The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[slapout9]

Have to agree with Wilf on this one. The IDF report calling it Stand Off Fire Power operations is a more accurate title and description. It had little or nothing to do with EBO. However don't make the mistake that Air Power cannot be used to influence Political Leadership. The Air Strike against Syria (that never happened) where they turned off their entire Air Defense system to directly attack their target and then tell Syria to keep their mouth shut is good example of what can be done.

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

[Tom Odom]

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

To a certain degree, yes, with Hezbollah as irregulars in prepared defenses. It would be a much closer match had their been a regular force afeild or at least poised to take the field. The Syrians are not that stupid.

Best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

Fortified Compound Warfare? Please explain. Is this another name for "hedgehog" or "Stellunghund" defensive systems?

[Tom Odom]

Here is an anthology on the subject

Compound Warfare: An Anthology, Thomas M. Huber, editor. Final Version. (PDF)

In the long history of warfare, a recurring theme is the combined use of regular and irregular forces to pursue victory. The American colonists relied upon regular Continental Army troops and local militia in their war for independence. British troops commanded by Wellington fought alongside Spanish peasant guerrillas against Napoleon in Spain. The Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong organized local militia units, regional forces, and a regular army for use in their struggle to topple the Nationalist government. In these and many other cases, the practice of employing regular and irregular forces together was not only applied, but also instrumental in bringing victory to the side that at the beginning of the conflict seemed clearly inferior to its opponent.

In 1996, in an article entitled “Napoleon in Spain,” Dr. Thomas M. Huber of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) coined the term “compound warfare” to describe this phenomenon of regular and irregular forces fighting in concert, as he examined the reasons for Napoleon’s failure to pacify the Iberian Peninsula. The article, written to support CSI’s course in modern warfare at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, received high praise from student officers, from the CSI faculty, and from the Institute’s director at the time, Colonel Jerry Morelock. Impressed by Dr. Huber’s analysis of the synergistic effects achieved by Wellington’s British Army and Spanish guerrillas as they worked together against Napoleon’s forces, Col. Morelock suggested that other members of CSI examine examples of this pattern of warfare in other times and places. This book is a compilation of their studies.

[William F. Owen]

Here is an anthology on the subject

Aha! Many thanks.