Quote Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt View Post
I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?
Hello KiwiGrunt,

I have to admit that, yes, the idea of a 20-man Section (with 3x6-man Squads) originally came from Senator and former US SECNAV James Webb, although he envisioned only a single man in the HQ; Tom Odom's (et al's.) article suggested 2 men in the HQ, with the Commander free to fight the Section and his 2i/c handling the comms and admin (great idea). I think that the 2-Section Platoon does that, restoring Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, yet remaining flexible enough to adapt and reorganize as necessary to meet the situation at hand, under conditions of some adversity. I also took one of Wilf's Platoon proposals (the 20-man version) to broadly, if not exactly, reinforce the notion (he would broadly disagree on this point, though).

The purpose of the threads on this board have not been to find some "one-size fits all" ideal Squad/Section/Platoon/Company organization, but the organization best suited to adapting to the tactical situation as it changes - METT-T and all that. In other words, we are looking for the "best" basis for change. The Platoon organization that you propose is perhaps the "best" in this regard that I have seen so far. The Canadian Infantry Pam begins with this quote:


"The platoon is, for all purposes, the unit for whose perfection we strive. Because, a perfect platoon means a perfect battalion and brigade or division: and the efficiency of any army corps is to be measured by that of its platoons."
MGen Sir John Monash, from Chapter 1, B-GL-309-003/FT-001, Infantry, Volume 3, The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle, 1996.

Now, I grew up on the old 1982 Infantry Pam, which differed in some ways (some substantially, in some ways better, in some ways worse) than the 1996 Infantry Pam, but as we can see from Wigram's work, never mind more recent work like Wilf's, that much the same old problems persist, and for many of the usual reasons.

What most strikes me about your proposed Platoon composition, KiwiGrunt, is its 2-Section organization. As the Section you propose has its own 2-man HQ and 3x6-man Squads, it is fully capable of independent missions by itself, or semi-independent tasks during a Platoon mission. As it is a mini-Platoon in effect, with its own full HQ and its own Reserve (whether for Fire Support or for Manoeuvre), it can perform F&M by itself if it has to. Operating as part of the Platoon, the Section can bring to bear a substantial portion of the firepower of a Platoon during a Fire-Fight, and either continue to suppress during the Assault, or handle the Assault all by itself while the other Section and the Platoon Mortar continue to suppress. It also makes the Consolidation a little more secure and easier, as the Assaulting Section possesses considerable firepower and fighting power by itself, while the Covering Section moves up to join it.

There is another advantage to it, its ability to operate dispersed over a relatively wide area in small patrols. That was what struck me most about the German Infantry Group, how it operated not so much as an open-order field formation during the approach, but more so as a Patrol, moving from fire position to fire position using all available cover, and only when in the heat of battle would it rely upon suppression by fire in the absence of any available cover ("Effect over Cover"). Even in the Fire-Fight, normally the German Group would fight with only the Group Commander and his Machine Gun Troop of 3 or 4 men, while the Group 2i/c and the bulk of the Group remained under cover, unless circumstances forced it to be otherwise. Wigram and Wilf have each further developed this, and what you propose KiwiGrunt, potentially takes it a little further.

As each of the 6-man Squads can easily form its own self-contained Patrol, or break down into a pair of 3-man Patrols for reducing sign to the utter minimum possible whilst achieving the greatest practical coverage and dispersion. The 2-Section organization of the Platoon makes coordination much easier; 6x6-man Patrols could get complicated for a Platoon HQ to coordinate, and a dozen 3-man Patrols would be positively nightmarish. As is, a 6-man Patrol is really the largest you can use without sign and control likely becoming a significant problem. 3- or 4-man Patrols, as you know, leave the least trace of their presence, and are the easiest to control. As each Section would coordinate half of the Patrols, the Platoon HQ could concentrate on coordinating the two Sections as a whole with the Platoon Mortar Squad. Tighter control of the Patrols by the Sections could make it easier and faster to coordinate the Squads/Patrols, and especially to mass them for attack or quickly disperse afterwards as necessary; the Platoon may find it rather harder to do so with so many Patrols. I do notice a vaguely passing resemblance to the Patrols Company in a Parachute Battalion here.

As is, KiwiGrunt, your proposed Platoon organization may afford the advantages of both Wigram's and Wilf's ideas, not least by disposing of the almost mechanical formations and drills that Infantry presently are indoctrinated in, and moreover to restore Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, where it is best handled (usually). And I am very much in agreement with your ideas on Suppression, the 7.62mm round, and the 6.5 mm Grendel as a possible "best" cartridge at Squad level.

Excellent work.