The Emerging "Neocon" Alibi on Iraq

[Ski]

Thanks for the clarification. I did not know that. The education continues...

Ski - I've spent a bit of time there as well, but Incirlik is not our base. It is a Turkish AF installation, of which they permit us to use a part. We've been using it since '55, but it still ain't our base. They've made that very clear; especially clear on the occasions that they've rolled armored vehicles onto the airstrip to stop our aircraft from taking off when they were engaged across the Iraqi border.

Over the years, Incirlik has played an important role in a broad spectrum of missions, from the '58 intervention in Lebanon, to OPC/ONW and current ops. But the Turks always have the last word on what we can launch from that site - and since the interference they ran against us with OPC missions, and the issues we had with them over OIF launch, they are no longer viewed as reliable ally in the COE (despite public stroking to the contrary). In too many important regards, their interests diverge from ours - long-term, we need an air base to replace Incirlik that will meet the same regional needs.

[Ken White]

Ken

I understand where you are coming from now. Don't agree with you all the way, but that's life.

We do have an air base in Turkey - Incirlik. Been there twice.

So have I -- more than twice; see Jedburgh. Also been to Izmir. We were guests and we had restrictions on use.

[Ken White]

Obviously, we had the ability to kill Saddam, because he's dead now. Obviously he knew it, because he had a spider hole prepared.

We had the ability to kill him after we found him in the hole; we did not to get the bases at the time of the invasion or for a great many months thereafter; so that's really a sort of silly argument.

Or to express my thoughts more concisely, if all we wanted were bases, we should have offered to call off the invasion in exchange for bases. Since the people in the White House are pretty smart and didn't make that offer, I suspect it was about more than bases: at least in their minds.

Of course it was about more. As I said there were over a dozen reasons I can think of and they probably had a few I didn't think of -- I simply believe the bases were among the most important if not the most important of all those reasons.

... give us permission to use bases to attack Iran than an Iraqi Prime Minister who has been told that he's liberated and holds hands with Ahmadinejad. But that's just my opinion.

Who said anything about attacking Iran? That's your construct, not mine.

I'd place the blame for the last five years higher up: a combination of arrogance and ignorance of the basic fact that urban combat can't possibly play out like the 1991 slaughter in the dessert. But that's also just my opinion.

Those factors had a play but were not the principal problems.

Given that one of UBL's objectives was to weaken our the economy, and our massive debt has contributed to the weakening economy, I personally wouldn't brush off the expense so quickly.

You don't have to, I've seen our debt far higher in my lifetime so, hopefully, you won't mind if I yawn and move on.

Slate has a whole bunch of people reflecting on whether they were right or wrong five years ago.

And all these people had what role to play in the whole thing? You really pay much attention to those talking head squirrels? Surprising.

Since I'm batting somewhere between .800 and .900 on the whole thing, you'll forgive me if I sort of ignore the Punditocracy who rarely get much of anything correct in my observation.

[Rank amateur]

Since I'm batting somewhere between .800 and .900 on the whole thing, you'll forgive me if I sort of ignore the Punditocracy who rarely get much of anything correct in my observation.

Since you commented on Hitchens I thought you might find it interesting. I find comparing the mea culpas to the excuses interesting and at the very least it gives Steve a platform to plug his book.

I took a simple approach 5 years ago. Powell knew more about military affairs than anyone in the cabinet. The cabinet ignored him. I made some predictions based on those facts. I'll refrain from guessing my batting average until I've read Steve's book, but sometimes the simple approach - "hit them where they ain't" - can produce a decent batting average.

[Ken White]

Since you commented on Hitchens I thought you might find it interesting. I find comparing the mea culpas to the excuses interesting and at the very least it gives Steve a platform to plug his book.

Only reason, I also skimmed your links above but didn't really see anything to attack or defend. Not that I was defending Hitchens, merely stating he wasn't totally out to lunch. Neither are the others -- nor do any of them offer any significant insights, IMO. Been my experience that those self appointed mavens rarely do...

I took a simple approach 5 years ago. Powell knew more about military affairs than anyone in the cabinet. The cabinet ignored him. I made some predictions based on those facts. I'll refrain from guessing my batting average until I've read Steve's book, but sometimes the simple approach - "hit them where they ain't" - can produce a decent batting average.

Neither of your approaches were or are bad; both are good, in fact -- the latter particularly so. If you can do that...

My take on the whole thing wasn't radically different than Powell's. Like him, I reconciled myself to the fact that we were going to do it anyway -- and I think he will acknowledge, as do I, that it doesn't have to be our way to work and that sometimes you can't hit 'em where they ain't because you don't know where that is. Intel is never flawless...

[Rank amateur]

I'm taking this thread off on a tangent, so maybe it should be split into two threads.

An Army captain is proud of his service but changes his mind on Iraq.

In 2002, I believed the intelligence painting Iraq as an imminent threat and supported our invasion. In 2003 and 2004, I worried about the growing insurgency and grew dismayed at our counterproductive tactics and strategy, but I still felt the war was a worthy cause.

In 2005, I volunteered to deploy to Iraq as an Army captain...

But I came home in September 2006 frustrated with the strategic direction of the war and alienated from the country that sent me there. I saw our failures to secure the country and build a new Iraq as proof of the limits of military power—and a sign that America was not omnipotent. Over a beer near Times Square in October 2006, I told George Packer (who had been embedded with my adviser team earlier that year in Baqubah) that I thought the war was now "unwinnable"—and that we must implement an adviser-centric strategy.

A senior fellow of the Freeman-Spogli Institute is optimistic post surge, but mentions some lessons.

So in the fifth year of the war, the tide began to turn, albeit for reasons that are not exactly fortuitous. Maybe, five years from now, we will be able to look back and point to Iraq as the first successful counterinsurgency war since the British bested the Malay rebels in the 1950s (though after 12 long years)...

The lesson is stark: If you don't will the means, don't will the end. To this Kantianism, let us add pure homily: Look before you leap. The tragedy of American power in the Middle East, the most critical arena of world politics, is that the United States ended up working as the handmaiden of Iranian ambitions.

8 lessons on Iraq: #4 and 8 seem correct to me.

I particularly want to talk to those of you who, like me, would like to understand the errors of this war without renouncing the use of force altogether. "I don't oppose all wars," Barack Obama declared six years ago. "What I am opposed to is a dumb war." Let's try to flesh out that distinction.

This one is actually on topic: a conservative places the blame at the top. I agree with much of it.

Another larger mistake was to put my trust in the Bush administration, not so much on matters of intelligence—faulty intelligence was a near-universal phenomenon—but on matters of basic competence. I will admit to a prejudice here: I believed—note the tense, please—that Republicans were by nature ruthless, unsentimental, efficient, and, most of all, preoccupied with winning. It simply never occurred to me that Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney would allow themselves to lose a war. Which is what they have very nearly done.

[Tom Odom]

So of course Mssr Bremer must answer idealogue Mssr Perle and disciple Feith as he does in this article in Nat Review

Facts for Feith
CPA history.

By L. Paul Bremer III

A recent article in the Washington Post previewed the forthcoming book by former undersecretary of defense Douglas Feith. In his book Feith apparently alleges that I was responsible for what he calls the single biggest mistake the United States made in Iraq. He claims that I unilaterally abandoned the president’s policy, promoted by Feith and others before the war, to grant sovereignty to a group of Iraqi exiles immediately after Saddam’s defeat. On March 16, Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute elaborated on this theme, arguing that a key error was that “we did not turn to well-established and broadly representative opponents” of Saddam.

And so he disputes the details going so far as to produce a copy of a short memo from SecDef Rumsfeld approving a memo of his. That is in itself bizarre as Mssr Bremer uses "the former presidential envoy to Iraq" as his credit line. Presidential envoys do not work for the Sec Def; they work for the President. So Bremer using Rumsfeld's memo of approval suggests confusion.

But where it just gets too surreal is in the closing:

Admittedly, it was an imperfect political process. The occupation lasted 14 months, which no doubt frustrated and angered some Iraqis. But the time we bought allowed the Iraqis to write a progressive constitution and to embark on the long, difficult path to democratic government.

