The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[Tom Odom]

If there is a lesson here, it is that it <has> been clear from Douhet to the present that the advocates of airpower have no better political understanding of this aspect of airpower than any man on the street and probably less. They tend to sharply exaggerate its ability to influence or intimidate leaders and politicians, and act as a weapon of political warfare.

Amen Brother Cordesman

[Ken White]

"...it would raise far more serious questions about the value of uparmoring and the security of tactical and logistic movements."

I think he agrees with me that all this MRAP overkill is of little long term value...

[Ski]

Thanks for the link, I have found Cordesman to be one of the most honest and realistic observers of the wars of the early 21st Century

[William F. Owen]

Thanks for the link, I have found Cordesman to be one of the most honest and realistic observers of the wars of the early 21st Century

...and I used to agree with that, till I saw these slides. While what he writes is vastly more accurate than I have seen in most open sources, there are some omissions, and some mistakes that indicate that this may have been a bit of a "rush job."

For example, the IDF had working examples of every ATGM and AT weapon they encountered in the Lebanon, prior to the war. They weren't "got by Military intelligence". They just went out on the market and brought them.

The statement "swarming works" indicates a lack of tactical and operational understanding and I don't think he would ever make that comment to a professional military audience.

IMO, the J.P. Storr article in the RUSI journal remains the most accurate and measured assessment of the ground war.

[slapout9]

Have to agree with Wilf on this one. The IDF report calling it Stand Off Fire Power operations is a more accurate title and description. It had little or nothing to do with EBO. However don't make the mistake that Air Power cannot be used to influence Political Leadership. The Air Strike against Syria (that never happened) where they turned off their entire Air Defense system to directly attack their target and then tell Syria to keep their mouth shut is good example of what can be done.

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

[Tom Odom]

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

To a certain degree, yes, with Hezbollah as irregulars in prepared defenses. It would be a much closer match had their been a regular force afeild or at least poised to take the field. The Syrians are not that stupid.

Best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

Fortified Compound Warfare? Please explain. Is this another name for "hedgehog" or "Stellunghund" defensive systems?

[Tom Odom]

Here is an anthology on the subject

Compound Warfare: An Anthology, Thomas M. Huber, editor. Final Version. (PDF)

In the long history of warfare, a recurring theme is the combined use of regular and irregular forces to pursue victory. The American colonists relied upon regular Continental Army troops and local militia in their war for independence. British troops commanded by Wellington fought alongside Spanish peasant guerrillas against Napoleon in Spain. The Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong organized local militia units, regional forces, and a regular army for use in their struggle to topple the Nationalist government. In these and many other cases, the practice of employing regular and irregular forces together was not only applied, but also instrumental in bringing victory to the side that at the beginning of the conflict seemed clearly inferior to its opponent.

In 1996, in an article entitled “Napoleon in Spain,” Dr. Thomas M. Huber of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) coined the term “compound warfare” to describe this phenomenon of regular and irregular forces fighting in concert, as he examined the reasons for Napoleon’s failure to pacify the Iberian Peninsula. The article, written to support CSI’s course in modern warfare at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, received high praise from student officers, from the CSI faculty, and from the Institute’s director at the time, Colonel Jerry Morelock. Impressed by Dr. Huber’s analysis of the synergistic effects achieved by Wellington’s British Army and Spanish guerrillas as they worked together against Napoleon’s forces, Col. Morelock suggested that other members of CSI examine examples of this pattern of warfare in other times and places. This book is a compilation of their studies.