From PhilR

I'd turn the question around--do the two subordinates see themselves as accomplishing policy goals set by the national level and transmitted through CENTCOM? I'd submit that, in reality, each of these three commanders are fighting their own fights and consider the national level as their direct HHQ. I haven't seen CENTCOM given much latitude to provide significant direction to either of the commanders in Iraq or Afghanistan, except on the most routine of administrative and logistics issues.
I agree, I think you have to consider the question from the other end as well. Ken brought the coordination of the war in the Pacific and the role personalities played in the developing the Lines of Operation, the battles that were fought, the distribution of resources, etc. If you expand the scope to include operations in Burma, and early on operations in China you add additional layers.

I was also thinking about when a senior CDR gets selected he has the same biases etc. that others must overcome. ADM Fallon was widely accepted as a wise choice based off of his performance as a GCC CDR in PACOM. Based off that performance, the characterization that the experiences of the Navy as a service offers broader strategic perspective, and that given the scope of a GCC's responsibilities, CENTCOM did not necessarily require that its CDR be from a ground service - e.g. purple and broader experience was good enough.

I think coming from a very busy GCC (PACOM) where certainly we have enduring interests, and where there is tension that could lead to military commitment, but also one in which we are not engaged in achieving major political objectives like OIF and OEF by predominantly military means (this includes using military means in some non-military ways) is a larger transition then we may have attributed to it.

Ken's example,
Look at my favorite unnecessary battle, Peleliu. Nimitz ignored both Halsey and Spruance who argued it was totally unnecessary to accede to MacArthur who thought otherwise and he did so as much because he and Ernie King had stolen a lot of resources from MacArthur for over two years to build up the Pacific Theater to the detriment of MacArthur's SouWesPac Theater and Nimitz believed he owed MacArthur a bone or two. So the 1 MarDiv went in to make unnecessary history at great cost. So, Ernie King had an impact as did inter service relationships. MacArthur's direct line to DC probably contributed to the decision.
is a good one to talk about how strategic personalities translate to operational and tactical consequences.

Mountbatten may offer another alternative to considering how personalities shaped by different experiences. Slim's memoirs would seem to indicate that Mountbatten did an extraordinary job at coordinating and synchronizing the various efforts and personalities that had bearing on operations in the Burma theater. It also offers a different political relationship given the nature of Great Britain's political objectives and priorities in the broader context of WWII. (David, it'd be interesting to hear from you or one of our British SWC members here)

Best Regards, Rob