IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[Global Scout]

This particular thread amused and disappointed me, and I don't want you to pardon my rant, if the shoe fits, then it yours to wear. Based on some of the comments, you should be wearing it proudly.

I'll only point out one my name, since he has a habit of frequently calling those who disagree with him stupid throughout the council. It would be nice to see some credential beyond studies military history if you're going to call those who do this for a living stupid. I really don't mind it when the shoe fits, as my wife calls me stupid at least once a week, so the term is no longer overly offensive. On with the rant,

William Owen thinks he has an accurate grasp of history; therefore, he apparently "thinks" he has the credentials to call anyone who doesn't agree with his dumbed down version of "war is war" explanation.

Others who have been brain washed by simplistic concepts at CGSC seem to have lost the ability to think critically and challenge their own ideas.

I think I just read that irregular warfare will morph into conventional warfare? This was outdated thinking when Special Forces doctrine first developed the seven phases of unconventional warfare. The seven phases continue to be interpreted as some sort of doctrinal history, but it completely fails to identify how to utilize irregular forces effectively, instead it focuses on developing a large guerrilla force into 5th column to support conventional maneuver forces with their "decisive' battle. It is clear the communists (both the Maoists and Leninists and those inbetween) had a much clearer grasp on to achieve victory utilizing full spectrum unconventional warfare that had little to do with conventional warfare. They focused on the populace and established control over them (making the government irrelevant in those areas) through infiltration, subversion, conversion (mobilization), select terrorist and other psychological means to gradually bring the government to a culminating point.

You can't defeat this type of strategy with a conventional warfare strategy, because the enemy is effectively blended into the masses. Unless you're fighting a fool you will largely be punching into the air when you attack with overwhelming force. So you kill 20 here, and 20 there, or on a good day maybe a few hundred. If the insurgents still hold sway over the populace you still have gained no additional legitimacy for the government, and you simply further eroded your nation's will to continue on with the fight.

I misspoke when I said you couldn't win with a conventional strategy, because that is not the whole story. If you simply declare the populace as a whole hostile and declare war on them, you can engage in operations that border genocide or at least forcably dislocate whole population groups from an area, then you win with conventional tactics. Needless to say American Soldiers wouldn't do that even if the ROE permitted such a strategy, so we're back to square one where you can't win with conventional tactics.

The opposite of irregular warfare in our lexicon is not regular warfare it is conventional warfare, and I explained that in my previous post. If you want to develop your own terms that is fine, but unless you define them they don't have any meaning. What the hell is regular warfare?

It would seem to be that the correct definition of stupid would be repeating the same behavior after it has demonstratedly failed. At least it has clearly failed for those who are capable are perceiving the world as it instead of the way they desire it to be.

Fortunately we have some great officers in our ranks in the Army, and I guess a few in the Marine Corp who clearly understand that IW is very much different than conventional warfare. Yes it is still warfare, but that is like stating farming is farming, but I think an argument may be able to be made that growing corn and growing rice are just a wee bit different? Maybe not, maybe farming is just farming. However, we tried the conventional warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan (after phase III where conventional warfare tactics were needed and appropriate), and for some reason our "drive by" COIN operations didn't facilitate anything resembling success. After several months/years of failing to make any headway with missions simply focused on finding and killing insurgents (of course everyone is a high value target today, it is the new version of the Vietnam body count) some officers were "finally" able to move into position who effectively learned the lessons of the past, and then adapted those lessons appropriately to the realities of today. These officers focused on controlling and securing the populace, which greatly reduced or denied insurgent influence on these protected souls. The military effectively created a window of opportunity for a political victory. The military can't win this alone, the political leaders have to skillfully and courgeously exploit temporary military successes, if that doesn't happen (or won't happen), then we are pee'ing in the wind, and we all know it. However, that is the only effective strategy and it is not conventional warfare. That doesn't mean conventional forces don't do it, it is a matter of who does it, but rather what they do.

My rant deals with my frustration of our failure to consistently fail to apply the lessons of history when we go to war. Why do we have to relearn the basics each time? This is a failure of our officer corp, not just our politicians. Politicians are elected, they may or may not be wise, but our officers are developed over a period of years through experience and education, and yet that professional development system seems to be failing our nation.

Now that we live in an information age unlike any other in our past, though I'm sure Clausewitz somehow addressed this also according to some of you, the key take away is that public perceptions are shaped by multiple media venues and speakers, and failures we could have overcome in the past with time, we cannot overcome now, because we deal with a better informed (probably not the right choice of words) and less patient public. Our mistakes erode public will quicker than they have in the past. They can see when we're making progress and when we're not (what they see is reality to them, so there is no use arguing they don't get it). If we're not they wonder why we're wasting precious resources on a fight we're not going to win. The insurgent can survive forever if we use conventional warfare tactics, we can't. Adapting a proper irregular warfare strategy where we live in the streets face to face with our invisible foe is tougher, more demanding, and more dangerous (unless you're fighting a peer competitor in conventional warfare) than drive by COIN, but at least there is some benefit in the cost:benefits ratio when we lose our brothers. I'm not sure that is the case when we lose them to IEDs when we're simply driving by, our massing forces to hit some mystical center of gravity.

Failure to understand the difference the between IW and conventional warfare in my mind borders on incompetence and treason if you're a professional officer. Many get it, and don't realize they get it, because they don't understand the differences. That doesn't bother me so much, as the definitions are broad and sufficient gray areas for broad interpretation. However, not getting it bothers me, because next up in the arena is our kids, and I know that is the case for many of you already. We have every right to demand the best from our leaders.

[William F. Owen]

I'll only point out one my name, since he has a habit of frequently calling those who disagree with him stupid throughout the council. It would be nice to see some credential beyond studies military history if you're going to call those who do this for a living stupid. I really don't mind it when the shoe fits, as my wife calls me stupid at least once a week, so the term is no longer overly offensive. On with the rant,

William Owen thinks he has an accurate grasp of history; therefore, he apparently "thinks" he has the credentials to call anyone who doesn't agree with his dumbed down version of "war is war" explanation.

Global Scout,

a.) I am not aware of ever having called anyone on this board stupid. If I had, I would be rightly banned. If you think my behaviour (rather than my argument) is unacceptable, then I suggest you report that behaviour. Yes, I strongly disagree with some of views posted here, but I do not post here because I assume it is a comfort zone for "bumper sticker group think" ideas.

b.) I am here to learn. That I seek to do so, by asking provocative and even uncomfortable questions, I assumed would be welcome. If not, please explain. I don't have a problem telling a 2 or even 3 star General he is wrong, or a highly respected academic. It also goes that I am happy to post in an open forum and have my arguments ripped to shreds by those more knowledgeable than I am - of which there are many.

c.) I am not aware of any reason, why I should present my credentials. My ability to think and argue in this domain has nothing to with my published articles in peer reviewed military journals, my time spent in the British Army, or my extensive correspondence with those currently involved with military thought, speaking at the RUIS and other military thought forums or having a full time job that requires to me write and talk about current military issues. As I understand your beef is with my understanding of military history, I am not sure why being a graduate of the LRRP School, or Support Weapons Wing would be relevant.

d.) I am not, and never have promoted a "dumbed down" version of "War is War" - nor have I ever called anyone stupid. I passionately believe that modern (and post modern) military thought has left us with a poison chalice that continues to misguide and mislead current military practitioners.

My rant deals with my frustration of our failure to consistently fail to apply the lessons of history when we go to war. Why do we have to relearn the basics each time? This is a failure of our officer corp, not just our politicians. Politicians are elected, they may or may not be wise, but our officers are developed over a period of years through experience and education, and yet that professional development system seems to be failing our nation.

So do my "rants". Well this is exactly what I feel, and I feel it is important enough to state my view plainly and as powerfully as I can. I believe I do so in a respectful, polite and humorous when appropriate fashion.

[William F. Owen]

The problem is that military thought (as I have said many times before) is discussed as though spoken by Avril Levene, by randomly using nonsensical, definition free words, phrases and aphorisms like, 4GW, OOTW, Asymmetric (which is really stupid) and now Hybrid Wars.

Rant complete. Guns to rest. Secure from action stations. Systems to stand-by. Listening out.

Cognoscente of Global Scouts assertion that I call people stupid, I feel it only right that I draw attention to my actual use of that word.

Based on the quote above, I did say, and also implied that the use of phrases and ideas such as 4GW, OOTW, Asymmetric and Hybrid Wars, was stupid.

Let me clarify and apologise (if required). I do NOT consider anyone here stupid. I do consider the use of such phrases and ideas as "Not Useful" and that they may even harm understanding. (and I submit that 4GW has done harm) - but the use of language is critical in military thought, and I sometime use it as stupidly as everyone else.

I understand that Frank Hoffman coined "Hybrid Wars" and Frank is a good friend, whom I very much respect, so I would never call him stupid - but I don't agree with him on many things. The use of this terminology is one.

[Rob Thornton]

Gents,
Does not matter to me how it got started - it does neither the topic, nor the SWC any good to stray off topic and get personal. I don't usually intervene as a mod, but since I kicked off the thread, I will this time. Stick to the topic and your arguments as to why you think what you think. Your both assets to the SWC, and have made some great posts in the past. For the most part we police ourselves here, please demonstrate the professional maturity to do so as well. Its not bad right now, just be a pro and drop the personal side of it - lots of opinions here and diversity and open discourse is our strength - if new members see a pattern of behavior that sets the wrong standard for them, and then we have to police them as well.
Rob

[Rob Thornton]

GS,
Its worth talking about - I'm not sure if the comment was raised off my post, but it should be brought up:

I think I just read that irregular warfare will morph into conventional warfare?

I think its a question of the political objective of the various combatants, what means they have access to over time, and how conditions change. So I'd agree with "can" or "may", but I'd not commit to "will", that leads to deterministic thinking and can get you into trouble when making decisions e.g. you look for what you think you should see vs. evaluating what you do see.

Time is a funny thing, and different cultures have different takes on it. For some 400 yrs ago is like last week, for others yesterday is like last week. Some see a struggle as lasting generations and anticipate a time when things will return to as they believe it once was and by Law, should be. I think AQ senior leadership (and the truly committed) share a sort of quasi belief that although they themselves would like to preside over a greater caliphate, they can content themselves with moving that goal forward a yard at a time if need be - the commitment to struggle is a large part of how they define themselves, and thy believe that as long as they do so, they will eventually prevail as God has promised. T

Having said that, I think we must consider that there is both an IW component to their strategy and the desire to obtain regular means by which to preserve their eventual gains and move into legitimacy - no matter if that be infesting a destabilized state and then rebuilding from the inside out, or if that means co-opting or allying themselves with some govt. that shares their interpretation and goals. For my part I think AQ (and like organizations) must retain an IW capability as long as it benefits them to do so. This could mean retaining an advantage against its enemies, or to shape conditions for future military actions.

Best, Rob

[Bill Moore]

You (or your enemy) may begin by waging IW as your campaign because its all you can manage, or you might include it as part of a broader campaign if you can, or if called for - meaning you have the resources and believe that regular warfare by itself will not accomplish the objective, or will not accomplish it in the time or manner you desire. Additionally - along the lines of Mao - you might envision phases to your campaign that begin on the IW side using guerrilla tactics, but eventually take you to the regular side -

Rob, I don't disagree, but I think the above statement is misleading and "big Army" centric. Pardon us SF guys, but we get a little agitated when folks try to evolve IW into conventional warfare (CW for this post). Throughout history there are examples where insurgents massed into larger elements in engaged in set piece battles, but that is not always required or desired. When insurgents present themselves as cannon fodder, we generally have what "seems" like a good news story on the 6 o'clock news, where coalition forces killed 70 or more insurgents.

Please consider for a few moments the following:

The insurgents knew they were going to get their butts handed to them, but they attacked anyway.
The insurgents, despite our claims to the contrary, are not stupid.
What the heck did they do this for?
Where are they getting the volunteers?

I would offer that this is part of the overall theater affect to create perceptions with select audiences. One, we're still in the fight. Two, we're brave (where are you). Three, America how can you win against warriors like this? Four, this is the overt war that everyone sees, but you don't see what I'm doing behind the scenes gradually re-establishing control over the populace by infiltrating their ranks and threatening or killing those who don't cooperate with me. I would argue that the major insurgent attacks are a secondary effort, while their primary effort subversion largely remains unchallenged.

The bottom line is that an insurgency can survive for ever without evolving into conventional warfare. Sometimes all they want is the ability to control a certain area or certain ethnic group, and the cost for the government to reestablish control is too high, so they acquiese. More thoughts on this later, again I agree that many insurgent groups like the FARC, LTTE, have developed impressive conventional force like capabilities, but other groups have survived simply using irregular strategy.

If you consider that there is an existing criminal element in every society that the irregular force can advantage them self to, or may have to contest with, or that can be seen as another complex actor

-

Yes and no, it might be more accurate to state that many insurgent groups morph into criminal organizations like the FARC, MS13, the Taliban, Burmese drug lords, Khmer Rouge, etc. They start a life of crime to sustain their organization, then the business model tends to trump their ideological cause and now you have a very dangerous organized criminal group. The thesis on 3d generation gangs was superb and I agree it needs more study, but I'm not sure it is a separate bubble.

Stability Ops in the IW bucket vs. acknowledging that it cuts across the full spectrum and must be considered and planned as such would constrain our thinking and lead to bad DOTMLPF outputs.

When I read FM 3-0 I thought it did list stability operations as part of conventional warfare, not just a component of IW? There were three major types of operations: offense, defense, and stability, but the percentage of the force/effort dedicated to a particular operation would vary depending on a number of factors and where you were on the continuum. I think stability operations is now a phase in the joint pub after achieving dominance? It also realizes that the battlespace is not contiguous, so like the three block war (at a much larger level) it anticipates doing all operations simultaneously. Not sure that makes teh DOTMLPF outputs any easier though.

[Ken White]

with life and war today and wish -- quite wrongly, IMO -- to return to the 1988 version of the Army...

...I think stability operations is now a phase in the joint pub after achieving dominance? It also realizes that the battlespace is not contiguous, so like the three block war (at a much larger level) it anticipates doing all operations simultaneously. Not sure that makes teh DOTMLPF outputs any easier though.

It makes them a lot more difficult -- and makes training more difficult -- and expensive. That means fewer toys...

It means more work...

It means changing the way one thinks...

Thank you and GS for adding some good and thoughtful comments to an odd thread.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Bill,
Thanks for bringing up some great points on what Ken rightly termed "an odd thread".

The bottom line is that an insurgency can survive for ever without evolving into conventional warfare. Sometimes all they want is the ability to control a certain area or certain ethnic group, and the cost for the government to reestablish control is too high, so they acquiesce.

I'd agree. Vin diagrams (or any model) are limited in their ability to establishing proportionality - people have to do that based on assessment of the conditions. I think it (the proportionality of one over the other) could stay anywhere within those circles for a number of reasons. I now understand where GS was going when he voiced his concern about one evolving or devolving into another.

I think that is one of the reasons its critical to evaluate the conditions and look at the context in which the fighting is taking place.

They start a life of crime to sustain their organization, then the business model tends to trump their ideological cause and now you have a very dangerous organized criminal group. The thesis on 3d generation gangs was superb and I agree it needs more study, but I'm not sure it is a separate bubble.

I'd agree - I'm not sure it does either, but then again I'm not convinced it doesn't - from what I've seen within the same AO you can have some groups that remain pure, some groups that dabble in the criminal end, and some that are purely criminal - this makes for a very messy center- particularly for us when we're trying to sort out responsibility and causality so we can allocate the right efforts and resources - no easy answers there. You could reserve the space for anything that represents a third part (outside of the populace) that wiled influence and adds complexity - if its useful in working through framing.

When I read FM 3-0 I thought it did list stability operations as part of conventional warfare, not just a component of IW? There were three major types of operations: offense, defense, and stability, but the percentage of the force/effort dedicated to a particular operation would vary depending on a number of factors and where you were on the continuum. I think stability operations is now a phase in the joint pub after achieving dominance? It also realizes that the battlespace is not contiguous, so like the three block war (at a much larger level) it anticipates doing all operations simultaneously. Not sure that makes teh DOTMLPF outputs any easier though.

I think that is where Army may differ from others- Army sees SO as broader then IW - as being something you may be called to do regardless of the type of warfare (or the dominance of one over the other) being conducted. However, if you take the tack that there will always be some form of IW being conducted then you might fit SO within IW. Allot I think depends on what lens you look through - that is why I think a linear or phased perspective is more constraining then a perspective that should lead you to considering the conditions at hand and trying to work out what is actually going on. Diagrams are only useful in getting you the first look or maybe to help initially frame the conditions, after that its grey matter. As Ken pointed out - almost any diagram can be used to justify a position for various reasons.

As Ken noted its an odd thread, but its representative of the type of discussion that are being worked through as the IA comes to a "more" common understanding of security challenges and how to address them.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

sense that it somehow got politicized (military and other) or off track in several directions on occasion. The basic premise was a good and fair question and there are some good comments. I contributed mightily to oddness by getting in off thread jabber answering Rank Amateur's ad copy political interjections, a failing of mine I should resist but alas, cannot...

After re-reading the whole thread, I get back to two things I said earlier:

"No statement pertaining to warfare is ever completely accurate. War is too chaotic to codify and define precisely. We can have fun trying but we will not succeed."

"Irregular Warfare (and / or other types of warfare) and Stability Operations may be simultaneously conducted. Or they may not be. Or there may be a time phased melding. I believe that METT-TC applies in that determination..."

[wm]

Hi Bill,
Thanks for bringing up some great points on what Ken rightly termed "an odd thread".

I'd agree. Vin diagrams (or any model) are limited in their ability to establishing proportionality - people have to do that based on assessment of the conditions. I think it (the proportionality of one over the other) could stay anywhere within those circles for a number of reasons. I now understand where GS was going when he voiced his concern about one evolving or devolving into another.

I think that is one of the reasons its critical to evaluate the conditions and look at the context in which the fighting is taking place.

Rob,
The real problem I see with using Venn diagrams in this analysis has to do with the fact that you do not get all the dimensionality you need. For example, you cannot use them to measure how intensely a given member of the IW group is committed to the cause. The Venn diagram is also, at best, only a momentary snapshot in time which cannot show the status of events which may, or may not, be in a stasis of time.

Here's a little explanation of this last. The American Revolution did not start with Lexington and Concord; there were "closet" rebels in place for quite some time before that happened. Things like the Connecticut Charter Oak Incident of 1687 and the 1773 Boston Tea Party, IMO, are examples. And the "conventional phase" of the Revolution may have been delayed much longer had the British not really preciptated actions at Bunker/Breed's Hill. I submit that a large portion of the campaigns around NYC (Battle of Long Island or the Battle of Stony Point for example) were much more examples of irregular than regular war (at least from the British point of view of how the battles played out)--even Trenton strikes me as a guerrilla raid, not a conventional pitched battle. 1st/2d Saratoga (Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights) and some of the later (1780s) battles in the Carolinas (Cowpens particularly) were more like 18th C. conventional war. Interestingly enough, I think conventional war came in the Revolution largely after the French ( a regular force) allied with the rebels (largely an irregular force despite von Steuben's hard work) .

