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Thread: FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out

  1. #101
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Cool

    Wasn't it something like 23 survived out of 600? Hmmm. Okay, I can see taking the objective, but....
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
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  2. #102
    Council Member CR6's Avatar
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    Default C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre...

    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Wasn't it something like 23 survived out of 600? Hmmm. Okay, I can see taking the objective, but....
    Out of 660-670 soldiers who participated, 118 KIA and 127 WIA. Approximately 36% casualties, all the result of misunderstood orders and no recon. Cardigan could of used one of RTK's classes on the 8 troop leading procedures.
    "Law cannot limit what physics makes possible." Humanitarian Apsects of Airpower (papers of Frederick L. Anderson, Hoover Institution, Stanford University)

  3. #103
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default Revised Army Doctrine Elevates Stabilization

    Revised Army Doctrine Elevates Stabilization

    The Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable featured Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV on the Army's new new operations manual (FM 3-0) that elevates the mission of stabilizing war-torn nations to make it as important as defeating adversaries on the battlefield.

    LTG Caldwell currently serves as the commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army’s doctrinal manuals, training of the Army’s commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army’s Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

  4. #104
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CR6 View Post
    Out of 660-670 soldiers who participated, 118 KIA and 127 WIA. Approximately 36% casualties, all the result of misunderstood orders and no recon. Cardigan could of used one of RTK's classes on the 8 troop leading procedures.
    I could have made him somebody. I could have made him a contender.
    Example is better than precept.

  5. #105
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CR6 View Post
    Out of 660-670 soldiers who participated, 118 KIA and 127 WIA. Approximately 36% casualties, all the result of misunderstood orders and no recon. Cardigan could of used one of RTK's classes on the 8 troop leading procedures.
    Actually British Cavalry were always screwing up. This was just the best known, worst case.

    His Grace, the Duke of Wellington was a Cavalry sceptic, and famously asked a young Cavalry liaison officer what role his unit should play in the forthcoming engagement. The young chap thought for a bit, and then said,
    " If I may, your Grace, perhaps we might lend some tone to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl."

    Other Wellington classic was a hand written note passed to the Heavy Brigade, who were under long range cannon fire, during the action at Waterloo, that said.

    "His Grace the Duke sends his regards and asks that the Gentleman of the Cavalry put away their umbrellas, now that they are engaged by the enemy."

    Being mostly Americans, you probably won't get it, but it kills me!
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 02-27-2008 at 11:58 AM. Reason: I never did and you can't prove it!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #106
    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    "His Grace the Duke sends his regards and asks that the Gentleman of the Cavalry put away their umbrellas, now that they are engaged by the enemy."
    I get it. The Iron Duke did have way with words. My favorite is the letter requesting instructions during the Peninsular Campaign.

    Regarding the Charge, and regardless of Lord Cardigan's abilities, I've always thought that the blunder was failing to support there Brigade.
    John Wolfsberger, Jr.

    An unruffled person with some useful skills.

  7. #107
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Another famous fatuous cavalry charge

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Actually British Cavalry were always screwing up. This was just the best known, worst case.

    His Grace, the Duke of Wellington was a Cavalry sceptic, and famously asked a young Cavalry liaison officer what role his unit should play in the forthcoming engagement. The young chap thought for a bit, and then said,
    " If I may, your Grace, perhaps we might lend some tone to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl."

    Other Wellington classic was a hand written note passed to the Heavy Brigade, who were under long range cannon fire, during the action at Waterloo, that said.

    "His Grace the Duke sends his regards and asks that the Gentleman of the Cavalry put away their umbrellas, now that they are engaged by the enemy."

    Being mostly Americans, you probably won't get it, but it kills me!

    The 21st Lancers at Omdurman with Winston Churchill in attendance riding a white horse that drew special attention from Osman Digna's fuzzy wuzzies.


