IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[wm]

Hi Bill,
Thanks for bringing up some great points on what Ken rightly termed "an odd thread".

I'd agree. Vin diagrams (or any model) are limited in their ability to establishing proportionality - people have to do that based on assessment of the conditions. I think it (the proportionality of one over the other) could stay anywhere within those circles for a number of reasons. I now understand where GS was going when he voiced his concern about one evolving or devolving into another.

I think that is one of the reasons its critical to evaluate the conditions and look at the context in which the fighting is taking place.

Rob,
The real problem I see with using Venn diagrams in this analysis has to do with the fact that you do not get all the dimensionality you need. For example, you cannot use them to measure how intensely a given member of the IW group is committed to the cause. The Venn diagram is also, at best, only a momentary snapshot in time which cannot show the status of events which may, or may not, be in a stasis of time.

Here's a little explanation of this last. The American Revolution did not start with Lexington and Concord; there were "closet" rebels in place for quite some time before that happened. Things like the Connecticut Charter Oak Incident of 1687 and the 1773 Boston Tea Party, IMO, are examples. And the "conventional phase" of the Revolution may have been delayed much longer had the British not really preciptated actions at Bunker/Breed's Hill. I submit that a large portion of the campaigns around NYC (Battle of Long Island or the Battle of Stony Point for example) were much more examples of irregular than regular war (at least from the British point of view of how the battles played out)--even Trenton strikes me as a guerrilla raid, not a conventional pitched battle. 1st/2d Saratoga (Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights) and some of the later (1780s) battles in the Carolinas (Cowpens particularly) were more like 18th C. conventional war. Interestingly enough, I think conventional war came in the Revolution largely after the French ( a regular force) allied with the rebels (largely an irregular force despite von Steuben's hard work) .

Back to the main point--to do an adequate modeling of the interrelationships, I suspect we need something like at least 3 or 4 dimensional Cartesian coordinate axes--not only an X and a Y axis, but also a Z and a Z' axis too.

But, mathematical models are probably the wrong way to go entirely for explaining this very human activity called conflict.

[Rob Thornton]

Wayne,
I could not agree more! We can use straight text to discuss things, but that I think limits the discussion some. Using a diagram (of any type) sometimes offers content, but often no context. So I try and use both. I believe you are absolutely correct to say the human behavior can't be accurately modeled - its too complex, to inter-active and offers too many non-linear outputs - and that is on a fairly simple day.

That I think is why when we try and boil art into science, it often loses some of its flavor - doctrine (or any efforts to tame art in order to make it ubiquitous and digestible) should be thought of as descriptive vs. prescriptive. There is a reason why most FMs & JPs that while they will lift a quote from Clausewitz or Sun-Tzu, etc. will not default to whole chapters - there would be a tendency to keep going back and rereading it to determine its specific applicability, where because it tackles the complex subject of human interaction in war, it does not lend itself well to digestible chunks - its more of a revolving narrative - that does not fit our notion of useful doctrine well. So we seek a balance - we introduce and idea, lift a portion of a greater idea to emphasize it, then get on with the business of laying out the concept with in a ablanced manner that can be useful to the broader, targeted audience.

From a admin thread starter/moderator/facilitator point of view:

When I do throw in a diagram to go with a discussion, I'm generally using it to facilitate the conversation - to give participants a visual to debate and question, or as an object to build context around. Its the product of that discussion we should be most interested in, not really the base idea. Most of our threads start in one place and evolve - sometimes they come back to the original idea, sometimes they take on new, and more useful meaning and direction. In my view that is how we leverage the broader CoP we are fortunate enough to have resident here in our virtual SWC.

I try never to get wedded to an original idea or thread topic, because I often find the direction it takes offers more benefit then the one it started with. However, the arguments presented here often require us to go back and consider alternative perspectives, reframe our arguments, clarify our language, etc. this can make for a better argument, a better communicator, a more informed CoP – or all.


Best, Rob

[Surferbeetle]

All,

IMO it is beneficial to regularly discuss and examine terminology and concepts if for no other reason than it furthers the education of those involved. I note that Clausewitz was said to have characterized Jomini as 'narrow, simplistic, and superficial' yet I have learned a thing of two from both of them despite (or because of) their different styles and focuses. Liddell Hart has some interesting points as well on this subject of conventional/regular warfare (steady G.S., steady) and irregular/civil/religious warfare that all of us here study and participate in to one extent or another.

With regard to mathematics and associated models, I must respectfully dissent as to some previously made statements about their applicability to the study of warfare. There are things that cannot be adequately described without the use of mathematics and at a certain point mathematical models are simply the most accurate and appropriate way to describe things....the problem, I find, is often found in the initial assumptions made and then later in attempting to translate back and forth between the world of deeds, words, and math. Operations research is an interesting discipline which militaries seem to devote resources to.

This is not to say that such models are a cure-all and the only way to 'truth'. For those of you interested in a non-mathematical book on quantitative financial models and their limitations I just finished off Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (ISBN 978-0-8129-7521-5) and found it to be a fun and fast read and a reminder about the limits of what we think that we know.

So back to definitions. I would like to solicit opinion as to whether the following (Bloomberg on the US Economy and its current potential for crisis given the actions of the Federal Reserve with regards to Bear Stearns) link describes the effects/responses of/to irregular/economic warfare or is this just a self inflicted wound?