Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War

[Rob Thornton]

I'm actually working on a theory about the behavior of "inkspots" but it is difficult to define the geopolitical limits of COIN in a thousand words or less - while working a full time job - so it's possible I might never succeed.

I think that will make for an interesting and useful paper - I hope you can flesh it out. You might consider posting chunks of it on the SWC to help you write it as you go.

Stability under Saddam was unacceptable and like I said, if someone could scientifically prove - and this is obviously hypothetical - that dividing Iraq into three countries would cause stability, we still wouldn't do it. Democracy in Iraq hasn't produced much stability. Obviously, an "iron fist" could produce stability faster, but we won't go down that road. (BTW I'm not saying we should, just that logically we should if stability was our only objective.)

I'd agree, its not just stability - its got to be qualified by something like: Increased Stability in developing and politically volatile states that offer conditions our enemies can exploit to counter or harm U.S. interests at home or abroad; or to a greater extent, something like - The United States and its Interests are not threatened at home or abroad by State and Non-State actors using Violence, Coercion, Intimidation & messages of intolerance to promote extremist agendas to realize their political ends

I pulled those from the slides, but I'd say those represent acceptable endstates in terms of political objectives that justify the expenditure of means. The discussion Marc brought up is relevant here as there is a gap in terms of specific justification to settle domestic policy concerns and in terms broad enough to accommodate others in the International community. There is also the context in which a threat and an endstate are evaluated - regardless of what is known now, the Administration and all those in Congress who voted for war saw Saddam Hussein as a threat. They can bemoan the fact that they were not given the whole truth, but many did not even personally read the intelligence they were provided or conduct personal analysis that would define their vote. You could go back to Clausewitz's Trinity and contemplate the role of emotion over rational thought, but its still OBE. So context of evaluation matters.

There is also the analysis that must be conducted to determine which COA gets you closer to your broader objectives, and it gets real muddled there. Consider the potential consequences for a hard partition of Iraq? Other then saying we did our part to address Iraq's internal problem so we can exit, I find few good things in it for the future. I think the potential for greater regional and international instability would only multiply.

So - yes the word stability must be qualified. I think anything that is as complex and interactive as a human society is going to be inherently unstable - it almost has to be given the nature of its actions. To be completely stable would be no activity. So, the goal might be defined as "more" stable, or stable "enough" to run itself within the context of the endstate or political objective. As I'd mentioned early on, ideas like BPC have their warts, nobody should be under the illusion that you are going to make completely self sustaining states over night, or even over a decade - they are going to require continued inter-action - it may be on a military level, a diplomatic level, an informational level, or economic level - which we have (and others have with us) with almost every existing state.

Assuming for the moment that the factors you discuss are necessary for stability, are they sufficient? Will they work every time, or are there other factors that could cause instability anyway? If so, what are they?

Yes - I'd pointed to a few earlier in the thread - put a "trans" in front of almost anything and you have a potential enabler or accelerator for instability - this just means that if you add more of something - it creates more things the HN government must contend with. Refugees crossing the border, nomadic influences, crop infestations, cyber-hacking/crime/espionage, human migrations, climate changes, crime, terrorism, foreign investment that attracts more of something else or creates something new, the use of ungoverned spaces as safe havens, etc. - you could really go for awhile I think. However, if you increase a states ability to extend governance over its own territories and citizens, you mitigate (probably not eliminate - after all look at our own domestic issues) the effects of those destabilizing influences. The pay off for us goes back to the endstate. So if Columbia is able to extend governance and increase stability how does that effect destabilizing influences in our own country? If Latin America is more developed and offers more opportunity - how does that effect us - not just the things that come to mind, but the second and third order effects.

Not all of it is good - countries that are developing are by nature "unstable", but you have to weigh the good against the bad - and you must weigh the various potential outcomes as well given the nature of things today, and our best guess on the future - this gets into things like "conflict prevention vs. conflict termination" and the associated costs of doing either. That goes back to - how important is it to the role you see yourself playing in the world, it could be because nobody else can or will, and the effects of doing nothing are going to hurt you (or your friends, or your partners, or your outlook) enough to justify the effort, or because the benefits and prospects of doing something now are better then waiting, or because there is competition on the horizon that will accelerate it in the other direction because they view it as a zero sum game, etc.

It gets complicated fast, but that is the nature of it. Its messy, it requires sustained commitment or the means to go back and fix what you left unattended when you can no longer ignore it. Given the changes we've seen in the world, the latter may no longer be an option. Its not just a matter of "new", or "more" changes, its the degree of scale and the speed in which those changes now effect us, and our ability to compensate - it almost seems exponential.

Best, Rob