    We've fought with many men acrost the seas,
    An' some of 'em was brave an' some was not:
    The Paythan an' the Zulu an' Burmese;
    But the Fuzzy was the finest o' the lot.
    We never got a ha'porth's change of 'im:
    'E squatted in the scrub an' 'ocked our 'orses,
    'E cut our sentries up at Suakim,
    An' 'e played the cat an' banjo with our forces.
    So 'ere's to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan;
    You're a pore benighted 'eathen but a first-class fightin' man;
    We gives you your certificate, an' if you want it signed
    We'll come an' 'ave a romp with you whenever you're inclined.
    Attached Images Attached Images

  8. #108
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default JRTC BiWeekly History Lesson: Vietnam, Compound Warfare, and the new FM 3-0

    And relating to the new FM, I sent this out as a history lesson today:

    "North Vietnam won the Vietnam War because it ruthlessly and systematically applied version of fortified compound warfare. South Vietnam and its ally, the United States, lost because they were unable or unwilling either to counter this effort or institute their own version. With support from both the Soviet Union and China and with sanctuaries from American military might, the North Vietnamese conducted a guerrilla campaign that culminated in the 1968 Tet Offensive. This campaign confused, distracted, and wore down the South Vietnamese and drove the United States from the war. Then, the North Vietnamese employed a massive conventional campaign that unified the two nations.

    The United States found itself in the classic dilemma of the conventional operator in compound warfare; it faced an enemy that intelligently and ruthlessly combined main and guerrilla forces, utilized safe havens, and received support from powerful allies. The Americans and South Vietnamese, continually responding to the aspect of compound warfare that seemed predominant at any given time, tried a plethora of approaches until the American public lost its willingness to support the war. This “strategy of tactics” was ultimately a strategy for defeat."

    This installment of the JRTC CALL BiWeekly History Lesson looks at Randall N. Briggs' chapter, Compound Warfare in the Vietnam War, in Dr. Thomas Huber's anthology, Compound Warfare, That Fatal Knot, published by the CGSC Press and the Combat Studies Institute. Compound warfare theory put forth by Dr. Huber examines the relationships and power amplification inherent when regular and irregular forces are used together under a coherent strategy. Dr. Brigg's study differs from most Vietnam histories in that it looks at the war as a compound war pitting North Vietnam's compound strategy against conventional forces of the US and South Vietnam and other allies.

    As such, this chapter is not a case study of counterinsurgency, although COIN was very much part of the struggle. Rather it examines the play of regular and irregular forces in concert against a more conventional enemy. This close juxtaposition of regular and irregular warfare offers greater understanding of what those terms mean and do not mean. Neither the term "regular" nor its counterpart "irregular" have anything to do with normalcy or frequency. Indeed, "regular" warfare may be abnormal in the 21st Century. Rather regular and irregular warfare relate to the conventional and unconventional approaches to conflict and compound warfare theory offers a framework for their study.

    It is in that light that I offer this chapter as a history lesson, one intended to broaden the reader's understanding of irregular warfare. Notably the new version of FM 3-0 makes critical changes in defining irregular warfare as it relates to stability operations. This single chapter from Tom Huber's anthology on compound warfare provides an excellent companion to the 2008 version of FM 3-0.

    You may download the entire anthology at CSI Press.

  9. #109
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    GEN Wallace in the Mar-Apr 08 Military Review:

    FM 3-0 Operations: The Army's Blueprint
    ....The 2008 edition of FM 3-0, though shorter in length than its predecessors, presents the fundamental principles and concepts that guide the direction of Army operations rather than a checklist for success. Significant recent operational experience from the War on Terror, specifically the operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, as well as urgent relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina and Rita, necessitated changes in doctrine. The development of this version of FM 3-0 traces back to 2005 with a series of issue papers covering unified action, the design of the war fighting functions, the continuum of operations, and the Army’s operational concept. The collective thoughts poured into and resulting from the issue papers served as a structural foundation for codifying the key concepts of the manual. The FM 3-0 issue papers were staffed to a broad audience of over 200 organizations, media groups, and individual recipients. The major organizations included the Army Staff; Army commands; Army service component commands; Army corps and division headquarters; training divisions; and TRADOC commands and centers, proponents, and staff, as well Air Force, Marine, and Navy doctrine centers. The discussion generated from the issue papers led to a draft of the content summary that served as guide for the overall layout of the themes, concepts, and chapter structure of the field manual.