Technically I guess that is true, marking the period of the CPA and Bremer's tenure. But in 2008 that sentence just kind of stands out--yes I added the bold italics--as symbolic. To Bremer, who left soon afterward, the "occupation" lasted but 14 months? All said and done, it comes across as a 5-person band version of Nero fiddling. No one was clearly in charge but they all really tried. The music still sucked.

Tom

[SteveMetz]

These guys need to spend less time taking shots at each other and focus on Tenet and Powell.

Peter Feaver's essay in the Weekly Standard is much more useful contribution to the debate.

I'm thinking of emailing him directly. He wrote, "Despite strenuous efforts, war critics have not come up with well-substantiated cases of the administration saying something that it knew was not true or had no evidentiary basis for believing was true. Of course, there are many cases of the administration saying things that turned out to be not true. But moving the public from "you were lying" to "you were mistaken" would be significant progress. And moving it all the way to "you had understandable reasons for your policy" could be game-changing."

I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

[Ken White]

For Rank Amatuer:

Opinions are good, everyone should have at least one. Whether any you link address all the realities is immaterial, I suppose; long as they get a point or a few correct, there's always something to like...

For Tom Odom:

We can agree on the music quality -- and I've got a tin ear...

For Steve Metz (at last; I have an at least moderately substantive comment!):

"I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

I totally agree with you on both counts. I also acknowledge that in the case of Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) the argument was done exceedingly poorly if at all. Further, I'm trying to dredge up a memory of when the USA has ever really done that at all well? Can you think of any involving the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers?

My point is not to denigrate or challenge what you say, I do agree with you. It's just that my perception is that we do not do that very well. We certainly should, no question, however, indications lead me to believe it's sort of unlikely. Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

[SteveMetz]

For Rank Amatuer:

Opinions are good, everyone should have at least one. Whether any you link address all the realities is immaterial, I suppose; long as they get a point or a few correct, there's always something to like...

For Tom Odom:

We can agree on the music quality -- and I've got a tin ear...

For Steve Metz (at last; I have an at least moderately substantive comment!):



I totally agree with you on both counts. I also acknowledge that in the case of Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) the argument was done exceedingly poorly if at all. Further, I'm trying to dredge up a memory of when the USA has ever really done that at all well? Can you think of any involving the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers?

My point is not to denigrate or challenge what you say, I do agree with you. It's just that my perception is that we do not do that very well. We certainly should, no question, however, indications lead me to believe it's sort of unlikely. Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

I think in Bosnia, Panama, El Salvador, etc the expected costs and risks were weighed in the strategic decision.

[Rank amateur]

Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

War is a human endeavor. The more wars we lose, the more realistic we'll get about costs. The more we win, the more arrogant we'll become and we'll assume that the next war will be short and quick.

I think it's the same for everyone. Has they're ever been a dominant Army that didn't eventually over reach?

[Ken White]

El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels...

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

There oughta be a law...

[SteveMetz]

El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels...

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

There oughta be a law...

The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits. Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.

There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.

[Ken White]

The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits...

An alternative view is that the domestic political risk was excessive.

With the exception of the Civil War and arguably WW II, every war in which we have been involved has been a war of our choosing. With the exception of Greece and Korea, and thus Truman, every operation since WW II in which we have been involved was effectively driven by and hobbled by domestic politics. In every case, the party not in the WH objected vociferously to the war and poor mouthed it for its entire length. The Kennedys went to Viet Nam to prove their anti-communist bona fides (and to boost the economy) as well as for ultra idealistic reasons; Johnson followed along and expanded for the very same reasons -- minus the idealism...

And the Republicans were opposed.

Fast forward to Kosovo, the Republicans were again opposed and fought it tooth and nail just as todays opposition is fighting Iraq. I believe domestic concerns cut more ice with Clinton that did a cost benefit analysis. Bush 41 demurred on going to Baghdad in 1991 ostensibly on a cost benefit basis though I would argue that it would have been far easier then than it was in 2003. In the event, domestic political concerns had a part in that decision as well. And he still didn't get reelected...

But you know all that, sorry.

The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.

...Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.

