Next Small War

[zenpundit]

Any comment or analysis of the ongoing riots in France ?

I see ( at leastgiven MSM reports) an insurgent operation there remarkably like the intifada launched after Sharon visited the Temple Mount.

French citizens are now demanding the army be called out and are even raising the idea of militias to counteract the gangs of rioters/arsonists

[DDilegge]

While not on our (U.S.) radar screen - i.e. U.S. intervention, the French Muslim riots may well be a harbinger of the future "internal small war" - at this time too much a political hot potato to even mention in official circles and mainstream media.

Unlike past small wars with an adversary confined to particular countries we are now facing a threat that has made inroads across the globe. Nothing new here – except that now many countries who felt insulated from being on the receiving-end of a 9-11-like attack or otherwise attacked by Islamist extremism now have to rethink their over-tolerant policies.

Simply being against the war in Iraq offers no safety-net and many western countries are waking up to the fact that simply being western is a “good enough” reason for being targeted. Go figure…

[Martin]

Sir, DDilegge, France has for some time recognized that they are threatened, regardless of their stance on Iraq. I remember that even at Strasbourg airport they had FAMAS carrying MPs patrolling. They have also made public announcements to this effect.

What I find curious is that there's an ambiguity in deciding who the enemy is. I think the naming of the war (GWOT) is a reflection of an inability to define the threat. So instead of saying something as politically incorrect and bottomless as that it's a war against evil (NK is not Islamic), we say terrorism.

I think we’re not having an official discussion about whether or not we’re at war with Islam partly out of political correctness (yuck) and out of fear that the power of defining this war will move from the US government to those who can scream the loudest. Reciprocally the Islamic extremists would find themselves with more scared recruits and we would have to broaden our definitions on just who it is we’re fighting, until it comes full circle.

We are today far from united in how to combat this threat – an outwardly focus that seems diluted from the fact that people put it into so many different contexts, whether each and everyone are correct is not “clear”. What if we’d have to ask who it is who bears responsibility for what?

So we say that they hate our way of life, and sure they do, and the Europeans in their (ahem, our… as I am regrettably European) delusional vision of moral and intellectual grandeur laughs at such a simplistic explanation. I think people need and deserve a better context to put it in than that, and unless it is explained well, they will create or search for that context elsewhere.

The west may not be at war with Islam, but in failing to understand the people behind the headline of “terrorist threat”, even those who are content to passively give the nod, of course it is unlikely France will identify them. Of course you must be crazy and extreme and dumb if you’re not shouting Vive La Republic at the Champs Elysees. Or maybe their politicians simply don’t understand the orientation of their people, much less the disenfranchised who come from yet more different backgrounds, with much different experiences. Cloudy vision, diluted focus, half-strength blows. EU constitution anyone?

Yes, I do think this is alluding to the future. But I don't think the agitators understand what will happen when the people redefine the threat picture themselves, including as allies criminal organizations concerned about their money, and the state with its military forces.
What China would do in such a case could be interesting to ponder...

I hope that made sense, and please correct me and tell me if I should rather be quiet. I really don't want to step where I shouldn't, and this is about as far as I go.

Martin

[Tom Odom]

Folks,

France's current problems stem from the end of its colonial empire, especially the loss of Algeria which Frenchmen of the day considered to be an extension of European France rather than a mere colony. France ruled its colonies by making the locals nominal French citizens, especially the upper classes. Britain in contrast used indirect rule as much as possible without the fiction of handing out British passports. The exception to that was in the loss of India when Britain did extend citizenship to "Indians" (Indians and Pakistanis) who wanted to leave.

In France's case and under French method, it became very easy to get that French passport if things were not going well in one's native country (colony). In graduate school at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1981, we had to read Franz Fanon's book, Wretched of the Earth[ viewed as something as a fundamental platform for anti-colonial wars. Fanon was one of those upper strata Algerians who was nominally French and who then found himself excluded from both "real" Algerians and "real" Frenchmen. His book is not an easy read because it is an emotional cry, not a logical discussion.

In my 15 years as a FAO, it was quite common to meet Africans who had one foot in Africa and one foot in France. The same is true in North Africa for Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans, etc. As the decades have passed, the numbers of such quasi immigrants have steadily increased. They never truly integrate into France's social structure and France has allowed that to continue. Right wing politics in France have largely been driven by this alien body; in 1988 during the French elections for President, I was on OP duty with a number of French soldiers in Sinai. Discussions on the election were hot and heavy and the right wing candidate promised Draconian measures if he were elected. He was not. But the French senior officer on duty actually got on the UN radio network and put out a net call to all French observers bemoaning the defeat. Think about that one...

Since then French policy has been accomodation, wise in some ways and foolish in others. France has been sitting on a tinder box of discontent among the immigrants and among those who would support a large scale crackdown. The rise in tensions ampong the Muslim population and the GWOT seem to have acted as the necessary spark.

Other countries in Europe (and the US!) have similar issues. Belgium is an extension of the Congo, Rwanda, and other francophone Africa. Germany has long had a large Turk population. The US has its own illegal immigrant crisis.

The real challenge for France is going to be containing the current violence without pouring gasoline on the fire. I have read reports suggesting premeditated organization to the violence. Certainly that is possible if not absolutely probable. This has been brewing for some time. But I would also say that you should not underestimate the capacity for spontaneous violence in these populations. In Zaire, le pillage was an art form.

best
Tom

[DDilegge]

Grand V sent this link along to a Sep. 2005 article in Proceedings - The Impending Collapse of Arab Civilization by Lieutenant Colonel James G. Lacey, U.S. Army Reserve. Excerpt follows:

"... A lot of the evidence that Huntington presents for his theory of civilizational war makes more sense when viewed through the prism of the collapse of Arab civilization. Global maneuvering that Huntington interprets as preparations for a new round of world conflict are in reality the spontaneous adjustments that other societies are making in reaction to the collapse of a neighboring civilization. By accepting that we are facing the collapse of Arab civilization we can, for the first time, create a grand strategic concept for success. We no longer have to engage in a war against terrorism, which is a method of fighting and not an enemy. Additionally, we now have a strategic explanation for what is going on that does not make Islam the culprit. Hence we do not have to fight a religious war to win."

"The grand strategic concept that provides the best chance of success is the one that served us so well in the Cold War—containment. No matter what else we do we must position ourselves to contain the effects of the complete collapse of Arab civilization. Already 10 percent of the French population is from Muslim North Africa. Europe's ability to assimilate a larger flood of economic refugees is questionable. And mass migration is just one effect a total collapse will have. Containment will mean adopting and maintaining difficult policy choices..."

[Tom Odom]

I found the paper interesting and in some regards refreshing. Most refreshing was that he did not hesitate to adresss Bernard Lewis's work in cautionary terms. Lews is/was the archbishop of the NeoCon "church" and should be viewed accordingly.

It was interesting that he offered the strategy of containment as an alternative to preemption. Those of us who date back to the Cold War will recognize that alternative immediately. And certainly containment of a collapsing region is an alternative, albeit I would suggest one increasingly hard to even mount in today's information age. One defacto case of containment was Somalia in the early 1990s. I say defacto because it was containment based on disinterest. The widespread use of the video camera and satellite communications unhinged that disinterest. Another case of containment was the Western reaction to the Rwanda genocide; in that case the West's containment of the tragedy lasted until the Rwandan rebels won the war and the killers joined me in Zaire.

My issues with the paper are rooted in 2 areas: the definition of Arab and a limited view of history. Most who Arab watch--including other Arabs--define an Arab as one who speaks Arabic as a native tongue. using that defintion, we have the broadest and most inclusive group possible. But it is a LARGE group and it contains any number of peoples each with their own local political and ethnic identity, so large in fact that to apply a label of Arab civilization to all is indeed a reach. Coupled with that is his use of history; to suggest a polyglot civilization has declined based on modern statistics is another stretch. Put simply what appears bad today is a probable improvement from what was 100 years ago.


Best

Tom

[Ironhorse]

That is an excellent article, an interesting viewpoint, and correctly challenges a few sacred cows that have been left un-BBQ'd for too long. However, I do find it exceptionally difficult to have it both ways, as it were -- a very convincing argument for containment (Tom Odom's points well taken, too) but with the ju-jitsu of "Reverse the tide when and where we can" thrown in for good moral measure at the end.

Benevolent interdiction? The political science and international relations theorists can have a good time slotting that one in to the continuum. I have some concern that it would undermine the strategy that is advocated.

[Tom Odom]

A related op-ed in today's NYT by Richard Haass entitled "is there a Doctrine in the house?" is worth reading. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/op...html?th&emc=th

Best

Tom

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
Does anyone agree that there is a distinct disconnect between how U.S. military doctrine defines war and how our advesaries define war?

[Jedburgh]

A related op-ed in today's NYT by Richard Haass entitled "is there a Doctrine in the house?" is worth reading. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/op...html?th&emc=th

Interestingly enough, the op-ed you linked essentially talks to the same issues that Stephen Biddle did in his paper published at SSI back in April: American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment

It is hard to escape the paradox: Iraq, a classic war of choice, has constrained the administration's choices in its second term. Choices are further constrained by tax cuts, extravagant spending and the absence of a policy to reduce American dependency on imported oil. The result is that the United States is moving - haltingly and reluctantly, but inexorably - toward a more pragmatic and multilateral foreign policy appropriate to the era in which we live.

...whereas the costs of strategic ambiguity were relatively modest for the first 2 years of the War on Terror, the campaign in Iraq is now rapidly increasing the financial, human, and strategic opportunity costs of leaving basic choices unmade. Perhaps the most important of these ambiguities concerns our end-state goal for countering terrorism: should we insist on reducing this threat to a level as close to eradication as we can manage, or should we tolerate greater terrorist violence as a quasi-permanent condition?

[Bill Moore]

Does anyone agree that there is a distinct disconnect between how U.S. military doctrine defines war and how our advesaries define war? M.J.

M.J.

I think your question is one of the most important ones put forward on this forum, and the essence of understanding our enemy, which is key if we want to attack his strategy instead of his fielded forces.

I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.

When Bin Laden declared war on America, what did he mean by war? When President Bush declared war on terrorism mean what did he mean? Are they symmetrically opposed definitions? I don’t think so….

[aktarian]

Does anyone agree that there is a distinct disconnect between how U.S. military doctrine defines war and how our advesaries define war? M.J.

M.J.

I think your question is one of the most important ones put forward on this forum, and the essence of understanding our enemy, which is key if we want to attack his strategy instead of his fielded forces.

I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.

When Bin Laden declared war on America, what did he mean by war? When President Bush declared war on terrorism mean what did he mean? Are they symmetrically opposed definitions? I don’t think so….

There is one more thing, which is a bit different. One of level. When we classify conflicts as LIC/MIC/HIC we look from our perspective.

Take Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. For Soviets that was LIC, for Afghans it was life-or-death struggle, and due to resources commited HIC.

Which IMO means that those who see this as LIC, and as such not terribly important to national interests, are more likely to give up after reaching some threshold than those who see it as HIC and as such extremly important to national interests.

[Robal2pl]

I have a question : what is Your opinion about situation in former USSR?
I think that possible areas of confilct (includnig small wars) in western part of former USSR are :
1)Baltic States : conflict beetwen russian minrity and Latvian/Lithuanian/Estonian majority
2) Belarussia : the confilct is possible when Lukaszenko regime will fail or his leadershib will be close to end
3) Ukraine : I think tahat state of crisis can occur. pepole can be dissapointed after "Orange Revolution" , because current leadership is not able to solve basic problems. Also, Russia will support pro-Moscow political groups (mostly in DonBas industrial area) wich can lead even to civil war. (there was such possibility year ago)


Robal2pl

[zenpundit]

I think the chances for widening conflict are far greater in the Transcaucasian region and Southern Russia. Too many micronationalities in Daghestan and Georgia who can be agitated into taking up arms - Ossetians, Ingush, Kalmyks, Abkhazians, Mingrelians...

I would not rule out clashes within Ukraine though between nationalistic, Uniate, Western Ukrainians and Eastern, Orthodox, Russophile Ukranians being egged on by local nomenklatura-mafias

[GorTex6]

Venezuela prepairing to wage 4GW against the US

[Strickland]

Venezuela prepairing to wage 4GW against the US

My original post on this thread asserted that Chavez's Venezuela could be the scene of a Small War in the future. With sympathetic segments or organizations in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, Chavez could become a larger threat or irritant than Castro ever was to us in the past. He could also enable a dying Castro to try to fulfill his revolutionary desires with one last gamble in Central or South America.