Back to the main point--to do an adequate modeling of the interrelationships, I suspect we need something like at least 3 or 4 dimensional Cartesian coordinate axes--not only an X and a Y axis, but also a Z and a Z' axis too.

But, mathematical models are probably the wrong way to go entirely for explaining this very human activity called conflict.

[Rob Thornton]

Wayne,
I could not agree more! We can use straight text to discuss things, but that I think limits the discussion some. Using a diagram (of any type) sometimes offers content, but often no context. So I try and use both. I believe you are absolutely correct to say the human behavior can't be accurately modeled - its too complex, to inter-active and offers too many non-linear outputs - and that is on a fairly simple day.

That I think is why when we try and boil art into science, it often loses some of its flavor - doctrine (or any efforts to tame art in order to make it ubiquitous and digestible) should be thought of as descriptive vs. prescriptive. There is a reason why most FMs & JPs that while they will lift a quote from Clausewitz or Sun-Tzu, etc. will not default to whole chapters - there would be a tendency to keep going back and rereading it to determine its specific applicability, where because it tackles the complex subject of human interaction in war, it does not lend itself well to digestible chunks - its more of a revolving narrative - that does not fit our notion of useful doctrine well. So we seek a balance - we introduce and idea, lift a portion of a greater idea to emphasize it, then get on with the business of laying out the concept with in a ablanced manner that can be useful to the broader, targeted audience.

From a admin thread starter/moderator/facilitator point of view:

When I do throw in a diagram to go with a discussion, I'm generally using it to facilitate the conversation - to give participants a visual to debate and question, or as an object to build context around. Its the product of that discussion we should be most interested in, not really the base idea. Most of our threads start in one place and evolve - sometimes they come back to the original idea, sometimes they take on new, and more useful meaning and direction. In my view that is how we leverage the broader CoP we are fortunate enough to have resident here in our virtual SWC.

I try never to get wedded to an original idea or thread topic, because I often find the direction it takes offers more benefit then the one it started with. However, the arguments presented here often require us to go back and consider alternative perspectives, reframe our arguments, clarify our language, etc. this can make for a better argument, a better communicator, a more informed CoP – or all.


Best, Rob

[Surferbeetle]

All,

IMO it is beneficial to regularly discuss and examine terminology and concepts if for no other reason than it furthers the education of those involved. I note that Clausewitz was said to have characterized Jomini as 'narrow, simplistic, and superficial' yet I have learned a thing of two from both of them despite (or because of) their different styles and focuses. Liddell Hart has some interesting points as well on this subject of conventional/regular warfare (steady G.S., steady) and irregular/civil/religious warfare that all of us here study and participate in to one extent or another.

With regard to mathematics and associated models, I must respectfully dissent as to some previously made statements about their applicability to the study of warfare. There are things that cannot be adequately described without the use of mathematics and at a certain point mathematical models are simply the most accurate and appropriate way to describe things....the problem, I find, is often found in the initial assumptions made and then later in attempting to translate back and forth between the world of deeds, words, and math. Operations research is an interesting discipline which militaries seem to devote resources to.

This is not to say that such models are a cure-all and the only way to 'truth'. For those of you interested in a non-mathematical book on quantitative financial models and their limitations I just finished off Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (ISBN 978-0-8129-7521-5) and found it to be a fun and fast read and a reminder about the limits of what we think that we know.

So back to definitions. I would like to solicit opinion as to whether the following (Bloomberg on the US Economy and its current potential for crisis given the actions of the Federal Reserve with regards to Bear Stearns) link describes the effects/responses of/to irregular/economic warfare or is this just a self inflicted wound?