leaders became warlords in the years immediately following World War 2's end in the Philippines.

If you think Kerkvliet is a Huk sympathizer, fine with me. BUT the late Jesus Lava , former PKP Politburo Charman, wrote a critique of his work. Unfortunately, it is in Filipino.

He was a Marxist intellectual BTW, and earned his medical degree from the University of the Philippines, the most prestigious in my country.

Nothing wrong with the SSI papers. But using other sources, including Philippine-written ones, would give you a better perspective.

And among these would be Jose Ma. Sison's Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party as well as his Philippine Society and Revolution.

I suggest you also read William Pomeroy's, The Forest. Neither of us may agree with his politics. But it is a well-written account.

Cheers and I now end my debate with you.

[charter6]

Sorry to hear that you don't want to continue, I've enjoyed and found interesting our back-and-forth here.

Couple notes in closing:

I'm confident on my sourcing on the site of the Aurora Quezon assassination. You're right that Quezon's motorcade was on its way to Baler, but they were in Nueva Ecija when ambushed. Every source I've consulted cites an ambush in Nueva Ecija. Check for example the New York Times article on the assassination, dated April 29, 1949. "Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon, widow of the first President of the Philippines; two members of her family and ten other persons were killed in ambush yesterday in Hukbalahap-ridden Nueva Ecija province...."

Viernes was not a renegade in the sense you're suggesting. There's a reasonable argument as to whether Taruc and the HQ knew what he was planning, but I haven't seen any source question that Viernes and his squadron were recognized a recognized Huk unit generally acting under orders.

I don't deny that clashes with landlords and their guards were common after world war II; I'm just arguing (as I think most sources on the subject do) that there was also a concerted effort by the Huk leadership to engage government forces through the 1946-1950 period, with perhaps two or three breaks, and to undermine governmental legitimacy throughout Central Luzon.

Kerkvliet has a much more Communist-friendly depiction of pre-World War II peasant organization in Central Luzon, and is generally more generous to the Huk cause than most other works I've seen. I've read Pomeroy. I've seen Sison's work, but haven't spent too much time with him. Thanks for the tip on those.

[S-2]

Gentlemen,

You may enjoy this from the CMH-

The Hukbalahap Insurrection

[charter6]

have a copy sitting on my desk right now in fact. I don't suppose anyone here knows anything about the author, Lawrence M Greenberg?

...didn't notice General Stofft had written the foreward. He used to be commandant at USAWC, right?

[Tom Odom]

didn't notice General Stofft had written the foreward. He used to be commandant at USAWC, right?

I first met him when he was C/S of the college at Leavenworth and had been the first director of CSI where I worked. He went to CMH as a BG and then to the War College. He hosted the murder board for Certain Victory when I was part of the Mailhouse Gang working with Bob Scales. Finished as Director of the ARSTAFF.

Best

Tom

[Kenyatta]

Coming and growing up from the Philippines.

My view on Jose Ma Sison of the NPA was that he was influential during the Marcos dictatorship but I think he had great control of teh NPA during the 70s and 80s but this eroded badly after the 1986 People power revolution. The NPA was basically crippled during the internal purges during the 90s(due to heavy AFP infiltration of its ranks and turning of many of its members to the gov).

Sison himself currently has little to no power over the current NPA and is currently enjoying himself in the Netherlands getting monies and donations from the Dutch gov.

There has always been a schism between the NPA military commanders on the ground and its political admistrative wing.

The NPA currently while very much down is not out. but have been reduced to bandit level.(they supplement their income with criminal activities(kidnapping, extortion, smuugling,drug dealing etc.).

Also , the NPA has always been a haven for criminals on the run, in fact I know of several people who were on the run from the law who joined the NPA to escape capture(many of them returned back to being criminals since they can't hack living in the jungle). Also the relationship between the NPA/AFP/Philippine Gov is interesting. It seems that the Phil Gov is not really interested in completely stamping out the NPA. In the provinces such as Negros, the NPA/AFP/Phil Gov have a cooperative/business relationship that the Phil Gov and local AFP commanders allows the NPA to extort the local pop and recognizes its territory. The NPA has evolved into a criminal organization rather than a grass roots guerilla revolutionary group. Also local AFP commanders make money from bribes, some arms sales etc. to the NPA. This fact is preety much a not too well kept secret but it is quite known and tolerated on the local level.

If you are interested in books on the war in Mindanao in the 70s-Present I highly recomend the following:

Under a Cresecent Moon by Marites Vitug. Gives a broad view on the conflict in Mindanao mostly on the political social aspects of it. Quite balanced.

The Day with Almost Lost Mindanao: The CENTCOM Story. By Former General Francisco Abat. A very nice military view by the commander of the AFP forces in Mindanao at the time on the Mindanao conflict in the early to mid 70s. Chronicles the MNLF offensive and the AFP counteroffensive. The book is quite rare and hard to get even in the Philippines. From what I heard, this book is surprisingly balanced, and gives a matter of fact view on the conflict.

A Mindanao Story by Delfin Castro. Focuses on the whole war with particular focus on the war with the MILF in the 90s.

[Jedburgh]

AWC, 8 Mar 71: The Philippine Constabulary as a Counterinsurgency Force, 1948-1954

The evidence indicates that the Constabulary was an effective counterinsurgency force, however, success came only after political, social, and economic operations were combined with military operations. Although the Philippine Constabulary represents an ideal model for other developing nations faced with an internal defense problem, and although the US Army Military Police School, in conjunction with the CDC Military Police Agency, has the capability to develop appropriate doctrine for this type force; the US Army has generally neglected the Constabulary in its counterinsurgency program.

Complete 82 page paper at the link.