Clerics losing influence in Iraq?

[Menning]

Tom Odom's history lesson forced me to reflect on the relationship between secular and theocratic states in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Rifaat al-Assad ruthlessly destroyed Muslim Brotherhood sanctuaries in Syria. From 1992-1998, Mubarak initiated the reconquista where he reasserted government control by cracking down on dissidents including radical Islamic groups. In 1979 the Saudis crushed the Mecca uprising.

As a result, extremists and terrorists found it almost impossible to overthrow governments in their native countries. The United States become more of an attractive target because of the aid we provided to secular regimes in the region and the plethora of U.S. targets available.

My question is this: Do theocratic Islamic governments provide a sort of a safety value for Islamic extremism? Meaning, if a government embraces sharia and Islamic custom, are Islamic extremists relatively placated and less willing to export violence against the U.S.? If a government is more secular, yet a virtual police state, will the extremists continue to see the U.S. as the most viable target for their anger as opposed to their native country?

Finally, how does Iraq's current mix of government and religion favor or disfavor possible Iraq-born violence against U.S. territory?

Interesting is the correct word but not surprising. The cycle between religion and secular forces in the region is long standing. On a macro-level, in the Cold War it was Arab Nationalism as defined by the Pan-Arab Movement. The 1967 War unhinged those Pan-Arab ties prettty effectively and 1973 cut them. Still the movement toward a Palestinian identity remained secular for the most part until the 1979 Iranian Revolution and events in Lebanon with the rise of Hizballah, later matched by Hamas in the course of the 2nd Intifada.

[MSG Proctor]

"Second, under the leadership of its politically shrewd leader, JaM was successful in combining its populist ideology with social programs aimed at supporting the lower-income strata of the Shiite population. The Sadrists are avid advocates of social justice and try to represent the more economically disenfranchised Shiite Iraqis, who make up a considerable portion of the southern urban regions and parts of the capital city. The Sadrist militants are inspired by the apocalyptic teachings of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father-in-law, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, whose execution by Saddam in 1999 elevated his prestige to a cultic figure of immortal status. The core of these teachings is a belief in the millenarian notion of the return of a messianic figure, in this case the twelfth Imam and Mahdi, Muhammad ibn Hassan (born in 868 C.E.), whose reappearance—as he is already on earth but concealed from view—will establish justice in a world infected by sin and oppression. The spiritual mission of the militia is to hasten the Imam’s return through various heroic enactments of self-sacrifice, though at times these acts may merely mean offering selfless service to the Shiite public. In this ideological spirit, JaM is known to operate both as a military unit and a charity group."

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr