Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
... It would help if the commands in both Iraq and Afghanistan were separated from CENTCOM but it would not fix the problem. Indeed, it is a social science law (I believe) that organizational change simply cannot fix anything. It can only make the job easier or harder.
Agree but I submit that it is in effect making the job harder; only very slightly, to be sure, however, why not make it easier instead of harder. Or at least let it be neutral...
Just because the chain of command in Iraq is not unified - who is in charge, Petraeus or Crocker? - doesn't mean it can't work. It appears that there is mutual respect between the two and they coordinate their actions effectively. Of course, I could be wrong about that having no direct access to either but the appearance is good. If so, then they have made a situation that lacks unity of command work. Would it be easier if oneof them were designated as "in charge." Probably. But it would still depend on the personalities as to how well it worked.
Not the issue I was addressing; my issues were CentCom force structure tampering, general intrusion, the JFACC -- and I'll add the not mentioned USSOCOM effort -- in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The remark above applies; it is in effect making the job harder; only very slightly, to be sure, however, why make it harder...

I certainly acknowledge that the SOCOM interface is not a significant problem at this time but my point is simply that it can be. This thread and you point out why. Personalities on either side of that divide...

Crocker vs. Petreaus at this point seems to me to be irrelevant -- though that does not diminish my generic if poorly stated concern about the Tribune like powers of the GCC Cdrs; sooner or later, one of them is going to be out in a bad position through that little design flaw (See MacArthur, D.).