What are the SWC thoughts on policing in combat?

[jcustis]

While I was an advising I considered the challenges of the IA and IP to be similar in terms of the enemy they faced, however, neither appeared to be optimally manned, organized, trained, equipped, or advised to meet the challenges the insurgents and criminal elements posed, but the Iraqi Army seemed better set to do so – from the level of U.S. support and advising, to the access to a regional support unit – that while not perfect, was far better structured through MoD then the IP were through MoI. The IA at least had many of the tools from which to adapt. The IP were kind of a weak sister – funded, organized, trained, equipped & manned for basic police functions, they were extremely challenged to try and fulfill there role in an environment where even combat troops fought a clever and adaptive enemy who had access to IEDs, RPGs, Mortars, SVBIEDs, PBIEDs, Sniper Rifles and many other tools of modern warfare. The insurgents certainly understood this, and attacked what we thought of as the short leg in the three legged security stool (IA, IP and CF). The insurgents knew that if that leg was broken off, then the ability to maintain balance on the other two legs was more challenging, and put a much greater strain on the coalition, the IA and the local and national government.

First off, that's a darn good way of summarizing the situation in the late 2003 to 2005(6?) timeframe.

Capability gaps in policing – such as why some states establish a gendarme, or paramilitary organization? What are good models and why (ex. Why would a model based on the Spanish Guardia Civil work in one place but maybe not another – create, or pick a model – base it off things like intel, maneuver, force pro, sustainment, specialized capabilities like EOD etc, or whatever works.

I have to go back to the Rhodesian well on this one, considering the relationship between the Special Branch fellows and the mainstream military formations, to include to a larger degree the Selous Scouts. Shame is that there just isn't a whole lot of good reference material to point to that describes the roles and interactions.

I wouldn't call it the best model, b/c there are so many subtle as well as large differences between the socio-cultural-economic issues in southern Africa and what you'll find in Iraq. I do think, however, that the degree of integration and cooperation is something to look at. As a case in point, in many of my reads of Rhodesian Light Infantry and Rhodesian African Rifles contact reports, Special Branch reps were involved to some degree on the back end, policing up the intelligence, working the names on the captured documents, etc.