Steve,
You touched on some real considerations that leaders should consider when conducting (before or during) SFA. Since we're talking about assistance to the security sector, one of the first considerations may be to ask ourselves what we hope to accomplish by BPC with the HN? That is probably a 2 part question - the first is how does it help the United States achieve FP objectives, and the second is defining the nature of the SFA the partner requires and desires?

Tackling the first question - about how it furthers our FP - on the surface that probably seems overtly pragmatic. However, given the nature of our political system, and the unpredictable nature of war, the the risk and benefits for using military means to achieve a policy object need to be considered up front and incorporated into strategic communications that consider the domestic, international and regional audiences. Also to be considered with regard to the first question is how is a bi-lateral (or as part of a multi-lateral) SFA effort is integrated into a larger regional picture and potentially as part of a grand strategy where all the elements of national power are being leveraged to create a more enduring effect that justifies the means. We could be talking about a few ministerial level advisors, the routine visits by an ODA, FMS (Foreign Military Sales), or the use of some other emerging TAA (Train, Advise & Assist) effort such as the Marine Corps SC-MAGTF, or the Army TMAAG-F.

The second question is about working with the partner nation's political leadership and also to our other regional partners who have to consider how new capabilities will be integrated into a regional outlook (there could be an existing collective security arrangement, or something informal). Not just in terms of changing the balance of military power, but increasingly, how that partner's ability to govern itself and support the domestic RoL effect other states and interests in the region. Ideally we'd support and facilitate regional diplomatic talks aimed at improving security and furthering stability from a regional perspective.

Once we get the strategic SFA/SSR framework established, I think we can better address important operational and tactical questions about the level of SFA, what types of enablers are needed to support the SFA effort (be they financial, cultural, technical), and how the conditions in the operational and tactical environment can best be overcome or mitigated. We've learned (and continue to learn) a great deal in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and the HOA - it could also be argued we've had to relearn a great deal of it. The question is how we use the knowledge to inform current and future efforts to achieve our and our partner's goals.

Best, Rob