Ken,

First of all, thanks for your extended replies. I'll respond to a few points:

First is control as in who "controls" the specific air asset. Take CAS for example. Typically in theater the CFLCC submits prioritized air support requests which the CFACC matches to available assets. For CAS this usually takes one of two forms - the CAS is either prededicated to a specific unit, mission or operation, or the CAS is on ground or airborne alert for anything that might prop up. For dedicated CAS the asset is, for all intents and purposes, controlled by the ground force commander. The aircraft looks at what the ground commander wants it to look at and engages when and where the ground commander wants it to engage. Alert CAS, by contrast, is available for contingencies. Once tasked, that asset is controlled by the ground element. And this isn't just for USAF aircraft, but every aircraft under CFACC authority including our coalition partners, the Navy and the Marines.

So I'm not sure where the issue of "control" is. How would A-10's with Army pilots, for example, be any different from A-10's with Air Force or Spanish or Marine pilots?

That doesn't address the fact that CAS is still not high up the priority list, is it?
What, exactly, would make CAS "high up on the priority list?" The USAF in particular has put a lot of effort into improving CAS including rapid development of new and smaller bombs, more precision/accuracy, much improved all-weather and night capabilty, the A-10 SLEP and capability upgrade and even modifying "strategic" aircraft like bombers into capable CAS aircraft. What more should the AF be doing WRT CAS? As of now, I think the AF is doing all the right things. The main problem in my view is that joint CAS doctrine is new and not yet fully implemented by either service and the two services don't do nearly enough training together pre-deployment, nor CAS training individually.

No intent to imply that the CFACC would be doing their own thing in the sense you state; simply pointing out that some 'strategic' missions are of little or no consequence (that is fact and as an Intel guy I'm sure you've seen dry holes in the quest for info) and if the assets are committed to them and some distance away from a ground action, then said assets are of little use to the GFC.
It sounds like you're arguing that tactical needs should always take priority over operational and strategic needs because strategic needs are of "little or no consequence." On what basis do you make the claim that strategic missions are so inconsequential?

You may assume the JFC has detailed ATO knowledge. I'd rather not.
The knowledge need not be detailed. The various missions are clearly spelled out and geographically annotated on a couple pages or a few powerpoint slides. Maps clearly show the what, where, when and why for each ATO cycle and are available to everyone. The CFLCC has a sizable liaison element within the CAOC as well.