Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
...What are the thoughts in the SWC on
Policing in counter insurgency?

Capability gaps in policing – such as why some states establish a gendarme, or paramilitary organization? What are good models and why (ex. Why would a model based on the Spanish Guardia Civil work in one place but maybe not another – create, or pick a model – base it off things like intel, maneuver, force pro, sustainment, specialized capabilities like EOD etc, or whatever works.
Primarily due to the degree of centralization of the governmental model as opposed to what works or is ideal. CAC should have an old copy of USAREur Pam 550-1 Dated 27 Nov 1963 (so it's old but it's probably still fairly valid) somewhere, it discusses national models of Police function and services in Europe, Africa and Asia in great detail. It certainly offers a lot of historical perspective and has some interesting ideas.

One exception to the centralized government rule is Canada with the RCMP which is a pretty unique organization.
Capability gaps in our ability to train, advise or assist states with capability gaps in areas we don’t have a cultural understanding of due their absence in our own societies?
Easily fixed. The MP School then at Gordon did a whole series of Pams on the topic of policing in internal development back in the early 60s and most of them were pretty good. My spies tell me the School at Leonard Wood is working the issue (and probably has some of those old Pams in the Library...). We do not have a national police model to draw from (thankfully). We use DynCorp and MPRI to hire folks on Contract to do the training now but that has numerous problems.

A far better approach would be to designate a few Guard and Reserve MP Bns, most of which are filled with a lot of working civilian Police Officers to be "Gendarmerie" or National Police trainers. They'd do a super job and have the expertise on hand. We have the capability of doing that quickly and fairly easily.

Also back in the '60s when there was a USAid (for real, not todays contracting office), they did a lot of developmental police work. There's a fairly lengthy thread here on SWC (from last fall IIRC) where Law Vol pointed out the possibility of using USAF Security Police who get more pure Police training than Active duty MPs that discusses this whole schema.
Ways we might leverage other states who do understand it, and the implications of doing so? Ways we might better leverage our own resources.
I'd be very leery of the former approach; nations have interests, not friends and we could not depend on any nation to always be there. Better to develop the capability; we can afford it -- and using some Guard and Reserve MP Bns specifically trained in the advisory role is a quick and simple way to get there.
HN military taking on functions that might better reside with HN police?
A turf problem but it can be a knotty one. Most likely scenario is that currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq where the bulk of the Army is starting to function and the National Police are lagging behind for a host of cultural and training reasons. Just takes time and work to sort it out.
The dangers in trying to build HN police forces that are inadequate for the environment they have to operate in?
Very important point and one that is too easy to allow to occur. We can train the Army; we are the Army; the Army is important -- so the poor Cops get short shrift. As you said in your post, this is not a good thing; the Police are probably, barring really heavy combat, far more important than is the Army. Insurgency is a governmental problem and COIN is best conducted with Police Leading and Army assisting.

That's backwards from the way we do it -- but that's due to a number of cultural factors on our part. It's a training and education problem, ours as much as the HN.
Also feel free to address what the impacts are on the way we (or anybody else) does business from the standpoint of titular authority and responsibilities.
Heh. Here in CONUS, we do it right -- the Police and the ArNG have primacy and the Army only assists when requested. That's only partly due to the Posse Comitatus bit, a lot of it is our desire NOT to get involved in riots and such. Then we go to another nation and are in charge and put their Army out front and downplay and poorly equip the Cops. As usual, we let our egos get in the way and do it backwards. Both Iraq and Afghanistan offered somewhat unusual problems but ordinarily, the cops should get priority if at all possible.
What are the implications for future operations – both our ability to conduct stability type operations, our ability to enable civil authority as a domestic mission (think support to local govt in crisis response), and other homeland security issues?
Stability ops I discussed above; the primary issues are simply our own organization, our own training and our focus. those factors are easily fixed.

On the domestic front -- we have a model, derived over 200 years. It works.It should absolutely not be trifled with. The States have the responsibility and we, when asked, assist -- no more.

My only Homeland Security issue is to disband that Goat Rope of an aggregation. Since that won't happen, we have to live with it -- but we should stay as far away from it as we can. Assist when directed and no more.
Also feel free to import other emerging models – such as existing national police forces, etc., or to discuss other justice type functions such as penal systems – courts, judges and jails.
All I know about jails is what the inside of a few look like...