[M. J. Dougherty]

ALCON,
Thanks for the outstanding feedback! Currently I am working on a thesis that the "chaos" stategy of Jemaah Islamiyah in SE Asia is to achieve victory by denying us decisive victory. How? In my opinion, one of the more important lessons of Korea and Vietnam for potential U.S. adversaries is that the average American is not interested in fighting a war without a clear moral issue- a pure cause that will justify the bloodshed & destruction of major sustained combat operations that result in decisive victory, defeated and complient enemy, and a American interests clearly achieved.
JI is employing a strategy that leverages inherent instabilities of the SEA reagion to maintain a relatively high level of violence and social discord. When opportunities (such as the tsunami, Mollukus, the '98 financial crisis) to create an environment that is difficult for a U.S.-led coalition or UN to justify a prolonged intervention to restore stability. Just look at the restricitions and risk assessments that occured in just sending the hospital ship and medical aid. As the credability and legitmacy of governments erode, capital flight destroys the economy and countries collapse bring even more social upheaval and violent competition.
In a grand strategic sense, SEA is just as important if not more so to U.S. long-term interests as the Mid-East oil. More than 60% of maritime shipping passes trought the Straites of Mulacca; Korea & Japan get 80% of their oil through here; China's oil consuption needs are expected to increas 40% by 2015 and they need to secure this route as well; one-third of the world computers are maunufactered here and over half the worlds computer chips, the list goes on ad naseum.
A hostile entity (Islamic Caliphate) based in Indonesia could have serious consequesnces for U.S. long-term security interests and might even spark future Chinese intervention.

[CPT Holzbach]

In my opinion, one of the more important lessons of Korea and Vietnam for potential U.S. adversaries is that the average American is not interested in fighting a war without a clear moral issue- a pure cause that will justify the bloodshed & destruction of major sustained combat operations that result in decisive victory, defeated and complient enemy, and a American interests clearly achieved.

I recommend reading an article in the Nov/Dec issue of Foreign Affairs, if you havent seen it already, entitled "The Iraq Syndrome" by John Mueller. It addresses this very issue.

[NDD]

I recommend reading an article in the Nov/Dec issue of Foreign Affairs, if you havent seen it already, entitled "The Iraq Syndrome" by John Mueller. It addresses this very issue.

Interesting. Iraq is now a "war"? This would appear to me to be purposeful mis-characterization by political elements in the US that is gaining traction.

[AdamG]

That said - Castro's death will be a wild card in this equation and most certainly draw our attention to Cuba. Anyone want to dare a call on this scenario?

I will, but first -

I find that it is hard for us to play the role of the red cell when we war game various courses of actions. I think most of us, even though we try to avoid doing so, are forced to use mirror analysis, which I define as seeing ourselves when we look at the enemy. I think we frequently assume the enemy has our values, uses western logic in his decision making (remember game’s theory?), etc. It is hard to overcome years of training indoctrination and to apply our vocabulary (our thinking tools) outside of its intended use.

Not only does our non-western enemy think about war differently, I think our non-western enemy has a distinct advantage in that there is not as much separation between the political and the military, so they understand the concept of the total war better (military is truly tied into political objectives), while I think our military is focused on staying in its lane and destroying the enemy’s fielded forces, which puts us at a distinct disadvantage.
.

Bingo! Someone gets it.

To answer the original question, we have to remember that Cuba has been suffering from a drought for the last decade, the military has been on a shoestring budget for even longer and the people have been tasting capitalism ever since tourism brought foreigners in on a regular basis.

1. Castro succumbs to old age and his brother Raul becomes a walking dead man. There is a period of mourning and much-emoting, while Raul puts the armed forces on their highest-capable war footing and warns the US against any Imperialist moves (realistically, this is as much to protect himself as to protect Cuba).

2. Chavez immediately echoes Raul's warnings, pledging all manner of aid if Cuban sovereignty is violated. Backs it up by moving F16s and/or MiG-29s to Havanna and NE Cuban coast.

3. Raul and whatever Generals are the top contenders for the throne are involved in a brief stare-down resembling the three-way climax at the end of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly. Raul dies, probably from a bomb but the majority of Cuba doesn't have a problem with it - think Ceausescu's end.

4. The Generals' factions duke it out in Havana (Chavez and China have their favorites, which may not be the same person). The wild card is the Miami families.

5. The US has to sit on it's hands, leaving Spain and Canada to be the credible peacemakers (both of which send naval units under a UN mandate). The drama in Havanna lasts for a week, after which Cuba emerges as a quasi-democracy: they like US tourist dollars, but they're not as close to Chavez as he'd like (unless by a stroke of luck 'his' guy comes out on top).

6. Donald Trump is on a flight down there before the last barrel cools. Havana vacation packages from LA, Dulles and Newark become the hottest tickets to get.