Well, my perspective was far more from a strategic level than tactical, anyway. I am well aware of the enormous differences in the details of the actual operations - although I would contend that both also are examples of the HN forces' raison d'etre; more conventional combat in the case of the ARVN and urban combat/anti-militia COIN for the IA.

My comparison is solely based on the strategic impact of a HN visibly and unquestionably taking the lead in a major combat operation with only limited American support. Both the ARVN and the IA are sticking their necks out farther than they did in previous operations. Thanks for, as usual, helping to clarify what I'm trying to say.

However, on this

impact on US domestic support will have little real effect on much of anything; and the legitimacy of the Maliki government is determined by how it got in power, not by events that occur after it is in power -- though such events can affect its durability and / or survivability, different things.
we continue to disagree.

First, I think that while it's easy to dismiss US domestic opinion - fickle and unreliable though it may be - it is a mistake to do so. The resurgence of support for the war in the wake of this idea that the surge "turned the corner in Iraq" (not stated by General P or Sec. Gates but constantly repeated by the right-wing parts of the media) will likely be hit hard if the perception is that the IA fails in Basra. Obviously a lot of that depends on other factors, including the al-Sadr, the cease-fire, etc., etc., But if support begins falling again, the pressure on the next president, particularly if it is a Democrat, will be enormous to begin drawing down immediately and without regard to the situation on the ground. As a result, as always, we still are playing for the crowd at home, and it's risky to discount the importance of public support. We remain, after all, a democracy. At what point does consistent public opposition to a war take precedence over the government's prosecution of that effort as the elected decision makers in our country? I don't know the answer to that. But regardless, a return to consistent majority opposition to the war could not be anything but detrimental.

Secondly, legitimacy, both in foreign eyes and in Iraqi eyes, is very much determined by the actions of the president once he takes office. There's no historical political structure that confers accepted legitimacy onto the winner of an election like in a well-established democratic state. When large segments of a country oppose the government with armed force, clearly there's a lot to be desired in terms of governmental legitimacy. The Shi'ite militias, across the spectrum (not just the JAM, but primarily) are not just a threat to the "survivability" of the Maliki government. Their participation in the political process, regardless of the leader, gives legitimacy to the system. Without it, just like without the participation of the Sunni tribes, the head of government is not viewed as a legitimate national leader.

So it's not just for the survival of Maliki, but for the strength and stability of the democratic system in Iraq. That's the legitimacy question.

Regards,

Matt