Due to fear of WW III. Probably logical. I'm not as forgiving of the four previous administrations from both parties that tried to overlook fundamentalist Islamic export of terror attacks worldwide instead of forcefully nipping it in the bud -- starting with the Tehran Embassy seizure. In the case of the Islamists, it boiled down to not understanding the enemy and fear of WW III was not an issue. That and domestic politics.

In fairness to Clinton, at least, the capability to do some things that needed doing should have been available but did not exist. That's DoD's fault -- again under several Administrations. Yet again, domestic politics.

There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.

Nor was I actively engaged in the debate; and I partly agreed but partly disagreed with you and Zinni. Something needed to be done and I knew Afghanistan alone would not be enough. As I've often said, I wouldn't have done it the way it was done but it doesn't have to be my way to work. The biggest change I would have made would have been to wait until the second term while working harder on a coalition. My perception is that Bush, unsure he would get a second term at that point, decided to do something that he thought needed doing and that he feared a successor might not do. Domestic politics one more time...

That's pretty much why we have never done the assessment you and I and a good many others believe is needed. How to force that to occur is a knotty problem indeed. It will not happen just because it should.

[wm]

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

Ken,
Wishful thinking on your part I believe. (And hope is not a plan )

America going to war (and not just sending in a few troops a la Grenada or Panama as an exercise of testosterone release) is, IMHO, the national equivalent of a domestic "crime of passion." We knee jerk and send the troops off somewhere because we react very much as a husband would should he come home and found the missus in bed with another man--no rational thought involved, purely a visceral reaction.

The low level troop commitments have less emotional motivation, but it is still present to some degree(as the "testosterone release" phrasing in my description above indicates).

If you want strong, "take charge"national leadership, I suspect you have to accept the propensity for irrational responses to major provocations as well.

[Ken White]

Ken,
Wishful thinking on your part I believe. (And hope is not a plan )

America going to war (and not just sending in a few troops a la Grenada or Panama as an exercise of testosterone release) is, IMHO, the national equivalent of a domestic "crime of passion." We knee jerk and send the troops off somewhere because we react very much as a husband would should he come home and found the missus in bed with another man--no rational thought involved, purely a visceral reaction.

The low level troop commitments have less emotional motivation, but it is still present to some degree(as the "testosterone release" phrasing in my description above indicates).

If you want strong, "take charge"national leadership, I suspect you have to accept the propensity for irrational responses to major provocations as well.

...I said this:

""The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.""

My point in the last few posts on this thread was to (1) Agree with Steve that what he posits is what should be done. (2) Remind everyone that it has never really happened and is unlikely to. Much as we could all agree it should.

We just get to cobble stuff together and try to make it work out -- it's the American way...

[Presley Cannady]

I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

[SteveMetz]

Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

[Ken White]

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force...

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

[Rank amateur]

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

I'm going to agree with Ken:

ut Rumsfeld wasn't interested in waging that kind of war. He saw the war not so much as a fight about Iraq as a demonstration of a new style of warfare—known as "military transformation" or "the revolution in military affairs"—that signaled how America would project power in the post-Cold War era. He saw, not incorrectly, a turbulent world of emerging threats, some in remote areas inaccessible from U.S. bases. The large, lumbering armies of old were not so suitable for such conflicts. Hence his emphasis on small, lightweight units of ground forces—fast to mobilize, easy to sustain—and superaccurate bombs and missiles to hit targets that only heavy artillery could destroy in decades past. With the Iraq war (and the Afghanistan conflict before it), he wanted to send rogue regimes and other foes a message: Look what we can do with one hand tied behind our back. If we can overthrow Saddam (and the Taliban) so easily, we can overthrow you, too.

It is no surprise, then, that Rumsfeld rejected the argument, made by several Army and Marine generals, that whatever happens on the battlefield, we'll need a few hundred thousand troops to impose order and help form a new Iraq. A large, lengthy occupation would have nullified his whole concept of new-style warfare and its vision of 21st-century geopolitics.

Rummy et al had a solid strategic agreement: take out all state sponsors of terrorism - high benefit - using a "transformed" military: low cost.

When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.