I didn't refer to Title 10, I referred to the US Army Field Manual which is a doctrinal publication -- it refers to Title 10 but it doesn't need to do so, the writer just did put in his desired interpretation -- and the Army agreed and published it.Of course not -- but the FM does mention those. Title 10 is not your operational guidance; the FM is.Not a word about negotiations, targeting or intelligence.Most of 'em, some civilians here who do not and your method of advocating your position -- which is perfectly acceptable and fine with me -- could lead the uninitiated to think that a broader role than is doctrinally stated or logically expected (IMO) is to be encouraged and is totally acceptable to most. My suspicion is that such acceptance is not universal by any means.FWIW, my statements are adressing cababilities, not preroggatives; I assume our readers understand that final decision-making authority rests with commanders.Didn't say that; did say they should not meet them without a command presence; i.e. someone in the unit chain of command who is the negotiating representative of the commander. The Chaplain should under most circumstances should not be the acceptor of a negotiated solution for the command because he's not in the chain. Even in meetings where no negotiations are expected, there should be a combatant present; as you know, haggling in the ME is a blood sport. They're quite adept at seizing unexpected opportunitiesAdvising the commander on indigenous religions in the operational area without actually meeting any religious leaders?Again, I didn't say that -- that you were so advocating. However, the position you espouse is effectively a far more involved role and is effectively role enhancement. My greatest concern is that it will detract from his primary duty -- which is pastoral care for the unit. In a more intense war, that job will transcend any other role very quickly and in the US Army building new habits for added visibility is a way of life -- the problem is that those things get embedded and some of them do not work in many situations other than the one they were designed for. In a flexible organization, such developments wouldn't be a problem. The US Army is NOT a flexible organization.Please explain where I advocated role enhancement...I accept that it can be desirable when done circumspectly and when the personalities (Commander, Chaplain, local Clerics) are all in favor of it. It's been done in other wars in other places but circumspect is a good word and should always apply and IMO, such effort should be the exception rather than the rule. I base that on the status of the Chaplain as a noncombatant under the GC and on his primary duty.The roles are already there. As a member of TF 1st Armored Division in Baghdad in 2003-2004, the chaplain teams were participants in over 500 RLEs - I was active in about 60 of those. I respect the arguments from theory, but I also contend from the position of experience that chaplain involvement in [this] counterinsurgency is practicable and even desirable when done circumspectly.
My concern in addressing the issue is that I have seen good ideas to adapt to particular situations get adopted locally and in specific operations or wars. that's what should happen and I'm all for that. The problem that arises is that the inflexible US Army tends to get target fixation and take what should be a temporary, this operation, adaptation and embed it in the doctrine and that many such adaptations do not work well other times in other operations. It's sort of a 'be careful what you wish for, you may get it' thing.
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