    The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate hosted three action-officer-level councils of colonels in an effort to synthesize and integrate over 4,000 comments from various entities in the field at large across three drafts of the manual to coalesce as much expert knowledge, thought, and current operational experience as possible. The meetings provided a separate forum for fostering debate, gaining consensus, and resolving critical and major comments from respective reviewing agencies prior to a TRADOC commander-hosted doctrine and concepts conference.

    The latest iteration of FM 3-0 is evolutionary in nature, incorporating ideas from new joint doctrine while retaining those valued pieces of Army doctrine that have stood the test of time. However, the doctrine is revolutionary with respect to its impetus and momentum to drive change. FM 3-0 provides purpose and direction to Army transformation and the application of force in complex operational environments. The current edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex era of persistent conflict. The doctrine recognizes that military force alone will not resolve this type of conflict. Dominant landpower, while vital to operations, represents only one element of a broader campaign that requires the application of each element of national power. In line with this realization and reasoning, Army doctrine now elevates stability or civil-support operations to equal importance with offensive and defensive operations.....

  10. #110
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Actually British Cavalry were always screwing up. This was just the best known, worst case.
    I was having a conversation with the Canadian LNO here at Leavenworth. Being somewhat a fan of cavalry, we discussed approaches for awhile. One salient observation stuck with me:

    "Cavalry's a great combat arm. But when cavalry guys screw up, they really screw up."

    True.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

  11. #111
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    Default Here it is:

    FM 3-O Operations, 27 Feb 08
    FM 3-0 is one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army. FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The eight chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula:
    • Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army’s expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers and leaders who remain the Army’s most important advantage.

    • Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. This chapter helps Army leaders to understand and differentiate between the requirements of diverse joint operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It shapes supporting doctrine for each operational theme.

    • Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army’s operational concept—full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. It establishes mission command as the preferred method of exercising battle command.

    • Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems (“BOS”) with six warfighting functions, bound by leadership and employing information as the elements of combat power. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.

    • Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.

    • Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.

    • Chapter 7 is about information superiority, particularly the five Army information tasks, purpose, and staff responsibility.

    • Chapter 8 discusses the requirement for Army forces in joint campaigns conducted across intercontinental distances. It frames the challenges created by the requirement for Army forces in terms of strategic and operational reach.

    Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A. Command and support relationships are in appendix B. A brief description of modular force is in appendix C. And a discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is in appendix D.

    This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes made in this edition of FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, modified, and rescinded terms for which this manual is the proponent.

    Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-0 links landpower doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. FM 3-0 also uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. When published, Allied Joint Publication 3.2, Doctrine for Land Operations, will contain this material.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 02-28-2008 at 09:51 PM.

  12. #112
    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    "Cavalry's a great combat arm. But when cavalry guys screw up, they really screw up."
    But you have to admit, the opportunity for a stunning success is always accompanied by the opportunity for an equally stunning Charlie Foxtrot.
    John Wolfsberger, Jr.

    An unruffled person with some useful skills.

  13. #113
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default Fm 3-0

    The Army has announced that the updated Field Manual 3-0 (Operations) is now available online (non-AKO) - same version?

  14. #114
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SWJED View Post
    The Army has announced that the updated Field Manual 3-0 (Operations) is now available online (non-AKO) - same version?
    Surface look, yes. I would expect no less.

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    The updated version of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (with Change 1) has also been publicly released by JFCOM today.

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    Last edited by Jedburgh; 03-30-2015 at 02:38 AM.

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